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JIM CIEN**
Bakke is banal, and the affirmative action debate is dishonest. Two
decades of doctrinal deadlock have shed little or not light on "diversity, " the
only viable justfication for race-conscious university admissions. We can break
the logjam by entertaining a series of elaborate legal analogies. The law seeks
to protect diversity in many domains, including politics, free expression,
agriculture, and the environment. The diversity at stake in race-based
educational affirmative action seems minimal when compared with other sorts
of diversity, especially the precarious biological diversity shielded by the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. Extinction is forever; affirmative action
should not be. Bakke has failed on its own terms, and its eclipse in California
and Texas offers American higher education an opportunity to experiment with
innovative alternatives.
I. THE UNBEARABLE BANALITY OF BAKKE
[1]t will become a solid mass, permanently protuberant, its inanity irreparable
-Milan Kundera1
A. Perpetual Czech
Bakke2 is banal. Two decades after the Supreme Court decided its lone case
on the subject, the debate over educational affirmative action has exhausted all
available arguments. For this state of affairs, the judiciary bears no blame.
"[Tjhe Supreme Court has said a lot about contracting and rather little about
* Cf. (loosely) CAROL GIUGAN, IN A DIFEE VoicF: PsYcHoL( oIcAL THEORY AD
WoMN's DEvELOPMENT (1982).
** Associate Professor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of
Minnesota Law School <chenxO64@maroon.tc.umn.edu>. B.A. and M.A., Emory
University; J.D., Harvard University. Daniel J. Gifford, Daniel A. Farber, David McGowan,
and Miranda McGowan gave helpful comments and suggestions. Tracey A. Holmes provided
capable research assistance.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium, Twenty Years After Bakke:
The Law and Social Science of Afflirmative Action in Higher Education, The Ohio State
University College of Law, April 3-4, 1998.
1 MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGmNFss op BEiNG 4 (Michael Henry Heim
trans., 1984).
2 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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education."' 3 In its lone case on affirmative action in schoolteacher hiring, the
Court burned a rare grant of certiorari merely to crush a fatuous "role model"
theory.4 Other affirmative action blockbusters have evaporated from the
Court's calendar.5
Never fear. Hordes of legal commentators have invaded the niche left
vacant by the Justices. Volume, however, should not be confused with quality.
Daniel Farber's two-paragraph survey of American scholarship on affirmative
action remains as comprehensive today as it was in 1994.6
If only Herman Schwartz had correctly predicted in 1987 that it really was
all over but the shouting. 7 Alas, we are "doomed to hear" the opposing
arguments "repeatedly in the future." 8 "Against boredom even gods struggle in
vain." 9 "Damn!! Damn!! Damn!! Damn!!" 10
3 Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745,
1746 (1996); see also Wessmann v. Boston Sed. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 130 (D. Mass.
1998) (distinguishing between "regulations awarding... construction contracts" on one hand
and "the authority of a school committee to make student assignments on the combined
criteria of academic achievement and racial/ethnic sensitivity" on the other hand).
4 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
5 See Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Taxnan, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997), vacating as moot 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996); Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, denying cert. to 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318-20 (1974), vacating as moot 507
P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973).
6 See Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
147, 159 (1994). To wit, the pro-affirmative action argument:
Color-blindness sounds good in theory but ignores social reality. Given a history
going back to slavery, and the prevalence, even today, of conscious and unconscious
discrimination, affirmative action is a necessity. It also ensures that the fll diversity of
viewpoints in our multicultural society is represented.
Id. (emphasis omitted). And herewith the argument against:
Whether you call them affirmative action or reverse discrimination, racial
preferences are wrong. They are morally wrong whichever group is favored. They are
also dangerous, because they reinforce the legitimacy of racial thinking and racial
stereotypes. Race is simply an irrelevant personal characteristic.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
7 See Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but
the Shouting, 86 MICII. L. REV. 524 (1987).
8 Farber, supra note 6, at 160.
9 FRmDmcH NmlzscHiE, The Antichrist § 48, in TWIuGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE
AN'IcHRIsT 113, 164 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968) (1895).
10 ALAN JAY LERNER, MY FAIR LADY, act 2, sc. 2 (1956); cf Jim Chen, Diversity and
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Well, then. Affirmative action. There may not be a more overwritten
subject in American law.11 After two decades of repetitive scholarship, there
should be no more surprises-except perhaps the bottomless capacity of the
legal academy not to tire of the subject. Surely we can agree on this much:
1. Bakke lives. In 1996 a renegade Fifth Circuit panel disagreed,12 but so
what? The Supreme Court alone enjoys "the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions," 13 and so far it has not hammered Bakke. 14 Predictions that the
Court would eventually do so remain just that-educated guessesj 5
2. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,16 though largely abrogated, did
recognize diversity in broadcast television and radio as at least an "important"
governmental interest for equal protection purposes 7
3. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena18 applied strict scrutiny to all racial
Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1839-45, 1900-10 (1996) (examining affirmative
action through a damnation metaphor).
I That quickest and dirtiest of empirical surveys of legal literature, the Westlaw search,
revealed that as of July 11, 1998, the JLR library in the West Group's electronic database
included 462 articles containing "affirmative action" in their titles. By contrast, 586 articles
contained the word "federalism." Neither search is especially scientific, but there is no small
significance in the suggestion that there are four-fifths as many articles on affirmative action
as there are articles on the oldest and arguably most important question in American
constitutional law. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993).
12 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1933
(1996).
13 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989);
accord American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion);
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane).
14 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 257-58 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Adarand did not "diminish" that aspect of Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which established "[t]he proposition that fostering diversity
may provide a sufficient interest to justify" a racial classification); cf Texas v. Hopwood, 518
U.S. 1033, 1033-34 (1996) (opinion of Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (arguing that the petition for certiorari in Hopwood had not properly presented the
issue of "[w]hether it is constitutional for a public college or graduate school to use race or
national origin as a factor in its admissions process").
15 See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1037, 1043 (1996).
16 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
17 See id. at 566; cf Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (noting that Metro Broadcasting "held only that the diversity interest was
'important'" and refusing to elevate "diversity... to the 'compelling' level").
18 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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classifications, no matter what the level of government or the putatively benign
nature of the official action in question.19
The cases leave two serious doctrinal questions. First, is educational
diversity a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to justify resort to that
most lethal of legal tools, the racial classification? Second, even if educational
diversity is sufficiently compelling, under what circumstances, if any, can a
racial classification be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest?
Such doctrinal issues should have been resolved long ago. At the very least,
its contestants should have realized how quickly they would reach
argumentative deadlock. Bakke provided an entire generation of educators with
guidance 20 so explicit that Justice Powell's opinion can be regarded as "the
Kama Sutra of educational affirmative action." 2 1 Repetition of its own force
should have bored the academy into submission, for "everything gets old if you
do it often enough." 22 Even staid old Calvin Coolidge understood the true
essence of diversity: greater variety brings greater happiness.23 The
commentators could have left the problem's final resolution to an eminently
foreseeable lawsuit brought by a disgruntled college or graduate school
applicant. But no. Even though "[p]rofessors are the last class of individuals
who can be trusted to deliver dispassionate, well-deliberated views" on this
subject, 24 law professors persist in writing about affirmative action in law
school settings.2 5
19 See id. at 227 (overnuling Metro Broadcasting insofar as that decision prescribed
intermediate scrutiny of "benign" racial classifications adopted by Congress); cf. Neil Devins,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 Thx. L. REv. 125, 128
(1990) (observing-accurately in hindsight-that Metro Broadcasting was the most doctrinally
vulnerable of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions).
20 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1769; Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz,
The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 7
(1979).
21 Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1123, 1127 (1997).
2 2 THE LAST PICrURE SHOW (Last Picture Show Productions, Inc., 1971).
2 3 See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EvoLuToN, AND BEHAVIOR 79 (2d ed.
1983) (describing the famous "Coolidge effect" in evolutionary biology); MATr RIDLEY, THE
RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EvOLUrION OF HUMAN NATUREa 299 (1993) (same).
24 Chen, supra note 10, at 1867; cf R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market
for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 384 (1974) (explaining how educators' self-interest
undermines the credibility of their opinions on educational policy), reprinted in R.H. COAsE,
ESSAYS ON EcONOMIcs AND EcONOMss 64 (1994); E.G. West, The Political Economy of
American Public School Legislation, 10 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1967) (same).
25 See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L.
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The question remains. Why has the affirmative action debate endured so
long and on such dreary terms? Perhaps the answer lies in the sweet, soporific
nature of the word diversity. Consider this pair of observations from California,
the most prominent jurisdiction to have terminated affirmative action by
democratic means. UCLA professor Eugene Volokh noted that "[d]iversity is
particularly appealing because of what it is not." 26 It avoids all the hard issues
that burden other racially tinged legal questions: racial responsibility, group
rights, proportional racial representation, compensatory justice, innocent
victims, or "even ... a social consensus about the magnitude of present
discrimination." 27 Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit took the matter an
extra step, remarking that "everyone likes diversity, so long as it falls within a
fairly narrow ideological range." 28
Occasionally a wise voice from the bench or beyond indicates that we are
not so easily bamboozled. "[Flacial diversity is not true diversity," said the lone
Fifth Circuit judge in Hopwood v. Texas29 who declined to vote to overrule
Bakke. 30
On balance, though, Americans in general, and well-educated Americans in
particular, regard "diversity" as a catch-all, feel-good term. Like most other
American universities, the Ohio State University promises through its diversity
policy to "[c]elebrate our uniqueness" by "[c]ultivat[ing] respect for and
appreciation of personal and cultural differences among all members of the
university community." 31 But the term is plastic enough to serve other
ideological objectives. For years, lest our collective memory slip altogether, the
federal judiciary explicitly permitted the Virginia Military Institute to exclude
women in the name of educational "diversity." 32 She who lives by the
REv. 893, 919 (1994) (noting that articles on affirmative action often "draw[ ] on examples
within the law school context" because most of the writers "are law professors, and therefore
most familiar with employment standards for lawyers and law professors").
26 Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REv.
2059, 2059 (1996).
27 Id.
28 Alex Kozinskd, Teetering on the High Wire, 68 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1217, 1229
(1997).
29 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
30 Id. at 966 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
31 The Division of Student Affairs at The Ohio State University (visited July 14, 1998)
<http://www.osu.edu/units/stuafflmission.htm> (emphasis added).
32 Compare United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 946 (1993) (describing VMI's male-only admissions policy as motivated by "a
desire for educational diversity") with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539 (1996)
(rejecting VMI's diversity claim and thereby ending VMI's sexually exclusionary reign). See
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shibboleth shall die by sophistry and chicanery.
B. D-Day for Diversity: The Second Front
On so jovial an occasion as a twentieth anniversary, I shall not reformulate
my previous attacks on Bakke. Elsewhere I have argued at length that the
diversity rationale, as deployed to justify race-conscious admissions and hiring
in higher education, violates not only equal protection but also the constitutional
commitment to free speech33 and the simplest principles of administrative
consistency. 34 I have even had occasion to describe my own experiences on the
ideological frontiers of the race-conscious legal academy.35 Rather, I shall focus
on a missed opportunity. Yes, a battle-weary legal world long ago might have
resolved the affirmative action stalemate. 36
Our obsessive gaze on Bakke has blinded us to the fact that the Supreme
Court rendered a second diversity decision during October Term 1977. The
Court that ordered Alan Bakke's admission to medical school also halted the
construction of a $110 million dam that promised extinction for Percina
(Imostoma) tanasi-the snail darter. I am speaking, of course, of Tennessee
Valley Authotity v. Hill.37
June 1978 was D-Day for diversity. On the 15th, Chief Justice Burger
spoke for a six-Justice majority in Hill, over Justice Powell's objection.
also Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute:
Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 637, 656
(1993) (describing the use of the term "diversity" in the VMI litigation as "a clever rhetorical
device" designed to evoke "positive, politically correct connotations" of "a diverse student
body or diverse academic offerings"); cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 745 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (defending state-sponsored, single-sex education as
"preservation of" an American tradition of "respect for diversity").
33 See Chen, supra note 10.
34 See id. at 1883-94.
35 See Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REv. 145, 147-49 (1994) [hereinafter Chen,
Unloving]; Jim Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1609 (1996) [hereinafter
Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant]. Indeed, there may be no better evidence of diversity's
ideological insidiousness than the existence of law review colloquies designed to rebuke,
perhaps even to ruin, those who dare to question the value of race-conscious legal scholarship.
See Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1844 (1990) (responding to Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989)); Colloquy, The Scholarship of Reconstruction
and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IowA L. REv. 1467 (1996) (responding to Chen, Unloving,
supra).
36 See generally Nathan Glazer, The Affirmative Action Stalemate, 90 PuB. IhmRSr 99
(1988).
37 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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Thirteen days later, Justice Powell wrote for himself in announcing Bakke. To
my knowledge no scholar has ever compared the discussions of diversity in
these two cases. To be sure, Hill did not mention "diversity," much less
"biological diversity" or "biodiversity," but those two terms (rather
remarkably) did not work their way into reported federal decisions until 1995.38
Despite the superficial incongruity, it is obvious (with two decades' hindsight)
that both Hill and Bakke hinged on diversity.
Hill posed a conflict between the Tellico Dam, a $110 million project on
the Little Tennessee River,39 and the snail darter, a "three-inch, tannish-
colored," "previously unknown species of perch. "4 The proposed dam would
disrupt the aeration of the river's depths, eliminate the fish's breeding
opportunities, and exterminate snails, the darter's primary diet.41 Scientists
failed to find the fish elsewhere, 42 and there was no assurance that
transplantation to other watercourses would succeed. 43 No one disputed that
"the Tellico Dam [would] either eradicate the known population of snail darters
or destroy their critical habitat."44
The fish won. The Court vigorously enforced the Endangered Species
Act's command "that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by [federal
agencies] do not jeopardize the continued existence [of an endangered species]
or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species." 45 Chief
Justice Burger held that Congress assigned "endangered species ... the highest
of priorities," well above even the dam's "anticipated benefits."'46 Noting the
accelerating rate of extinctions attributable to human activity,47 members of
Congress "'uniformly deplored the irreplaceable loss to aesthetics, science,
38 See Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 839 n.8 (8th Cir. 1995)
(using the term "biodiversity"); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 passim (7th Cir. 1995)
(using the term "biological diversity"). These two cases were decided 12 days apart in
different courts of appeals and were reported in the same volume of Federal Reporter, Third
Series.
39 See Hill, 437 U.S. at 200 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (documenting the amounts
expended on the construction of the Tellico Dam); cf id. at 172 (placing the figure at "more
than $100 million").
40 Id. at 158.
41 See id. at 162, 165 n.16.
42 Seeid. at 161 &n.12.
43 See id. at 162-63 & n.13.
44 Id. at 171.
45 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 844 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)), quoted in Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (emphasis omitted).
46 Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
47 See id. at 176.
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ecology, and the national heritage should more species disappear."' 48
Legislators urged each other to staunch "'homogeniz[ation] [of] the habitats in
which [endangered] plants and animals evolved,"' to "'minimize the losses of
genetic variations. "' 49 This diversity-the concept was unmistakably present
even though the Court never used the word-had, "'quite literally, [an]
incalculable"' value.50
Bakke's celebration of educational, as opposed to ecological, diversity has
become a constitutional clich6. Enveloping the Regents' diversity claim within
the First Amendment cloak of "academic freedom," 51 Justice Powell agreed
"that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure'
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."52
Like its ecological counterpart, educational diversity could not be quantified or
reduced to a single moment; even without "'know[ing] how, and when, and
even if,... informal 'learning through diversity' actually occurs,"' Justice
Powell assumed it could take place through "'unplanned, casual encounters
with roommates"' and other students. 53 Regardless of its origins and its
mechanics, the diversity introduced by a student "with a particular ... ethnic,
geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged" background would
"enrich the training of [the] student body" at large "and better equip [all]
graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity."'54 As
did Hill, Bakke assigned a positive (albeit indefinite and unquantifiable) value to
a certain sort of diversity-and was prepared to defend that diversity on
utilitarian grounds.
Ironically, only two weeks before announcing Bakke, Justice Powell had
dissented vigorously from the Court's celebration of ecological diversity in Hill.
This dissent packed twice the persuasive power of the lead opinion in Bakke. 55
4 8 Id. at 177 (quoting George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An
Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REv. 315, 321 (1975)).
49 Id. at 178 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93412, at 4-5 (1973)) (emphasis omitted).
50 Id. (emphasis omitted).
51 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
52 Id. at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
53 Id. at 313 n.48 (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race,
PRNCarON ALumNI WKLY., Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
54 1d. at 314.
55 Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell's Hill dissent. In Bakke, of course, Justice
Powell stood famously alone. See Cass A. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action,
and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1185 (1996) (noting that Justice Powell
spoke solely for himself and "that other eight participating Justices explicitly rejected" his
view of the case).
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Justice Powell took special pains to stress that "the snail darter is ... hardly an
extraordinary [species]." 56 Noting the difficulty faced by ichthyologists in
"distinguishing it from several related species," 57 he recited several numbers
manifestly intended to minimize the snail darter's uniqueness and value:
[N]ew species of darters are discovered in Tennessee at the rate of about 1 a
year; 8 to 10 have been discovered in the last five years. All told, there are
some 130 species of darters, 85 to 90 of which are found in Tennessee, 40 to
45 in the Tennessee River System, and 11 in the Little Tennessee itself.58
And to compound the insult he had hurled at the snail darter, Justice Powell
heaved a rhetorical Parthian volley at putatively "lower" life forms. Surely it
would be "absurd,"'59 he suggested, to destroy "even the most important federal
project in our country [upon] a finding by the Secretary of the Interior that a
continuation of the project would threaten the survival or critical habitat of a
newly discovered species of water spider or amoeba." 60 "They're not even in
our phylum," one might imagine Justice Powell protesting. "And that one's a
prokaryote! Who let all this riffraff into our law?" 61
I do not mean, of course, to harangue Justice Powell for a benighted view
that he has probably ameliorated. The fact remains, though, that he missed the
obvious link between ecological and educational diversity. If a Supreme Court
Justice could belittle ecological diversity within two weeks of venerating its
educational variant, we can readily explain (if not excuse) how the rest of the
legal world has missed the same connection for two decades. But having
"walk[ed] by the color purple in [the] field" 62 that was October Term 1977
without noticing this wondrous confluence of two diversity cases, we surely
deserve the damnable deadlock that the affirmative action debate has become.
The failure to connect Bakke with Hill has inflicted a deep wound on
affirmative action scholarship. The time for the cure has come. The concept of
biodiversity underlying the Endangered Species Act is "an especially rich
source of analogies to affirmative action."'63 And analogy, after all, is the
56 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 197 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id. (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 204 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)).
60 Id. at 203-04.
61 C. PINKFLOYD, In the Flesh, on THE WALL (Sony 1977).
62 AucE WALKER, THE CoLoR PuRPLE 167 (1982) (asserting that this sin of omission
"pisses God off").
63 Chen, supra note 10, at 1869.
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engine that drives science and art alike toward new frontiers. 64 Although I have
twice declined to pursue "the endangered species analogy for fear of triggering
charges of racism and biological determinism, '65 I shall now examine
educational diversity through the lens of biological diversity. What diffidence
has hitherto deterred, boredom now compels. Life is a hundred times too short
for us to bore ourselves.66
Inspired by Edward 0. Wilson's bold proclamation that we stand on the
verge of uniting human knowledge under a biological umbrella, 67 I shall survey
evolutionary biology-and several other fields where diversity is legally
significant-in search of insights into the diversity rationale in educational
affirmative action. Darwin's "idea of evolution [of] natural selection," modestly
described as "the single best idea anyone has ever had," unifies "[i]n a single
stroke ... the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of space and
time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law." 68 We can demand of it
nothing less than the missing link between diversity as a legal rationale and
educational affirmative action as it has actually evolved.
If anything, the analogical link between species protection and affirmative
action has strengthened in the decades since Bakke. Texas's loss in Hopwood
and the voluntary termination of affirmative action in California threaten to
remove certain groups from these states' public universities. Defenders of
affirmative action have infused new rhetorical power into one of their loudest
battle cries. Contemporary trends portend the bifurcation of American
education into one cluster of "overwhelmingly white and Asian-American
school[s]" and another of "overwhelmingly black and Hispanic schools. ",69 An
64 See, e.g., ALBERT EinsmIN & LEoPoL INFELD, THE EvoLuToN OF PHYsICs: THE
GROWTH OF IDEAS FROM EARLY CONCEFm OF RELATIvITY AND QUANTA 3-4 (1938)
(describing "a deep and fortunate analogy" as the key to unlocking "some essential feature
hidden beneath the surface of external differences"); HiEKI YUKAWA, CREATIVrrY AND
INTIJIrON: A PHYSICIST LOOKs EAST AND WESr 114 (John Bester trans., 1973) (describing
how "notic[ing] the similarity of' a novelty "to some other thing which [the observer]
understands quite well" can be the beginning of "really creative" thinking); cf. WALKER
PERCY, Metaphor as Mistake, in THE MESSAGE IN THE BoTTLE: How QUEER MAN Is, How
QUEER LANGUAGE Is, AND WHAT ONE HAs To Do wrIH THE OTHER 64, 65 (1975)
(describing metaphors as "misnamings, misunderstandings, or misrememberings" that
"result[ ] in an authentic poetic experience").
65 Chen, supra note 10, at 1870; accord Chen, supra note 21, at 1158 n.215.
66 See FRIEDRICH NTZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in BASIC WRTINGS OF NmTZSCHE
346, 346 (Walter Kaufinann ed. & trans., The Modem Library 1992) (1885).
67 See EDWARD 0. WILSON, CoNs=UNCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
68 DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EvoLUToN AND THE MEANINGS
oF La 21 (1995).
69 McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D. Mass. 1996);
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"inexorable zero," the "glaring absence of minority" students from elite
institutions, rouses the faithful. 70 This inexorable zero is to affirmative action as
extinction is to species protection. Extirpating a group from any environment,
whether educational or natural, diminishes that environment's diversity, for all
its stakeholders.
I shall argue that a hard look at other forms of diversity and the laws
designed to protect them undermines the case for protecting the sort of diversity
that Bakke celebrated. Part II shows how judges, lawyers, and commentators no
longer distinguish diversity from analytically distinct rationales for affirmative
action. Part Ill explores diversity in several settings outside affirmative action,
ranging from species protection and the regulation of elections, campaign
finance, and mass communications to bilingual education and religious
freedom. Part IV, a census of relevant groups in these categories, provides a
logarithmic look at diversity by the numbers. Part V then describes the
utilitarian and aesthetic values served by the preservation of diversity. Part VI
compares and contrasts the measures that the law takes to protect these
disparate types of diversity. Part VII concludes that educational affirmative
action, in its own realm, accomplishes few if any of the purposes served by the
Endangered Species Act-the strongest and most intelligibly conceived legal
system for protecting diversity of any kind. Unlike its biological analogue,
Bakke fails to define, much less to promote, educational diversity.
II. UP FROM DIVERSrIY
Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and
complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and
complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more
allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language
into his meaning. -T.S. Eliot
71
A. Dishonesty in Defense of Diversity Is No Virtue
"Everybody talks about diversity, but no one knows what it means." 72
accordWessmanv. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 131 (D. Mass. 1998).
70 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977)
(quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1975)); accord
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 204 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 541-42 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 656-57 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
71 T. S. Eliot, The Metaphysical Poets, in Tha HoGARTH EssAYs 212, 221 (1928).
72 Chen, supra note 10, at 1849.
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Although "the word diversity appears with incantatory frequency" in the
relevant cases and commentary, "it is never defined." 73 Race-conscious
practices in university admissions, not to mention faculty hiring, have become
so elaborate that scholars distinguish among "at least five methods ... covered
under the umbrella of affirmative action." 74 Unfortunately, "how all this
promotes [educational] diversity is mysterious, and [is] left unexplained. "75
This will not do. Lest the majestic promise of "equal protection of the laws" be
reduced to a "splendid bauble[ ],"76 how can the government "use racial
classifications ... without knowing what the central classifying concepts
means?" 77 A government that would divide and distribute on the basis of race
"cannot abdicate its responsibility to define 'racial diversity' and to determine
what degree of racial diversity ... is sufficient." 78
Just what is diversity? As a matter of doctrinal coherence, it must be
distinguished from competing rationales for affirmative action. If Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke retains any value, diversity must mean something
besides the governmental interests that Justice Powell considered but rejected. 79
In other words, whatever diversity is, it cannot be a synonym for proportional
representation, remedying societal discrimination, or community service.
Remedying institutional discrimination-the original definition of the term
"affirmative action" 80 and to this day an undisputedly lawful rationale for the
73 Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
74 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HAsnNGs
CoNsT. L.Q. 921,926 (1996) ("There are at least five methods of race- and gender-conscious
practices which are covered under the umbrella of affirmative action: (1) quotas, (2)
preferences, (3) self-studies, (4) outreach and counseling, and (5) anti-discrimination.").
75 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1055; see also Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as
a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1996)
(conceding that educators have no precise means by which to measure diversity).
76 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1998).
78 Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1564 (3d Cir. 1996), vacated as moot, 118
S. Ct. 595 (1997).
79 Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying and upholding the diversity rationale) with id. at 305-11
(opinion of Powell, J.) (considering, and rejecting in turn, the rationales of proportional
representation, remedying societal discrimination, and community service).
80 See generally Frank W. Andritzky & Joseph G. Andritzky, Affirmative Action: The
Original Meaning, 17 LiNcoLN L. REv. 249 (1987) (describing the original meaning of the
term "affirmative action" as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994));
Carol R. Goforth, "Wat Is She?": How Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 DPAUL L.
REv. 1, 70-72 (1996) (same).
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practice-is in many senses the polar opposite of diversity. The contrast
between forward-looking diversity and backward-looking remedies has become
a staple of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence 8' and fodder for a multitude of less
powerful commentators. 82 In fact, one could argue that diversity and remedying
past discrimination are incompatible and mutually exclusive. 83 "[L]imit[ing]
education diversity to those racial groups who could show that they were
victims of past discrimination" would be "quite inconsistent" with Bakke's
brand of "broad-based diversity." 84 Finally, although diversity shares the
crucial defect that sank the role model argument-both rationales "are ageless
in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future" 85-
81 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-13 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646-
47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-15
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to be
Carefully Taught" Justifying Affirmative Action After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REv.
1141, 1154-57 (1996) (contrasting Justice Stevens's apparent preference for "a forward-
looking approach to affirmative action" with the Court's affinity for remedial affirmative
action).
82 See, e.g., Michael K. Braswell et al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment of Its
Continuing Role in Employment Discrimination Policy, 57 ALB. L. REv. 365, 402, 405-06
(1993); Richard Delgado, Why Universities Are Morally Obligated to Strive for Diversity:
Restoring the Remedial Rationale for Affirmative Action, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1165, 1165-
66 (1997); Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of
"Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 107-08; Charles R. Lawrence I, Each Other's
Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 757 (1997); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 84,
96-98 (1986); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the
Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 173-74 (1997); cf. Jeffrey S. Byme,
Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity
and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 47, 70-72 (1993) (extending the tension
between forward- and backward-looking rationales to a discussion of affirmative action for
lesbians and gay men).
83 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 966 n.24 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., specially
concurring); Chen, supra note 10, at 1865-66; cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552
n.30 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asking why merely "six racial classifications, and no
others," appeared in a minority set-aside program).
84 Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity
Justification, 29 TEx. TEcm L. REv. 1, 32 (1998).
85 Iygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.); see also Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (describing
"societal discrimination" as "an amorphous concept of injry that may be ageless in its reach
into the past"); Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L.
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Justice Powell's rejection of the role model rationale in Wygant requires us to
give diversity a separate meaning.
Bakke endeavored to distinguish constitutionally permissible diversity from
the pretenders. "The state interest that would justify consideration of race or
ethnic background," Justice Powell wrote, "is not an interest in simple ethnic
diversity." 86  Rather, genuine, constitutionally sanctioned diversity
"encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single (though important) element." 87 By and
large, however, judges, litigants, and commentators have mangled the
definition of diversity. Fubar, one of many acronyms invented by the American
military during World War I, applies with full force here. Diversity: fouled up
beyond all recognition.88
This is not to suggest that every court since Bakke has misunderstood or
misapplied the diversity concept. In the broadcasting dispute that became Metro
Broadcasting, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to equate diversity with
proportional representation. 89 The same court complained that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had extended the term "diversity,"
previously used to describe the goal of "[d]econcentrating ownership" of
television and radio stations, to the conceptually distinct objective of "allocating
licenses on the basis of the applicants' race, for the purpose of generating
programs 'targeted' at specific ethnic groups." 90 With both Croson and Metro
Broadcasting as binding precedent before it, the Seventh Circuit successfully
distinguished "disadvantage, diversity, or other grounds favoring" official race-
consciousness from "remedying discrimination against minorities." 91
REv. 1377, 1467-68 (1996) ("The popularity of the [role model] concept has been inversely
related to its clarity."); cf. Note, supra note 75, at 1364 (arguing, apparently without irony,
that "race-conscious decisionmaking should be permitted as long as race-blind decision
making is not achieving diversity").
86 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).
87 Id.; accord, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
88 Many an American veteran undoubtedly remembers a stronger "translation" offiubar.
See SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks 1998) (establishing that the acronym does not have
a German origin). Mindful that one person's lyric is often another's vulgarity, cf. Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), I shall stick to the milder version.
89 See Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 919 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1989) ("By itself, racial diversity of ownership is conceptually no different from racial
balance in the workplace."), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
90 Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting,
497 U.S. at 547.
91 Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir.) (emphasis
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Likewise, Taxman spotted the difference between "corrective efforts to
confront racial segregation or chronic minority underrepresentation" and "non-
remedial racial diversity goal[s]." 92 In a case addressing law school admissions,
a federal district court differentiated between diversity and the school's interest
in redressing "the low number of minority members of the bar and the
manifestly low proportion of minority lawyers" in New York.93
Most cases, however, are far less precise in defining diversity. Judging by
the dissimilar and contradictory uses of diversity in the reported cases, an
observer would be hard pressed to define the term. Perhaps racial diversity
means nothing more than racially integrated housing. 94 Or maybe diversity is
merely outreach, "a conscientious effort to reach out to worthy candidates
whose inclusion will enrich the educational experience for all who
participate." 95 Then again, with a distant echo of antitrust law's market power
concept, 96 might we prefer a definition of diversity under which "no racial or
ethnic group wields absolute electoral control"? 97
The greater part of the case law, however, even at the Supreme Court,
treats the term "diversity" as though it were synonymous with a doctrinally
distinct rationale for affirmative action. The language of proportional
representation pervades many discussions of diversity. For instance, "a racially
diverse police force" is by definition one that is "integrated and ... reflective
of the community at large." 98 Other litigants and judges have stressed
added), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
92 Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1561 (3d Cir. 1996), vacated as moot, 118
S. Ct. 595 (1997).
93 Davis v. Halpem, 768 F. Supp. 968, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
94 See South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 713 F. Supp.
1068, 1086 (N.D. MI. 1988).
95 Wessmann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 128 (D. Mass. 1998)
(emphasis omitted).
96 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469-
80 (1992); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 & n.15 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986); NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 112 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 44, 52 &
n.19 (1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-97 (1974); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1956); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981) (providing an economic analysis of
"market power").
97 Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1459 (N.D. MI. 1997).
98 Hayes v. North Carolina State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 213
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proportionality in educational settings 99 and even in controversies over judicial
nominating committees.100
The fetish of proportional representation is especially frustrating in light of
the refusal of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982101 to enshrine this
right.' 02 Then again, if the Supreme Court could make a travesty 0 3 of the
proviso that nothing in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require... preferential
treatment... to any group because of... race [or] color," 104 we should
expect if not excuse comparably shabby behavior in other racially charged legal
settings.
Given the incompatibility of diversity with remedial affirmative action, one
might expect the courts to distinguish forward-looking diversity from backward-
looking remedies. One would be wrong. A district court equated "a racially
diverse learning environment" with one of the classic remedial aspirations of
school desegregation, the "goal of avoiding racial identifiability in a school."1 0 5
For its part, the Supreme Court, including Justice Powell, has routinely
described diversity as a component of desegregation decrees aimed at de jure
discrimination in public schooling.' 06 Even Justice Stevens, otherwise a
(4th Cir. 1993).
99 See, e.g., Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1328-29 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1467 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (stressing "the
extent to which diversity is represented at various levels of university life" and asserting that a
"more racially diverse faculty will be associated with a more positive racial climate"
(emphasis added)).
100 See Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 757 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Mallory v. Harkness,
895 F. Supp. 1556, 1560 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
101 Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 1973
to 1973aa-6 (1994)).
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (providing explicitly "[t]hat nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population"). See generally Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986)
(explaining Congress's intent to override City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); S.
REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982) (same), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
103 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 (1979) (emphasizing
that Congress failed to pass a proviso to the effect that "nothing in Title VII shall be
interpreted to permit voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances"); cf., e.g.,
Bernard Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination
Standard in Employment, 47 U. CI. L. REv. 423, 456 (1980) (arguing that Weber's decision
to permit voluntary affirmative action by private employers upset "the bargain struck by the
88th Congress" and abrogated its "color-blind aspirations").
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
105 Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 742 F. Supp. 1275, 1307 (D. Md. 1990).
10 6 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982); Estes v.
Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
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champion of diversity as a prospectively oriented rationale, has effectively
equated diversity with the remedial purpose of "protect[ing] historically
disadvantaged groups against discrimination." 107 In his words, an employer
achieves diversity whenever it introduces new participants into "a category of
employment that had been almost an exclusive province of [others] in the
past."108
In refusing to elevate diversity to a compelling interest for equal protection
purposes, the District of Columbia Circuit recently pondered how the various
uses of the word diversity have generated one of the law's deepest linguistic
mysteries:
Perhaps this is illustrative as to just how much burden the term "diversity"
has been asked to bear in the latter part of the 20th century in the United
States. It appears to have been coined both as a permanent justification for
policies seeking racial proportionality in all walks of life ("affirmative action"
has only a temporary remedial connotation) and as a synonym for proportional
representation itself.109
Ah, if only commentators could subject judicial opinions to the standards of
review in administrative law! The courts' spotty record on affirmative action is
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of diversity. 10
Diversity's definitional problem poses a real crisis for university
administrators. Many educators desperately seek license to adjust racial balance
within their faculties and among their students. As Patsy Cline reputedly said,
though, "People in hell want ice water, but that don't mean they get any., 111
Few if any American universities can "demonstrate a history of constitutional
or statutory violations sufficient to warrant... remedial" affirmative action.112
Ordinarily a university would be delighted to hear a court proclaim a complete
absence of "evidence that ... the [university] has ever engaged in
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 486-87 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
107 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
108 Id.
109 Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
110 See Chen, supra note 21, at 1141; ef 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (stating the
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion" standard for judicial review of administrative
agency actions).
1l1 SwEEr DREAMS (Paramount 1986).
112 Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. &
MARY BiLL op RiG-s J. 881, 886 (1996).
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discrimination against [historically] underrepresented groups." 13 The City
University of New York's law school, however, greeted this very declaration
with grave disappointment, for it constituted a judicial rebuke of its affirmative
action program. Like hell itself, affirmative action really has become "the
world turned upside down., 114 If the University of Texas School of Law, home
of Sweatt v. Painter,115 cannot base an affirmative action program on historical
discrimination, 116 you really have to wonder whether any other schools can.
For the vast majority of American universities, Bakke's vision of diversity is the
only available affirmative action rationale. 1 7 Modest though it be, the "fig
leaf' of diversity has enabled race-conscious educators to pursue "primary
purpose[s]... other than diversity"-role modeling, community service, and
proportional representation for its own sake, or as a basis for patronage."18
Even affirmative action's defenders admit "that the diversity justification has
been seriously abused by educational institutions." 119 "Diversity!" as a battle
cry120 "is simply not the most honest statement of ... objective[s]."'121
In the end, we need not decide whether the courts and commentators are
disoriented, deluded, or dishonest. "For [constitutional] purposes, it matters not
which of these things occurred." 122 The problem remains the same. No one has
offered a meaningful definition of diversity, much less a "strong basis in
evidence" that race-based affirmative action promotes diversity. 123 The law's
113 Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
114 Chen, supra note 10, at 1847.
115 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
116 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); see also id. at 953
(suggesting that today's racially "hostile environment" at the University of Texas results from
"present societal discrimination and, if anything, is contributed to, rather than alleviated by,
the overt and prevalent consideration of race in admissions").
117 See Chen, supra note 10, at 1859; Chin, supra note 112, at 930.
118 Chin, supra note 112 at 902-03; see also, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Affirmative
Action: Policy-making by Deception, 22 OHo N.U. L. REv. 1291, 1293-95 (1996); Kent
Greenawolt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REv. 87, 122
(1979).
119 Bloom, supra note 84, at 72.
120 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. Ray. 1105 (noting
academia's rally towards the diversity banner and advocating that such a banner hinders civil
rights).
121 Wayne McCormack, Race and Politics in the Supreme Court Bakke to Basics, 1979
UTAH L. REV. 491, 530.
122 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984).
123 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion of
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collective "failure to render a reasoned" explanation should be, "as always,
reversible error." 124 "No more is required, no less is accepted."1 25 Whether
caused by disarray or dissembling, the deep void that diversity has become
cannot justify the constitutionally shaky practice of affirmative action. 126 Like
law at large, the arcane law of affirmative action can no longer endure as an
autonomous enterprise.127 If we would entertain any hope of defining diversity,
we had better consult analogous areas of greater bodies of nonlegal knowledge,
all untouched by the poisonous hand of race.
B. Creativity in Pursuit of Truth Is No Vice
This sad state of affairs need not continue, for "the law abounds with
concepts of diversity." 128 We can enrich the affirmative action debate through
analogies drawn from elections and campaign finance, mass communications,
plant variety protection, endangered species protection, and even bilingual
education policy. Although comparisons to these seemingly disparate fields will
operate at a high rather than "low or intermediate level of abstraction," the
"incompletely theorized" notions of diversity that emerge will supply a certain
"principled consistency."' 29
The definition of biodiversity provides a good starting point. The Office of
Technology Assessment has defined "biological diversity" as "[tjhe variety and
variability among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which they
occur.' 30 The concept embraces diversity not only among species but also
within species.' 3' Species with exceedingly few members are vulnerable to
inbreeding depression-genetic deterioration over inbred generations that
Powell, J.); accord City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 477 U.S. 469, 498, 505 (1989);
see also Note, supra note 75, at 1360 (conceding that universities must meet this evidentiary
standard in defending their asserted interest in diversity).
124 Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 934 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
125 Id.
126 Cf Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1446 (9th Cir. 1997)
(describing affirmative action as a practice the Constitution "barely permits").
127 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 778 (1987).
128 Chen, supra note 10, at 1868.
129 Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993)
(emphasis omitted).
130 UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL OF FCE OF TMCHOLoGY ASSESSMENT,
TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DivAsrrY 313 (1987).
131 See id. at 37-38; EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DivTsrry OF LiFE 88 (1992).
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expose small populations to an exaggerated risk of extinction. 132 Even if a
species made scarce eventually recovers, it may never recover the full range of
genetic differences that its members once boasted. 133 Finally, although the
species is the fundamental unit of biodiversity, 134 the concept also subsumes the
processes by which ecosystems operate-mutation and natural selection. 135
What ties it all together, in biology and elsewhere, is a sense that difference
matters. The law invariably begins with a static definition of diversity and ends
with a dynamic rationale for its protection. There must be a variety of actors,
plus a cogent way for classifying them. At a minimum, diversity in law begins
with a census of all the relevant groups and a schematic, if static, method for
understanding the relationship among these groups. Count, then classify.
But there is more. The study of biodiversity begins (but does not end) with
the Linnaean enterprise of sorting all living things into kingdoms, phyla,
classes, orders, families, genera, and species. 136 It may well be, "as the
Chinese say," that the "first step to wisdom is getting things by their right
names."1 37 If so, the second step surely is understanding how things relate to
one another. No matter how we identify and structure groups, the groups and
their members must interact in a meaningful, productive way. There should be
more than a single party in a polity, a single network in broadcast television.
An "ecosystem," after all, consists of interconnected "organisms in a
community plus the associated abiotic factors with which they interact." 138
Neither biological diversity nor any other variant depends on numbers alone.
For example, species protection preserves not only the mere number of species
in any ecosystem, but also the dense network of relationships among species. 139
132 See O.H. FRANKEL & MICHAEL E. SoulE, CONSERVATION AND EvoLUTIoN 59-61
(1981); Ian Robert Franklin, Evolutionary Changes in Small Populations, in CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY: AN EvoLUTIoNARY-EcoLOGIcAL PERSPECIIVE 135, 140-41 (Michael E. Soul6 &
Bruce A. Wilcox eds., 1980); Russell Lande, Genetics and Demography in Biological
Conservation, 241 SCIENCE 1455, 1456-57 (1988).
133 See Edward 0. Wilson, The Current State of Biological Diversity, in BIODIVERSrrY
3, 11 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
134 See ERNsT MA'R, EvoLurION AND THE DvnasrrY OF LUFE 522-23 (1976); Michael
T. Ghiselin, Categories, Life, and Thinking, 4 BEHAv. & BRAIN Sci. 269, 269-70 (1981).
135 See WILSON, supra note 131, at 75-93.
136 See WILSON, supra note 67, at 3-4.
137 Id. at 4; see also WILSON, supra note 131, at 44.
13 8 HEENA CuRns & N. SuE BARNES, BIOLOGY: PART 2-BIOLOGY OF ORGANISMS, at
G-7 (5th ed. 1989).
139 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL QUALITY, LINKING ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODivERSrrY
135 (photo. reprint 1992); Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But
Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 33, 81 (1996);
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Consider how Edward Wilson credits Ernst Mayr's "New Synthesis
[of]... evolution and modem genetics" for having opened Edward Wilson's
young eyes to the dynamism of the natural world: "Static pattern slid into fluid
process.... Scale expanded, and turned continuous .... The animals and
plants I loved so dearly reentered the stage .s lead players in a grand drama.
Natural history was validated as a real science."140
The quest for diversity in all of these contexts exhibits a second, albeit
more elusive, quality. The law routinely invokes a utilitarian justification for
diversity. The mere presence of a second political party gives meaning to
democratic governance. Distinct varieties and species of plants give rise to
pharmaceuticals for distinct ailments, to foods for all seasons and against all
famines. But beyond the quantifiable benefits of diversity, there is an aesthetic
sense that difference should exist for its own sake. Thus, even if the Navajo
tongue had provided no national service in the Pacific theater of World War I,
the aboriginal languages of North America are worth preserving.
With these observations in mind, I shall progress from static to dynamic,
thence from the descriptive to the prescriptive. From the biosphere to the land-
grant campus and in the many realms in between, I will describe diversity by
the numbers. How many species are there? Distinct breeds of domestic
animals? Human races? Then I shall ask the pragmatist's questions: What is
diversity good for? What purposes does it serve? The answer necessarily
includes a discussion of diversity's dynamic processes. Finally, on the
assumption that diversity does indeed deliver benefits, I ask how the law
protects diversity.
This is admittedly a roundabout way of addressing a straightforward
doctrine. But the sorry state of the debate leaves me no choice. Bear with me as
I borrow a seductive chess metaphor. 14' Even the number of moves in chess
are finite; the variations on the affirmative action argument are far less
numerous. In our version of the game, every argumentative gambit has failed,
and the players keep slumping inexorably toward perpetual check. My battle
plan embodies two strategies that, I hope, will speed us toward a successful
endgame. First, since it has become clear that the "diversity" concept is the
single piece holding together the entire argumentative apparatus of educational
J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws
Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 555, 567-78 (1995).
140 WILSON, supra note 67, at 4 (citing ERNST MAYR, SYSrEMATICS AND TI-E ORIGIN OF
SPECIES (1942)).
141 Cf. T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in COLEE POEMS 1909-1962, at 51 (1963) ("A
Game of Chess"). I am not the first to borrow a chess metaphor in discussing affirmative
action, e.g., Glazer, supra note 36, and I probably will not be the last.
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affirmative action,'I hope to overload the concept by asking precisely how
much weight it can bear, in more legal contexts than I really intend to address.
Second, mindful of the futility of all frontal attacks on such matters as the
appropriate measure of racial justice and the social significance of race, I shall
try something different and unexpected. Taking a hard look at diversity in every
legal context except this one epitomizes a Zwischenzug strategy: shock them
with a flurry of action in a seemingly unrelated area, then return to the business
at hand.
One final note of caution is in order. Throughout this article I shall explore
"diversity" as the concept has come to be understood in ecology and
evolutionary biology. In matters of race, "biology" is often a dirty word. A
belief in race as a biological phenomenon142 drove such travesties as Nazi
ideology and the Tuskegee syphilis study. More generally, under the sway of
the Standard Social Science Model, many American intellectuals distrust
biology.143
Let me allay those fears. This article emphatically does not seek, in the
fashion of The Bell Curve,144 to propound hypotheses on racial differences in
performance. My whole point is that "race" has no coherent biological
meaning. Even the Supreme Court agrees with that proposition.145 "As a
strictly sociopolitical phenomenon lacking any basis in biology, race lives and
dies by law." 146 Nor will I conduct a comparative analysis of social adaptation
strategies in order to predict which groups will win a socioeconomic battle for
"survival of the fittest." Whatever might be said for the sociobiological origins
of the Constitution, 147 the Fourteenth Amendment surely did not enact Herbert
142 See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, TH MISMEASURE O1 MAN 20-29 (1st ed. 1981)
(illustrating the faults of "biological determinism"); IAN F. HANEY LoPEz, Wr BY LAW:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTON OF RAcE 27-33 (1996) (documenting legal efforts to assign
people to racial classifications based putatively on biological principles).
143 So much that the principal intellectual project of the century to come may be the
dismantling, root and branch, of the Standard Social Science Model. See generally THE
ADAPTED MIND: EvOLUTIONARY PsYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE (Jerome
H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter m ADAPTED MND]; CARL N. DEGLER, IN
SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: T9E DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARwNSm iN AMERICAN
SOCIAL THOuGET (1991).
144 RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BEaL CURVE: ITLGENCE
AND CLASS STRucTmE iN AMERICAN LnFE 269-340 (1994).
145 See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987).
146 Chen, supra note 21, at 1163.
147 In point of fact, quite a bit can be said. See John 0. McGinnis, The Huan
Constitution and Constitutive Law: A Prolegomenon, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUmS 211
(1997); John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996); cf. E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,
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Spencer's "Social Statics." 148 Richard Delgado's imaginary friend, Rodrigo,
seems to have picked up a dreadful bookbag smelling of eugenics, 149 but none
of those books were on my summer reading list. It is not Social Darwinism but
real Darwinism that concerns me. 150
When evolution is liberated from those who would distort it for ideological
advantage, its hallmark becomes far clearer. Evolution is not the sort of game
that can be won. Every member of the biosphere is locked in an eternal struggle
for mere survival, with no prospects of "advancing" past its predators,
parasites, or competitors.' 5' Diversity, not progress in the sense of an
inexorable march toward increasing complexity, is the true hallmark of
evolution. 152 Indeed, greater sophistication in distinguishing environmental
from the genetic determinants of human performance has reaffirmed our
common humanity.
Uneven initial advantages conferred by geography, compounded over time,
and twisted by historical accidents, account for most of the differences. 153 No
85 COLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985); Mark I. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 HARv. L. REv. 641 (1996). To explain the fll extent to which Darwinian insights can
inform the law is, alas, another task "I [must] leave for another time," though perhaps not
"another scholar." Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L.
REv. 281, 282 (1994).
148 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also DENNETr, supra note 68, at 393 (describing Herbert Spencer's "Social Darwinism" as
an "odious misapplication of Darwinian thinking in defense of political doctrines that range
from callous to heinous").
14 9 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Bookbag: Brimelow, Bork, Hernstein, Murray, and
D'Souza-Recent Conservative Thought and the End of Equality, 50 STN. L. REv. 1929
(1998) (reviewing PETR BRMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARD GOMORRAH:
MODERN LmERASM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); HINSTERN & MURRAY, supra note
144; and DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY
(1995), and concluding that these books collectively advance "biological theories of racial
inferiority").
150 See generally JOHN KENNE GALBRArH, THm AFFLUENr SOcIETY 56-64 (1958)
(explaining the influence of Social Darwinism on American thought in the late nineteenth
century); RICHARD HOFSrADTER, SOCiAL DARwINISM IN AMmICAN THOUGHr (rev. ed.
1959).
151 See RIDLEY, supra note 23, at 63-67 (explaining the Red Queen hypothesis in
contemporary evolutionary theory); Leigh Van Valen, A New Evolutionary Law, 1
EvOLUTIONARY THEORY 1 (1973) (same).
152 See STEPImN JAY GOULD, FU. HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF ExCELLENCE FROM PLATO
TO DARWIN 15-16, 172-73 (1996).
153 See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
103, 405-08 (1997).
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longer can the racist explain Europe's historic dominance of Africa as a matter
of genes. 154 To inject biology into discussions of race is to risk condemnation in
the court of legal commentary, 155 but I shall not shrink from the task. "The
more forbidding the task, the greater the prize for those who dare to undertake
it. "1
5 6
II. L'HOMME ET L'ANIMAL
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question...
Oh, do not ask, "Wat is it?"
Let us go and make our visit. -T.S. Eliot 157
As we begin to dissect diversity, I shall impose a consciously arbitrary but
provisional sense of order. I shall classify fields as seemingly disparate as
elections and campaign finance, mass communications, agriculture, ecology,
and human languages according to the dichotomy perfected by the French
philosopher Alain: the line between human "culture" and bestial "nature.'1 5 8
Speech will represent the cultural side of this equation. Unlike either
feeding159 or breeding, 160 the uniquely human phenomenon of speech receives
explicit constitutional protection. So much for constitutional discourse on the
"two and only two [Darwinian] forces that matter," food and sex. 161 But
154 See id. at 401 ("MIThe different historical trajectories of Africa and Europe stem
ultimately from differences in real estate.").
155 See Neil Gotanda, Chen the Chosen: Reflections on Unloving, 81 IowA L. REV.
1585, 1590-91 (1996); Alfred C. Yen, Unhelpfil, 81 lowA L. REv. 1573, 1579 (1996).
156 WILSON, supra note 67, at 209.
157 T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Pnfrock, in COLLEcED POEMS 1909-1962,
at 3 (1963).
158 See generally ALAIN, L'HoMME El L'ANMAL (1962).
159 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (holding that the First
Amendment does not remedy disparities in welfare payments).
160 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
161 Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1278 n.99 (1995). For a compelling argument that the legal left has unwisely swapped its
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Bakke's vision of diversity does rest unquestionably on a First Amendment
foundation, 162 and "I1]anguage is how most of us get both" food and sex.163 If
we would understand how affirmative action enhances a university's interest in
diversity, we should study the concept in legal contexts where speech is more
directly and more explicitly regulated in the name of diversity.
By contrast, natural resource exploitation, whether through agriculture or
the "taking" of plant and animal species and their wild habitats, will represent
the natural side. Rather ironically, the emerging view of the natural world
through the four-letter code (ATCG)164 of molecular biology allows us to
imagine living things as copyrightable subject matter 65-and to decipher
DNA's double helix, the code by which Gaia, Mother Earth, has encrypted the
"concept of existence" and "the mystery of... life."1 66
A. Speak Now
Speech is a natural subject for a study of diversity. The untamed market not
only spurs product differentiation but also encourages uniformity. Modem free
speech law represents the most important remnant of a broader laissez-faire
jurisprudence. 167 To borrow a Darwinian metaphor, we might describe the plea
for free speech as the last surviving member of a once-populous libertarian
family tree. 168 Free speech slides into a Darwinian framework with great ease.
constitutional commitment to welfare rights (i.e., food) for a "Clintonified" defense of
abortion (i.e., sex), see Mark A. Graber, The Cl'ntonification of American Law: Abortion,
Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Omio ST. L.J. 731 (1997).
162 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Chen, supra note 10, at 1863--64.
163 Chen, supra note 161, at 1278 n.99.
164 These letters represent the component bases of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA):
adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine.
165 See, e.g., Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 191 (1982); Doreen M. Hogle, Comment, Copyright for Innovative
Biotechnological Research: An Attractive Alternative to Patent or Trade Secret Protection, 5
I H TEmCH. L.J. 75 (1990); Donna Smith, Comment, Copyright Protection for the
Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST.
MARY's L.J. 1083 (1988).
166 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
167 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1414
(1986); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. Rav. 949,
952-53 (1995); cf. Coase, supra note 24 (speculating on why opponents of restrictions on
speech nevertheless often support restrictions on the economic marketplace).
168 Cf GOULD, supra note 142, at 72 (arguing that the human tendency to reify the last
surviving "remnants of a remnant" as "false icon[s] of progress" is to fall victim to "life's
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As "an unmistakable" form of "universal acid," evolution "eats through just
about every traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a revolutionized world-
view." 169 Already, scholars have begun to adapt economics to a new
intellectual world reshaped by Darwinian thought. 170 Two shakes of
interdisciplinary pollen from positive political theory or microeconomics
connect this school of thought-and with it the entire Darwinian apparatus-to
free speech.
We can break down this realm even further according to the constitutional
divide between "core" and "commercial" speech. Political speech, of the sort
at issue in campaigns and elections, is quintessential "core" speech. 171 By
contrast, although the sort of speech typically at issue in controversies over
structural regulation of radio, broadcast television, and cable does not fit the
precise definition of "commercial" speech, 172 these cases routinely adopt some
standard of review below strict scrutiny. 173 That the Supreme Court has applied
strict scrutiny to restrictions on political speech in broadcast media merely
reinforces the distinction.' 74 This doctrinal phenomenon is usually blamed on
"scarcity" and other characteristics of the conduits by which mass media
travel,175 but it is also a question of content.176 Even though the presence of a
little joke").
169 DENNERr, supra note 68, at 63.
170 See generally RiaiARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WmTE, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982) (borrowing ideas from biology to form economic
theory); THE ELGAR CoMwAION TO INsrUONAL AND EVOLUrIONARY ECONOMICS A-K
(Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994); Giovanni Dosi & Richard R. Nelson, An
Introduction to Evolutionary Theories in Economics, 4 J. EvOLUTIONARY ECON. 153 (1994);
Elliott, supra note 147, at 62-71; Roe, supra note 147.
171 Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing the
spending of money as speech, provided that the money finances a political campaign) with
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (refusing to accord constitutional
value to speech about the spending of money, at least in the absence of a political agenda) and
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (same).
172 See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (defining as "commercial" that speech which can be reduced to the
simple message, "I will sell you the X [item] at the Y price").
173 See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the
New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REv. 141, 172-76
(1995) (documenting and disputing the prevailing tendency among constitutional scholars to
exclude mass media from "core" political speech).
174 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973); cf CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (holding that there is a "limited right
to 'reasonable' access" to the media for political candidates).
175 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
[Vol. 59:811
DIVERSITY IN A DIFFERENTDIMENSION
profit motive should not diminish the constitutional commitment to free speech,
the dominant tradition of American constitutionalism undervalues-and
arguably devalues-speech delivered by electronic channels of mass
communication. 177
1. Party Animals
Political parties are the basic organizational unit of American politics. To
be sure, broader groups of citizens enjoy rights of association even in the
absence of an imminent political agenda, 178 and the increasingly popular device
of direct referendum creates political coalitions limited in time and in scope. 179
The Supreme Court often invokes some notion of political fairness without
purporting to define it, much less prescribing how it is to be achieved. 180 But
parties remain the focus of many constitutional cases on elections and political
parties. 181 In extreme circumstances, a dominant political party becomes the
state and captures state law as an instrument of self-regulation. 182 Whatever
vitality remains in Buckley v. Valeo's183 protection of individual candidates'
right to spend money on their campaigns 184 appears to extend to parties. 185
U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
176 See Bhagwat, supra note 173, at 163-64 (emphasis added).
177 See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSrEI, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-
28 (1993); Fiss, supra note 167, at 1410-16. See generally Lawrence B. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 122 (1978)
(discussing the Court's "underenforcement of constitutional norms" within the framework of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
178 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
566 (1995); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
179 See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298. See generally Philip P.
Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and
the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMEar L. REV. (forthcoming 1998); Philip
P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996
ANN. Suav. AM. L. 477.
180 See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); Reynolds v. Simms,
377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
181 See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1741 (1993).
182 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
ofthe Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 653-54 (1998).
183 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
184 See id. at 45.
185 See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 627 (1996)
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Whether they involve primaries, 186 conventions, 187 ballot access, 188 or
patronage, 189 the Supreme Court's cases share a common element: diversity in
political parties should not be reduced to a one-party monopoly. This principle
is vividly illustrated in the White Primary Cases190 and in Davis v.
Bandemer,191 in which the Court recognized an equal protection claim against
political gerrymandering designed to annihilate the losing party in future
elections. 192 Similarly, in cases invalidating popular referenda, the Court has
frowned upon efforts to restructure the lawmaking process to the permanent
detriment of a political minority. 193 What is sauce for the popular referendum,
so it seems, is sauce also for more republican forms of government.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
186 See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
187 See, e.g., Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin cc rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981).
188 See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
189 See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62
(1990); Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
190 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 259 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 182,
at 652-68.
191 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
192 See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and
Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325 (1987) (articulating justifications
underlying the Court's regulation of partisan gerrymandering in Bandemer).
193 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
amendment that "classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end, but to make
them unequal to everyone else"); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483
(1982) (condemning an initiative that "burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate [public]
schools ... by lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new and remote level
of government"); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (equating efforts to
"disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation on its
behalf' with the undisputedly unconstitutional tactics of "dilut[ing] any person's vote or
giv[ing] any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size"). But cf
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 (1982) (upholding a popular referendum that
"forb[ade] state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation").
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2. We Want the Airwaves194
Somewhere outside the political "core" of the First Amendment, mass
media companies supply the speech that defines much of the popular and
political character of the United States. Outside the environmental context, mass
communications regulation provides perhaps the deepest body of law dedicated
to the preservation of diversity. The obsession with diversity arises from the
essential terms and conditions of competition in mass communications. Except
in the rarefied realm of pay-per-view, mass communicators compete for
audience share and advertising revenues by nonprice means-by providing
interesting, diverse content and viewpoints. 195 In a world of expanding
entertainment options, 196 audiences that find insufficient "variety or
heterogeneity" in available programming will find other ways to spend their
leisure time. 197
Although the Communications Act of 1934198 evidently "intended to leave
competition in the business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a
licensee ... to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his
programs attractive to the public,"' 199  the Federal Communications
Commission's policy and practice prescribe otherwise. The FCC's extensive
legal arsenal resists private concentration of media resources and disperses
ownership among discrete individuals in the hopes that diverse programming
will ensue.200 The Supreme Court has described the goal of "assuring that the
public has access to a multiplicity of informational sources [as] a governmental
purpose of the highest order," one that "promotes values central to the First
Amendment."201
194 THE RAMONEs, We Want the Airwaves, on PLEASANT DREA Ms (Warner Bros.
1981).
195 See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 588 n.13 (1981); Bhagwat,
supra note 173, at 164 (suggesting that customer preference in media markets is based on the
content of speech); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass
Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415, 1428-29 (1996) (stating that
competition "expresses itself through diversity in program content and viewpoint").
196 See generally HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAwMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICs: A
GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIs (3d ed. 1994) (documenting drastic changes in leisure-time
activities between 1970 and 1990).
197 SchurZ Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
198 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
199 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
200 See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699 (1979); FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 (1978).
201 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994); cf FCC v. Pottsville
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As in affirmative action and species conservation, mass communications
law assumes that diversity is both precious and precarious. The very market
forces that Congress and the FCC trust to sort winning from losing broadcasters
also threaten diversity. The problem of radio format changes illustrates just how
closely communications law tracks environmental law's extinction narrative.
When the last classical station in Kalamazoo converts to country, or hip-hop
hijacks the last jazz station in Jackson, the range of listener choice tightens:
Most format changes... do not diminish the diversity available, and "are
thus left to the give and take of each market environment and the business
judgment of the licensee." In [one] case, however, the format proposed to be
abandoned was allegedly unique and its loss would affect diversity, thereby
implicating the public interest in the change....
... We think it axiomatic that preservation of a format [that] would
otherwise disappear, although economically and technologically viable and
preferred by a significant number of listeners, is generally in the public
interest.202
Incidentally, this description of a common phenomenon should not be confused
with the law; neither the FCC nor the Supreme Court has endorsed this
approach. With explicit approval from the Court, the FCC leaves format
changes to the vagaries of the market.203
The assumption that broadcasters' self-interest is more effective than direct
regulation in encouraging diverse programming is the exception rather than the
rule.204 By the same token, however, the FCC only rarely engages in direct
regulation of its licensees' programming decisions. The Commission's statutory
mandate, after all, forbids "censorship. '" 205 Children's television is a major
departure from this principle; after years of wrangling, 20 6 the FCC recently
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) ("Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be subordinated to
monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field.").
202 Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 261,268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
203 See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 600-03 (1981).
204 For another rare expression of this minimalist regulatory sentiment, see Report &
Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1105-06 (1974) (invoking this rationale to justify the recission of a
mandatory origination rule).
205 See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994); cf Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.").
206 See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir.
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adopted a rule setting aside a fixed portion of the weekly television schedule for
educational programming designed primarily for children.207
Although the strategy of prescribing a scarce but specifically desired form
of programming should be regarded as an outgrowth of the FCC's historical
solicitude for children, the regulation of children's television does present a
salient factual oddity.20 8 The FCC is perfectly capable of setting aside portions
of the broadcast day for a favored form of programming. As befits a
revolutionary application of mass media and free speech law to affirmative
action,209 we should note and resolve this "fundamental novelt[y] of fact and
theory." 210 If the FCC seeks locally produced, minority-oriented, or other
scarce and "diverse" programming, why doesn't the Commission simply
command that such programs be shown during lucrative portions of the
broadcast day?211 Alternatively, to the extent we dismiss the children's
television rule as "an elitist [complaint] that viewers demand less children's
programming is desired in Washington," we can lay aside the "constitutionally
questionable" strategy of "content control of all broadcasters" in favor of
"government subsidies for those... who have the desire and expertise to
develop [appropriate] programming." 212 The answer to this mystery will reveal
itself after an examination of the FCC's full regulatory arsenal.
1987) (refusing to allow the FCC to eliminate commercialization guidelines for children's
television on a rationale that abandoned the longstanding regulatory "premise that the
television marketplace does not function adequately when children make up the audience")
(emphasis omitted); Washington Ass'n for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to impose a flat requirement that television licensees broadcast a
minimum amount of regularly scheduled children's programming each week).
207 See Final Rule: Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981 (Aug. 27, 1996).
208 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1994) (imposing limits on the duration of advertising in
children's television programming); id. § 303b (directing the FCC to consider broadcast
television licensees' efforts in children's programming when weighing renewal applications);
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (upholding an FCC rule that
restricted children's access to "dial-a-porn" services); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 748 (1978) (upholding post-broadcast sanctions on a radio station that aired profane
language during hours designated for "family listening").
209 See Chen, supra note 10, at 1846-50.
2 10 THONIAS S. KUHN, TIE STRUCIURE OF SClE'nm=C REVOLUTIONS 52 (1963).
211 Cf. Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 Omio ST.
L.J. 551, 568-71 (1998) (questioning "[w]hy academic institutions interested in creating a
diverse exchange of ideas consider [ ] a variety of proxies, such as race and socioeconomic
background, rather than... actual viewpoints and ideas").
2 12 Laurence H. Winer, Chilren Are Not a Constitutional Blank Check, in RATIONALES
AND RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELwCraONIc MEDIA 69, 105 (Robert Corn-
Revere ed., 1997).
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For the most part, the FCC's pursuit of diversity relies on structural
devices for promoting diversity. The Commission's complex strategies are
arguably as "diverse"-as numerous and as varied-as the conduits and
communicators at stake. A doctrinally and historically comprehensive review
would swallow this article,213 but it suffices to name a few exemplary
approaches: comparative licensing, 214 the localist preference,215 multiple
ownership restrictions, 216 the "one-to-a-market" 217 and "duopoly" rules, 218
integration credits,219 "chain broadcasting" rules,220 rules on prime time
access 221 and financial participation and syndication,222 defensive regulation of
intermodal alternatives to broadcast television (most notably cable),223 "must-
213 For a survey, see Chen, supra note 195.
2 14 See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
215 See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 362 (1955).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding a cap
on the number of AM, FM, and television stations held by any single owner). Compare
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1984)
(restricting any single owner to no more than 12 television stations or any combination of
stations reaching more than 25% of the national television audience) with
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(a), (c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 110,
111 (1996) (relaxing restrictions on ownership of multiple TV stations and eliminating
altogether restrictions on ownership of multiple radio stations).
2 17 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (1997) (restricting any owner to a single AM, FM, and
broadcast television outlet in a single market).
218 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1997) (restricting the amount of overlap between the
signals of commonly owned radio or television stations).
2 19 See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (striking down the FCC's
longstanding preference for broadcast licensees who proposed to "integrate" ownership and
management in a single individual).
220 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943).
22 1 See National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distributors v. FCC, 516 F.2d
526 (2d Cir. 1975) (vacating FCC rules designed to reserve portions of the prime time
television schedule for locally originated rather than network-supplied programming).
222 See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 1992)
(striking down an FCC rule restricting networks from holding financial interests or
syndication rights in the programs they broadcast). Both PTAR and "fin/syn," as these rules
are popularly known, have been repealed. See Radio Broad. Servs. & Television Program
Practices, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,773, 44,773, 44,780 (Aug. 29, 1995) (repealing PTAR); Network
Fin. Interest & Syndication Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,907 (Sept. 21, 1995) (repealing
"fi/syn").
223 See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (upholding
an FCC rule requiring cable systems with more than 3,500 subscribers to originate local
programming); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (extending
FCC jurisdiction to cable television); Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957
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carry"224 and access channel obligations, 225 and cross-ownership restrictions
designed to exclude telephone companies226 and newspapers227 from leveraging
their power into broadcast markets.
These tools follow three basic regulatory strategies. First, on the
assumption that dispersed ownership guarantees a greater number and therefore
a greater variety of voices, the FCC combats concentrated ownership,
especially at the actual broadcasting level (as distinct from the economically
distinct sectors of program production and transmission).228  Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC229 applied this principle to a different sort of
diversity: minority-oriented broadcasting. Second, cognizant that few if any
local broadcasters have the resources to originate programs, the FCC tightly
patrols the influence exercised by television networks over local affiliates. 2 30
Finally, the FCC jealously protects "free television"-advertiser-flnanced,
over-the-air broadcasting-from competitive threats posed by more advanced
video delivery technologies.231
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding channel set-aside regulations that govern direct broadcast satellite
systems).
224 See Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1200 (1997); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994).
225 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)
(reviewing a variety of rules regarding leased access and public access stations on cable
systems); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (striking down FCC rules that
imposed access channel requirements on large cable systems).
226 Compare US West Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994)
(striking down a 1984 ban on "video programming" by telephone companies), vacated, 516
U.S. 1155 (1996) and Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. National Cable Television Assoc.,
42 F.3d 181, 198-20J (4th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996) with 47
U.S.C.A. § 573 (West Supp. 1998) (permiting telephone company ownership and operation
of video programming facilities under a set of "open video systems" guidelines). See
generally Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLuM. L. REV. 1016 (1997) (analyzing the open video systems guidelines).
227 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 793-802 (1978)
(upholding a ban on newspaper-broadcast combinations); see also News Am. Publ'g, Inc. v.
FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the ban on newspaper-broadcast
combinations).
228 See, e.g., National Citizens Comm., 436 U.S. at 794-95.
229 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
230 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943).
231 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984) (recognizing
the governmental interest in "protecting noncable households from loss of regular television
broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems"); In re Advanced Television
Sys. & Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,540
(1995) (extolling the virtues of "[firee, over-the-air, universal broadcast television").
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The only trouble is that "[e]ach of these propositions" concerning broadcast
diversity "is demonstrably false." 232 Under certain conditions, concentration
has the counterintuitive effect of enhancing rather than diminishing program
diversity.2 33 Larger, vertically integrated companies have greater financial and
political'resources for enhancing diversity.234 Until 1990, the FCC knowingly
kept the number of national television networks at three,235 even though a
higher number was feasible. This conscious choice, rooted in a desire to
maximize opportunities for locally owned stations, effectively eliminated one of
the easiest ways of "reduc[ing] the cost... of satisfying a taste for serving
minority consumers": increasing the total number of broadcast channels.236
This tradeoff between localism and minority broadcasting is so clear that the
FCC has been able to make the exchange in the opposite direction. The
Commission relaxed the traditional "Rule of rwelve," which capped the
number of television stations in the hands of any single owner, for minority
owners. 237 In defense of this defacto "Rule of Fourteen," 238 the FCC reasoned
that enhanced service to minority audiences would outweigh any harm that the
marginal concentration in station ownership might inflict on competition among
232 Chen, supra note 195, at 1485.
233 See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir.
1992); Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets, 91
Q.J. EcoN. 15 (1977); A. Michael Spence & Bruce M. Owen, Television Programming,
Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 103 (1977); Matthew L. Spitzer,
Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 293, 304-19 (1991);
Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competition in
Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. EcoN. 194, 219-21 (1952).
234 See Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and
Emerging Media, 45 DEPAuL L. REv. 1009, 1026-29 (1996).
2 35 See STANLEy M. BEsEN Er AL., MISREGULATING TELEVSION: NErWORK
DoM]NNCE AND THE FCC 14-15 (1984); DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG Er AL., REGULATION OF
TiE ELEcmONiC MAss MaDiA: LAw AND Poucy FOR RADIO, TELEVION, CABLE AND THE
NEw VMEO TEcHNoLOGIEs 266 (2d ed. 1991); THOmAs G. KRATTENmAFm & LucAs A.
POWE, JR., REGULATjNG BROADCAST PROGRAmmNG 88, 283-84 (1995); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging
Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1736 (1995).
236 Spitzer, supra note 233, at 327; see also Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing
Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 841 (1995) (supporting this
proposition with econometric evidence).
237 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1)(ii), (e)(2)(i) (1997).
23 8 See generally Chen, supra note 195, at 1447-48 (explaining the tension between the
Rule of Twelve and the de facto Rule of Fourteen that the FCC fashioned on behalf of
minority broadcasters).
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broadcasters or on viewpoint diversity. 239
The recently concluded Turner Broadcasting litigation24 brings full circle
the history of mass communications regulation. Radio and broadcast television,
specifically exempted by the 1934 Act from common carrier obligations241 and
once seemingly liberated from the public utility model of regulation,242 are now
unquestionably the beneficiaries of what passes for affirmative action in federal
mass communications law.2 43 Cable television's "must-carry" obligations are
consciously designed to benefit local over-the-air television stations. The
Supreme Court's decision to sustain these rules has perfected the correlation
between broadcast regulation and educational affirmative action. "[M]inority-
oriented teaching and scholarship are the academic equivalent of underpowered
and undervalued conventional television signals in an age of cable, video
dialtone, and direct broadcast satellite."244 The logic of "must-carry" runs lock-
step with that of affirmative action: but for this set-aside, market forces would
erase this threatened form of expression for an underrepresented constituency.
This is the respect in which the "regulation of mass communications serves no
purpose except to protect incumbents on the verge of technological and
economic extinction. 245 Though we speak of law schools becoming "lily-
239 See Policies & Rules Regarding Minority & Female Ownership of Mass Media
Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 2788, 2796 (1995). Both the Rule of Twelve and the Rule of Fourteen
have yielded to a rle that any entity may own or control an unlimited number of broadcast
television stations, as long as those stations reach no more than 35% of the national audience.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56,
111; Chen, supra note 195, at 1445-46.
240 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
241 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp. 1998) ("[A] person engaged in radio
broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.").
242 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940) (holding
that "economic injury to an existing station is not a separated and independent element to be
taken into consideration" in broadcast licensing decisions); In re Application of Southeastern
Enters., 22 F.C.C. 605, 610-12 (1957) (declaring the Commission powerless to consider the
likelihood of incumbent broadcasters' economic failure in the wake of newly granted
licenses); Paul M. Segal & Harry P. Warner, "Ownership" of Broadcasting Frequencies: A
Review, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 111, 118 (1947) (proclaiming the "collapse of the public
utility analogy" in federal broadcast licensing). On the collapse of the regulatory distinction
between broadcasting and common carriage in communications law, see Howard A.
Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless "Carriage,"
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1048 (1997).
243 See Chen, supra note 195, at 1481 (describing incumbent television broadcasters as
"federal mass communication law's oldest and most gently pampered wards").
244 Chen, supra note 10, at 1890.
245 Chen, supra note 195, at 1471-72.
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white" 246 and of local television stations "going dark,"247 the superficial
difference in chromatic imagery can scarcely mask the parallel rhetoric.
We thus come to the answer to the anomaly posed by children's television.
The FCC does not direct diverse programming because it cares no more about
expressive diversity than the typical law school faculty does. What both actors
do care about is the distribution of benefits among favored parties.248
This sketch of mass communications law gives scant support for the notion
that affirmative action can enhance expressive diversity. Efforts to restructure
mass media markets have failed to improve the quality or diversity of broadcast
speech, whether measured by conventional broadcasters' constant loss of
audiences to competing providers of audiovisual programming, or by the
abysmal quality of over-the-air television. 249 Federal mass communications
law, deeper and older than educational affirmative action, strongly suggests that
government cannot dictate diversity.
3. Voice of America/Radio Free Europe
The great irony of the American quest for mass media diversity is that
virtually every other nation treats the United States as a threat to global cultural
diversity. What is absolutely fascinating is that the sternest measures to exclude
American cultural exports stem not from the traditional victims of Western
colonialism and imperialism, but rather Canada and the European Union-the
two places whose culture most closely, overlaps that of the putative white
majority in the United States.250 This phenomenon contradicts the logic of
affirmative action, but not evolutionary theory. Any naturalist understands that
the fiercest competition for food and habitat comes from similar rather than
246 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Hopwood and Its Consequences, 17 PAcE L. REv. 1,
20 (1996) (quoting Douglas Laycock).
247 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1197 (1997) (quoting Meek
Declaration 78 (App. 628)).
248 Compare Chen, supra note 195, at 1482 ("Federal mass communications regulation
has become a jobs program for favored broadcasters... .") with Chen, supra note 10, at
1892-93 ("[L]aw school faculties are less interested in true diversity and more interested in
the allocation of goods to persons of particular racial backgrounds.") (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted).
249 See Chen, supra note 195, at 1442-43.
2 5 0 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAX]NG OF
WORLD ORDER 46-47 (1996) (defining the "West" as "Europe, North America, plus other
European settler countries such as Australia and New Zealand" and "Western Civilization" as
"Euroamerican or North Atlantic civilization").
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dissimilar species.251
It is hard to overstate the vigor with which Canada and Europe have
resisted homogenization by American cultural imports. Adopting the Orwellian-
sounding directive of "Television Without Frontiers," the European Union has
ordered member-states to reserve at least half of all television airtime for
programs of European origin.252 One sympathetic commentator argues "that
Europe indeed suffers from a cultural crisis," and that the European Union
should be given space to resist the "irreversible, deeply rooted changes"
wrought by American cultural imports.253
Canada has gone even further, augmenting its own quotas against
American programming with an extensive system of subsidies, discriminatory
taxes, and discriminatory tax deductions.254 Canada's cultural stand may be the
hottest dispute-excluding only those involving salmon255-across the world's
longest undefended international border. The fear is real: after watching more
251 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 131, at 173-74 (describing this phenomenon and the
adaptive strategies of elasticity and character displacement).
252 See Council Directive 89/522, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23.
253 Laurence G.C. Kaplan, Comment, The European Community's "Television Without
Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255,
256(1994).
254 See generally Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free
Trade, National Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 Amz. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 203 (1998) (examining the rules set forth to protect cultural identity); Andrew M. Carlson,
Note, The Country Music Television Dispute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between
Canadian Cultural Protectionism and American Entertainment Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 585 (1997); Amy E. Lehmann, Note, The Canadian Cultural Exemption Clause and
the Fight to Maintain an Identity, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 187 (1997); Robin L.
Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Cowboys: Reconciling
Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165, 172 (1995) (illustrating
Canada's "various... protectionist measures"). Canada's hard line against "split-run"
editions of magazines with American content but Canadian advertising has triggered
condemnation by the World Trade Organization. See Report of the Appellate Body in
Canada--Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, AB-1997-2, WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted
June 30, 1997); Sean C. Aylward & Caroline M-L. Presber, Trade, Culture, and
Competition: WTO Overturns Canada's Excise Tax on "Split-Run" Publications, 8 J. INT'L
TAX'N 548 (1997); Aaron Scow, Note, The Sports Ilustrated Canada Controversy: Canada
"Strikes Out" in Its Bid to Protect Its Periodical Industry from U.S. Split-Run Periodicals, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 245 (1998).
255 See, e.g., Canada: Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring & Salmon,
BISD, 35th Supp. 98 (1989); In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon & Herring,
12 INT'L TRADE REP, DEC. (BNA) 1026 (1991). See generally Daniel A. Farber & Robert E.
Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATr's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
C/ause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1433-35 (1994) (discussing U.S.-Canada conflicts over
salmon and other fishing interests).
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than seven hundred hours of American television programming a year, the
average ten-year-old Canadian takes yet another step toward becoming "an
unarmed American with Medicare." 256 Canadian author Margaret Atwood
describes her country's cultural crisis this way:
Canada as a separate but dominated country has done about as well under the
U.S. as women, worldwide, have done under men; about the only position
they've ever adopted toward us, country to country, has been the missionary
position, and we were not on top. I guess that's why the national wisdom vis-
&-vis Them has so often taken the form of lying still, keeping your mouth shut,
and pretending you like it. 57
In short, in the global market for popular culture, Canada and Europe are the
leading champions of quotas, set-asides, and other forms of affirmative action
for culturally underrepresented and endangered voices.
B. The Call of the Wild
Why should lawyers stand alone in resisting "the innate tendency to focus
on life and lifelike processes," the "biophilia" that leads us "to distinguish life
from the inanimate" and to value "[n]ovelty and diversity"? 258 Even Justice
Holmes, whatever his attitude toward claims grounded in human reproductive
dignity,259 readily spotted the "national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude" in the conservation of migratory birds.260 Let us explore and
exploit the lessons that the natural world and our instincts would teach us.
Even the biosphere can be divided according to human activity. The most
striking distinctions between human cultures arise from their primary modes of
256 Lehimann, supra note 254,, at 200 (quoting Nina Munk, Culture Cops, FORBs, Mar.
27, 1995, at 42-43).
257 Frank E. Manning, Reversible Resistance: Canadian Popular Culture and the
American Other, in Tnn BEAVER BrrEs BACK? AmmaEcAN PoPuLAR CuLTuRE iN CANADA 4,
4 (David H. Flaherty & Frank E. Manning eds., 1993) (quoting Margaret Atwood), quoted in
Goodenough, supra note 254, at 223.
258 EDwARD 0. WiLSON, BIOPHIUA 1 (1984).
25 9 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.").
260 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (describing these birds as "protectors
of our forests and our crops" and as "food supply" in themselves). But c. Cargill, Inc. v.
United States, 516 U.S. 955, 956-59 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(questioning whether the presence of migratory birds on private land bears a constitutionally
sufficient connection to interstate commerce).
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food production-agriculture or foraging. 261 The exacting demands of
horticulture and animal husbandry,262 exacerbated by historical accidents,263
have limited commonly cultivated plants and familiar domestic animals to a tiny
fraction of the biosphere. 264 We can therefore divide the natural world between
those organisms whose reproduction humans routinely control and those that
are, metaphorically, "born free." On both sides of the divide, scarcity,
extinction, and creeping homogeneity provide the impetus for legal protection
of diversity.
1. The Nature of the Farm
The impulse to conserve endangered species began on the farm. Darwin
opened The Origin of Species, after all, with a study of variation in
domesticated plants and animals.265 Industrialization and the consolidation of
smaller farms were erasing entire varieties and breeds. Almost
contemporaneously, the United States acknowledged agricultural diversity by
ordering its newly established Department of Agriculture "to procure,
propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and
plants." 266 This statute thus codified Thomas Jefferson's sentiment that "[tihe
greatest service which can be rendered any country is to add a useful plant to its
culture. "267
The biological crisis faced by farms in Darwin's England has swept the
globe. The already shallow pool of domestic plants and animals "is being
2 61 See SUSAN ALUNG GREGG, FORAGERS AND FARMERS: PoPULATIoN INTERACrION
AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION IN PREmoRc EUROPE 1-10, 21-35 (Karl W. Butzer &
Leslie G. Freeman eds., 1988); Jim Chen, Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without
Frontiers, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 1031, 1033-34 (1996).
262 See DIAMOND, supra note 153, at 114-30 (explaining plant domestication); id. at
157-75 (describing animal domestication).
263 See, e.g., Jean L. Marx, Amaranth: A Comeback for the Food of the Aztecs?, 198
Scl. 40 (1977) (describing how amaranth ceased being cultivated widely because the Aztecs
consumed it in a ritual "that the Spanish conquistadores considered a perverse parody of the
Catholic Eucharist"). See generally NATIONAL REsEAR CH COuNCiL, AMARANTH: MODERN
PROSPECTs FOR AN ANCIENT CROP (1983).
264 See, e.g., WILsON, supra note 131, at 287-89.
265 See CHARLES DARwiN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPEC BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION 7-43 (Harvard Univ. reprint 1964) (1859).
266 Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, § 1, 12 Stat. 387 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 2201 (West Supp. 1998)).
267 Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping
Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REv. 210, 249 (1993) (quoting THOMAS JEMERSON's FARM
BOOK (Edwin M. Betts ed., 1976)).
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[drained] as human population and economic pressures accelerate the pace of
change in traditional agricultural systems." 268 What Darwin noticed of scarce
species also applies to economic entities such as small farms: "during
fluctuations in the seasons or in the number of its enemies," these rare entities
"run a good chance of utter extinction." 269 The largely socioeconomic
motivation for protecting small farms has always retained an ecological
component. In matters such as soil conservation and open space preservation,
such agroecological claims are dubious at best and fraudulent at worse. 270
Small farms, however, do preserve rare breeds and varieties in situ. Over many
generations, traditional foraging and agrarian communities have amassed
volumes of ethnobiological knowledge. 271 This knowledge, "if gathered and
catalogued, would constitute a library of Alexandrian proportions. 272
The extension of the industrial revolution to agriculture, one of the great
triumphs of contemporary capitalism, 273 has exacted a steep price.274 In
268 WORLD WATCH LIST FOR DOMESTIC ANIMAL DivERsrrY, at v (Beate D. Scherf ed.,
2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter WORLD WATCH LIST]; see also WILSON, supra note 131, at 322
("Small farms around the world are giving way to the monocultures of agrotechnology."); cf.
Williamson v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 1525, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (bemoaning the fate of "the family farm, an-all-too-rapidly-vanishing remnant of
our nation's rural past.... in our complex modem economy"). See generally Eric
Christensen, Note, Genetic Ark: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for Future
Generations, 40 STAN L. REV. 279 (1987).
269 DARwIN, supra note 265, at 109.
270 See, e.g., Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the New
Deal, 68 MINN. L. REv. 333, 348-49 & n.65 (1983); Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams,
Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 361, 405-10
(1997); Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from Economic
Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 333, 343-46 (1995).
271 See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for
Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28 TuLsA L.J. 587, 655 (1993); Winona LaDuke,
Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L.
& PoL'Y 127 (1994); June Starr & Kenneth C. Hardy, Note, Not by Seeds Alone: The
Biodiversity Treaty and the Role for Native Agriculture, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 85 (1993);
Lester I. Yano, Comment, Protection of the Ethnobiological Knowledge of Indigenous
Peoples, 41 UCLA L. REv. 443 (1993).
272 WILSON, supra note 131, at 321.
273 See, e.g., JOHN H. DAvis & RAY A. GOLDBERG, A CONCEPT OF AGRiBusINEss 1-4
(1957); Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REv. 809, 826-30 (1995).
274 The exact connection between industrialization and the disappearance of farms and
farmland is quite complex and demands more space than this article permits. One urban myth
does bear immediate debunling: in the years since World War II, cropland losses in the
United States are principally attributable to "lack of farm economic viability rather than urban
encroachment." Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J.
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exchange for the capacity to feed hordes at home and abroad, the United States
has lost many plant varieties and animal breeds. In the place of traditional farms
as in situ preserves of domestic biodiversity, we now have a clutch of ex situ
facilities. Against agricultural homogenization stands a "diffuse network of
laboratories and research stations," 275 including the National Seed Storage
Laboratory in Ft. Collins, Colorado, and a chain of land-grant universities,276
experiment stations, 277 and extension offices. 278 Guided by no specific statutory
mandate, the Department of Agriculture preserves genetic diversity through a
diffuse program of "research 'into the laws and principles underlying the basic
problems of agriculture in its broadest aspects. "279
We have yet to mention the impact of commercial breeders and seed
companies. These enterprises lie at the heart of the ongoing, genetically
engineered biotechnological revolution-the target of the newest debate over
genetic diversity in agriculture. American law protects developers of
asexually 280 and sexually reproduced plant varieties.281 American courts have
likewise extended utility patent protection to genetically engineered
organisms.2 82 A deep body of international law seeks to balance these
AGiC. L. 237, 243 (1998). Indeed, "urban development" has inflicted fewer "cropland
losses" than "forest, grazing, recreation, wildlife, and other uses" of land. Id.
275 NAIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENIc RESOURCES: THE
U.S. NAIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991).
276 See Morrill Land-Grant College Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-329 (1994).
277 See Hatch Act of 1887, 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a-361i (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Bankhead-
Jones Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. §§ 427, 427i (1994).
278 See Smith-Lever Act of 1914, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341-349 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1996); see
also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 389 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(describing the work of the Extension Service in "home economics, agriculture, 4-H and
youth, and community resource development").
279 Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 427 (1994)).
280 See Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1994); Yoder Bros. v.
California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976).
281 See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994); Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
282 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (microbes); Ex parte Allen, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (BNA) (Apr. 3, 1987) (animals), affid without opinion, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (BNA) (Sept. 24, 1985) (plants); Policy on
Patenting of Animals, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) (inviting applications for
patents on transgenetic animals, excluding humans); Patent No. 4,736,866 (U.S. Patent Off.
Apr. 12, 1988). See generally Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms:
The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051 (1988) (describing
the benefits of animal patents).
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intellectual property rights with the competing interests of farmers and of the
developing nations supplying most of the genetic material in the form of rare
plant species.283 These advances in biotechnology, especially when backed by
powerful intellectual property rights, directly menace agricultural
biodiversity.284 Transgenic techniques, which involve the transfer of genes
among organisms that do not naturally interbreed, pose the additional threat of
genetic pollution should accidentally released chimeras intermingle with wild
populations.285
2. Live Free or Die
The very existence of diverse species warrants and receives legal protection
at the highest levels. Although the international community has endorsed
endangered species protection through the CITES treaty286 and the Rio
conference,287 the United States' own Endangered Species Act of 1973288 is
283 See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, as
revised at Geneva (Mar. 19, 1991), UPOV Doc. 221(E); Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, opened for signature, Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRErARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTrATERAL TRADE NEGOTATONS 365 (1994), GATT Sales No.
1994-4; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources, Report of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 22d Sess., U.N. Doec. C/83/REP (1985); Interpretation of the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 25th Sess., U.N. Doec. C/89/24 (1989). See generally, e.g., Harold J. Bordwin, The
Legal and Political Implications of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources,
12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1053 (1985) (explaining the political implications of controlling genetic
plant resources); Carlos M. Correa, Sovereign and Property Rights over Plant Genetic
Resources, Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (Rome, Nov. 7-11, 1994) (Background Study Paper No. 2); Nicholas J.
Seay,' Intellectual Property Rights in Plants, in INTELECrEJAL PROPERTY RIGHS:
PRoTE ON OF PLANT MATauAis 61 (1993).
2 84 See Hamilton, supra note 267, at 252-53; Hamilton, supra note 271, at 647-52.
285 See Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic
Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There Is Reason to Believe Are Plant Pests, 52
Fed. Reg. 22,892, 22,906 (June 16, 1987) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 330 & 340 (1998));
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18F.01 to .12, 116C.91-96 (West 1998); North Carolina Biological
Organism Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-65.42 to 47 (1997).
286 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into force July 1, 1975).
287 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 283.
288 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
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perhaps the strongest and most successful scheme for protecting biodiversity. 289
The Endangered Species Act provides multiple layers of protection for
"endangered" 290 and "threatened" species.291 Section 4 requires the Secretary
of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior, 292 using "the best scientific and
commercial data available, " 293 to determine whether any species is endangered
or threatened2 94 and to designate any "critical habitat. "295 In addition to
publishing a list of all endangered and threatened species,296 the Secretary of
the Interior must also "develop and implement" recovery plans "for the
conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species....
unless he finds that such a plan will not promote the conservation of the
species." 297 The threshold decisions to list and to designate critical habitat are
the twin Achilles' heels of the Act. The feared economic consequences of a
decision to list or to designate critical habitat298 expose both decisions to
289 Other schemes protect specific species. See, e.g., International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716 (entered into force Nov. 10,
1948); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994). See
generally Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)
(interpreting the International Whaling Convention); United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859
(9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Marine Mammal Protection Act). Whether the Endangered
Species Act applies outside the United States remains an open question. See Daniel A. Farber,
Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1247, 1251-52 (1996). Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 122-23 (8th
Cir. 1990) (upholding extraterritorial application of the Act), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) with Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
585-89 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (refusing to apply the Act extraterritorially).
290 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994) (defining as "endangered" any species "which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its ranges").
2 91 Id. § 1532(20) (defining as "threatened" any species "which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range").
292 See id. § 1532(15) (defining the term "Secretary").
293 Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A); see also id. § 1536(a)(2) (imposing a similar requirement for
purposes of interagency consultation under § 7 of the Act). See generally Bob Marshall
Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the notion of "best
available" data); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1052
(1st Cir. 1982) (same).
294 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1994).
295 Id. § 1533(a)(a)(A).
296 See id. § 1533(c).
2 97 Id. § 1533(0(1).
298 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1403-04 (9th Cir.
1996) (recounting the controversial history of efforts to list the northern spotted owl as an
endangered species and to designate its critical habitat).
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political pressure and considerable uncertainty. 299
Section 7 requires interagency consultation and cooperation within the
federal government.300 In consultation with the Secretary, all federal agencies
are required to "carry[ ] out programs for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species." 301 This provision and has been interpreted as
imposing an affirmative obligation to pursue an active species conservation
policy.30 2 Each agency must also "insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification" of critical habitat. 30 3 This requirement
stopped the Tellico Dam cold. As the Supreme Court said in saving the snail
darter, section 7 as it then stood "admit[ted] of no exception." 304
In response to TVA v. Hill, Congress established an Endangered Species
Committee, popularly known as the "God Squad," with the power to grant
exemptions from section 7.305 In the first case brought before it, the God Squad
unanimously refused to terminate the snail darter.306 Although Congress
ordered the dam's completion through a rider in an appropriations bill, 30 7 the
29 9 See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation
by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 277, 284-85, 322
(1993) (noting substantial lags in the listing of eligible species and in the designation of critical
habitats for listed species).
300 Section 6 authorizes cooperative agreements between states and the federal
government to conserve species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994). See generally A. Dan
Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REv. 1315 (1995) (noting such acts will not
work unless states and the federal government cooperate).
301 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
302 See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir.
1984); Florida Key Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222, 1237-38 (S.D. Fla. 1994); J.B.
Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining
the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENvmL. L. 1107,
1137 (1995). But cf Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v.
FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (relieving FERC of the obligation to condition
annual renewals of hydroelectric licenses on conservation measures).
303 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). See generally Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754,
763 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing the three-step interagency consultation process).
304 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
305 See Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3752 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(e)-(h) (1994)).
306 See Decision of Endangered Species Committee, Jan. 23, 1979 (unreported
decision).
307 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law
Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 805, 813-14 (1986).
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fish eventually prevailed: relict populations were discovered away from Tellico,
and the snail darter was relisted as merely a "threatened" species. 308
Section 9 prohibits any "person," including a governmental entity, 30 9 from
"tak[ingl" any endangered species of fish and wildlife within the United States
or on the high seas. 310 "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct. '311 In turn, the Secretary of the Interior has defined the term "harm"
as "includ[ing] significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 312 The Supreme Court has upheld
this expansive interpretation.313
There are two significant exceptions to section 9. First, even though "[t]he
biological differences between animals and plants.., offer no scientific reason
for lesser protection of plants, ' 314 the Act offers less protection to endangered
plants. Section 9 prohibits removal, damage, or destruction of endangered
plants only on federal lands or in knowing violation of state law.315 The
difference is substantial, for more than half of listed species are found
exclusively on private land.316 Moreover, plants-but not animals-are
property merely by virtue of being present on privately owned land.317 Second,
a 1982 amendment authorizes the Secretary to permit takings that are
"incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity." 318 As an alternative to enforcing section 9, the Secretary is authorized
308 See Reclassifying the Snail Darter (Percina Tanasi) From an Endangered Species to
a Threatened Species and Rescinding Critical Habitat Designation, 49 Fed Reg. 27,510,
27,510-14 (1984) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
309 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994) (defining "person").
310 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) & (C).
311 Id. § 1532(19).
312 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998).
3 13 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
691 (1995).
3 14 NAIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, ScIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr 90
(1995).
315 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994).
3 16 See Houck, supra note 299, at 693.
317 See Holmes Rolston In, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 CorO. L.
REv. 283, 293 (1990).
318 96 Stat. 1424 (1982) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994)); see
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 70G-01 (holding that the incidental take exception does not
shield "deliberate action"); United States v. McKitirick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1998)
(same); cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1994) (authorizing the Secretary to relax § 7 restrictions
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under section 5 to acquire habitat for endangered and threatened species. 319
Individual citizens play a significant role in enforcing the Endangered
Species Act. Any "interested person" may petition the Secretary to determine
whether a species should be listed as endangered or threatened. 320 The Act also
allows '"any person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf... to enjoin
any person, including the United States .... who is alleged to be in violation
of any provision" of the statute. 321 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wilife,322
however, the Supreme Court refused to interpret the citizen suit provision as
granting individuals standing to force "the Executive [to] observe the
[interagency consultation] procedures required by" section 7 of the Act. 32 3 By
contrast, in Bennett v. Spear,324 the Court held that citizen suits under the
Endangered Species Act authorize "not only ... actions against private
violators of environmental restrictions, and not only... actions against the
Secretary asserting underenforcement [of section 4], but also ... actions
against the Secretary asserting overenforcement" of section 4.325
C. Mother Tongue
French philosophy, as usual, is wrong. There is no genuine division
between l'homme and l'animal. Homo sapiens shares 98.4%of its DNA with
the bonobo (Pan paniscus).326 The scant 1.6% in genetic distance accounts for
"[o]ur important, visible distinctions from" bonobos and common chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes).327 Among these differences-"upright posture, large brains,
ability to speak, sparse body hair and peculiar sexual lives"- speech is by far
the most diverse phenomenon.32 8 Language is "a true species property," part of
for incidental takings that are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1989).
319 See 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994).
320 Id. § 1533(b)(3).
321 Id. § 1540(g).
322 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
323 Id. at 573.
324 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
325 Id. at 1163.
326 See JAEED DIAMOND, THE THiRD CHIvPANzEE: THE EvOLUTION AND FUrURE OF
THE HUMAN ANMAL 23 (1992).
327 Id.
328 For an argument that peculiar sexuality should be regarded the truly distinctive
behavior of "the sexiest primate alive," see DESMOND MORRIS, THE NAKED APE 63 (1967).
More sophisticated research suggests, however, that we are far from being even the sexiest
chimpanzees. See DiAMOND, supra note 326, at 74 (awarding that distinction to the bonobos);
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the "biological endowment" unique to humans.329 The power to speak is "an
evolutionary adaptation," and "human language is a part of human biology. 330
Although "the ability to use a natural language belongs more to the study of
human biology than human culture," 331 linguistic diversity serves as perhaps
the truest measure of cultural diversity. Let us unite the artificially separated
realms of the human and the animal by examining the singularly human
characteristic of natural speech.
Linguistic diversity is endangered, and critically so. The "loss of cultural
and intellectual diversity" that occurs when "politically dominant languages and
cultures simply overwhelm indigenous local languages and cultures" poses risks
akin to "the dangers inherent in the loss of biological diversity. ' 332 When a
language dies, we are left to imagine "the nature of things that have been lost
and of what can be lost if linguistic and cultural diversity disappears. ,333 Half
the world's six thousand languages are projected to become extinct by the end
of the next century.334 The rate of loss bears a chilling resemblance to the
biological forecast that "half the world's species will be extinct or on the verge
of extinction" in the same time frame. 335
RiDLEY, supra note 23, at216-17 (same).
3 2 9 NoAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITs NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE, at
xxvi (1986). Chomsky, however, has denied the full Darwinian implications of this statement.
See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MD 97-98 (enlarged ed. 1972); NOAM CHOMSKY,
LANGUAGE AND PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MANAGUA LECruREs 166-67 (1988). For
a detailed discussion of Chomsky's reluctance to integrate his Universal Grammar within the
Darwinian intellectual framework, see DENNErr, supra note 68, at 384-93.
330 STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTMCr: How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE
24(1994).
331 Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom, Natural Language and Natural Selection, in THE
ADAPTED MIND, supra note 143, at 451.
332 Ken Hale, On Endangered Languages and the Safeguarding of Diversity, 68
LANGUAGE 1, 1 (1992); see also Michael Krauss, The World's Languages in Crisis, 68
LANGUAGE 4, 4 (1992) ("Language endangerment is significantly comparable to-and related
to-endangerment of biological species in the natural world.").
333 Ken Hale, Language Endangennent and the Human Value of Linguistic Diversity, 68
LANGUAGE 35, 40-41 (1992).
334 See Krauss, supra note 332, at 6; cf. Thomas S. O'Connor, "We Are Part of
Nature". Indigenous Peoples' Rights as a Basis for Environmental Protection in the Amazon
Basin, 5 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 193, 203 (1994) (noting that this projected rate
of linguistic destruction carries with it an especially steep price in lost ethnobiological
knowledge). Michael Krauss has outlined a worst-case scenario in which the extinction rate
projects "either the death or the doom of 90% of mankind's languages" within the next
century. Krauss, supra note 332, at 7.
335 Jared Diamond, World of the Living Dead, NATURAL HIST., Sept. 1991, at 30; cf
WILSON, supra note 131, at 278 (projecting the extinction rate solely from rainforest
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The United States plays an especially prominent role in this genocidal
story. Most of the surviving native languages of North America hang in an
especially precarious state between moribund and extinct. The linguistic
component of the longstanding federal policy of "terminating" Indian
sovereignty and culture formally ended only in 1990, with the passage of the
Native American Languages Act. 336 Not quite a third of Native Americans
today are familiar with their ancestral languages. 337 Four-fifths of the extant
native languages of Canada and the United States are moribund, in the sense
that they are no longer being learned by children. 338 The annual amount
budgeted by the federal government to this cultural preservation project
approaches $2 million-barely twice what the government devotes to saving the
Florida panther.339
Even languages with extensive literary traditions and millions of speakers
are vulnerable to the corrosive effects of American cultural hegemony. To a
German critic bemoaning the onslaught of English during an age of American
political, economic, and cultural ascendancy, the precarious persistence of
linguistic diversity serves as the last, best defense against cultural
homogenization. "Against rampant globalization, against all of these epidemics
of our insane desire for unification," he says, "no warning is as piercing" as the
biblical story of the Tower of Babel: "Mankind should not yearn for the uniting
of all peoples, to world government, to a universal language.'"340 In Europe, as
destruction "might easily reach 20 percent by 2022 and rise as high as 50 percent or more
thereafter").
336 Pub. L. No. 101477, 104 Stat. 1153 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994)).
See generally JAcK UrrER, AMERIcAN INDIANS: ANswERs TO TODAY'S QuEsToNs 83-84
(1993) (describing the end of the federal drive to commit linguistic genocide against Native
Americans); Lucille J. Watahomigie & Akira Y. Yamamoto, Local Reactions to Perceived
Language Decline, 68 LANGUAGE 10, 15-16 (1992) (describing the events leading to passage
of the Native American Languages Act).
3 37 See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INmAN 66-67 (1985); Mark
A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Traditions and the United States
Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1565, 1571 (1998).
338 See Krauss, supra note 332, at 5 (estimating that 149 of 187 such languages are no
longer being learned by children). See generally ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE WoRLD
9-55 (Barbara F. Grimes et al., 11th ed. 1988).
339 See James Brooke, Indians Striving to Save Their Languages, N.Y. TIMES, April 12,
1998, at Al.
340 Rolf Hochhuth, Deutsch? Bye-bye!, DER SPIEGEL, March 16, 1998, at 271, 275
("Gegen die weltweit marschierende Globalisierung, gegen alle diese Epidemien unseres
Einheitswahns gibt es keine eindringlichere Wamung: Wir Menschen sollten nicht zur
Vereinigung aller kommen wollen, zum Einheitsstat, zur Universalsprache.") (translation
from the German by the author with the kind assistance of Brigitte Frase). For a legally and
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in the rest of the world, the leading culprit is the "cultural nerve gas" known as
television.341 Absent massive and effective intervention, we seem doomed to
live in a dystopia where even German, like French and Polish, will be dimly
remembered as "dead language[s]."342
Meanwhile, American public schoolrooms are magnificent laboratories of
global linguistic diversity. The 1990 Census counted more than 31.8 million
persons in the United States who speak one of 298 languages besides English at
Home.343 Fairfax County, Virginia, counts more than one hundred native
languages in its public schools, while neighboring Alexandria boasts "the most
diverse school district in America. "344
This diversity is far from evenly distributed. In 1980, Spanish accounted
for roughly half of the linguistic diversity in the United States. 345 Although a
comprehensive study of language policy in the United States lies beyond the
scope of this article,346 it suffices to note that the debate over bilingual
religiously literate exegesis of the Babel story (recounted at Genesis 11:1-9), see Harold J.
Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAuL L. REv. 143, 165 (1994).
341 Krauss, supra note 322, at 6.
342 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEw WORiLD 25 (1932).
343 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING,
SUMMARY TAPE FILE 3c; Thomas H. Lee, Note, A Purposefid Approach to Products Liability
Warnings and Non-English-Speatang Commerce, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1109 n.7 (1994).
344 See M2 Presswire, May 14, 1998, 1998 WL 12206378 (quoting the Office of the
White House Press Secretary).
345 See Dorothy Waggoner, Language Minorities in the United States in the 1980s: The
Evidence from the 1980 Census, in LANGUAGE DnvERSrrY 79, 105 (Sandra McKay & San-
Ling Cynthia Wong eds., 1988); Edward Sagarin & Robert J. Kelly, Polylingualism in the
United States of America: A Multitude of Tongues Amid a Monolingual Majority, in
LANGUAGE POLICY AND NATIONAL UNrrY 20, 41 (William R. Beer & James E. Jacob eds.,
1985).
346 See generally Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008-10 (5th Cir. 1981)
(outlining standards for compliance with the Bilingual Education Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 880b (1994)); Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (declining to
enjoin the enforcement of California Proposition 227, which abolished bilingual education
programs in that state). In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1995),
the Supreme Court failed to address the merits of a state law declaring English the official
language and forbidding official communications in any other language. For studies of various
aspects of language policy in the United States, see Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the
Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293 (1989); Juan
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism,
and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices:
The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups From Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761; Leila
Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71
WASH. L. REv. 285 (1996); Frank M. Lowry, Comment, Through the Looking Glass:
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education has turned in part on the imbalance between Spanish and other
minority languages. Anecdotal evidence that children have been misplaced in
programs taught in languages other than their native tongue fueled California's
recent decisions to abolish bilingual education. 347 There is even one report that
the San Francisco schools have been assigning black students "for disciplinary
reasons to [bilingual] programs where the other language in use was
Chinese. "348
Indeed, diversity of its own force-the sheer number of languages
represented in American classrooms and the rate at which that number is
growing-has placed bilingual education beyond coherent design. Under Lau v.
Nichols,349 a school district can fulfill its Title VI obligations to children whose
native language is not English in either of two ways: by teaching them enough
English to mainstream them, or by teaching them in their mother tongue.350 But
in a remarkable illustration of network effects,351 at most a few of the foreign
languages represented in today's school districts can support a comprehensive
bilingual program. Students speaking infrequently encountered languages must
be mainstreamed. Yet it is jarring at the least and perhaps unlawful at the
extreme to channel speakers of Spanish into a bilingual program while inserting
speakers of Urdu into an English program. Each group has a colorable claim of
unequal treatment. The implications for affirmative action are grim: increasing
diversity, unaided by any other force, will destabilize efforts to accommodate
every racial, ethnic, or cultural difference in an equitable fashion.
D. A Final Burnt Offering
I could extend this survey of diversity even further. Although scholars
fixated on affirmative action speak as though diversity were synonymous with
racial difference, other forms of diversity abound. 352 Religious diversity bears
Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223 (1992); Note, "Official
English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 1345 (1987).
347 See, e.g., Toward a Common Culture, AsiAN WALL ST. J., June 5, 1998, at 10
(describing an "African-American father in the City of Oakland, whose 5-year-old was put in
a Cantonese-speaking kindergarten because the school he was required to attend offered no
such class in the boy's native English").
348 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1998).
349 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
350 See id. at 568-69.
35 1 See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
352 A leading version of diversity appears in immigration law. The diversity visa lottery
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special mention. In many free exercise cases, a minority religion pleads for
constitutional relief from a crushing legal burden. Compulsory education would
annihilate the Amish;353 education among goyim would harass the Hasidim into
destructive assimilation.354  For Native American religions, cemetery
destruction355 and prohibitions on peyote use356 pose a comparable threat. In
this context, religious and linguistic diversity routinely converge: "Because
that sets aside immigrant visas for citizens of foreign countries which have been
underrepresented in the American immigrant population, see Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 203, 104 Stat. 4978, 4986 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)),
embodies one of the few instances in American law in which the term "diversity" necessarily
subsumes a notion of historic underrepresentation. Thanks to the twisted path of American
immigration law between the patently racist "Quota Law" of 1921, Act of May 19, 1921, ch.
8, 42 Stat. 5, and the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1994)), a vastly
greater number of immigrants after 1965 came from places outside northwestern Europe-the
portions of the world where the old quotas had restricted immigration. See generally Gabriel
J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273 (1996) (recounting the history
of the 1965 Act as a "revolutionary" measure designed to eliminate race and national origin
as selection criteria for immigrants); Richard R. Hofstetter, Immigration Reform: Crisis and
Compromise, 5 B.C. T=IR WORLD L.J. 97, 105-06 (1985) (describing how quotas before
the 1965 reform failed to match overwhelming demand outside northwestern Europe). Yet the
legislative history of the 1990 Act suggests that Congress focused on the immigrant mix
during the quarter century after 1965, a period during which immigration from Europe
reached a historic low. See Walter P. Jacob, Note, Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and
Pork Barrel Politics, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 297, 301-10 (1992). The diversity visa lottery has
generated a fascinating but perverse array of winners and losers. The Irish and other
Europeans have been the primary beneficiaries. See Patricia I. Folan Sebben, U.S.
Immigration Law, Irish Immigration and Diversity: C6ad Mile Fdilte (A Thousand 77mes
Welcome)?, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 745, 746, 766--77 (1992). The primary losers are the two
largest groups of immigrants since 1965, Hispanics and Asians. See id. at 768. Little wonder
that the diversity visa program has been mocked as "affirmative action for the Irish," as a
"white man's lottery," id. at 766, and as "a preference program... as unjust as any form of
overt discrimination," Jacob, supra, at 301.
353 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
354 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 510 U.S. 1107
(1994).
355 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see
also Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1448 (1985) ("Adherents of traditional Indian religions
claim that development of certain areas threatens their religions with extinction. They fear that
development will undermine the religious power of sacred sites, inhibit communication with
spirits, prevent the collection of healing herbs, and even kill tribal deities.") (footnote
omitted).
3 56 See Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Native religions depend on the oral tradition for their transmission, the death of
a language often means the death of a religion. 357
It is hard to imagine why religious diversity should warrant less solicitude
than racial diversity. 358 Free exercise is as much a part of the Constitution as
equal protection. Therein lies a deep mystery. Why does educational
affirmative action put such a premium on racial diversity while paying little or
no heed to underrepresented religious groups? Eugene Volokh and Timothy
Hall have argued that there is no good answer to this question. 359 As far as I
know, no defender of affirmative action has attempted to reply.
For my part, I believe that the answer echoes an ancient edict: "I am
AFFIRMATIVE ACrION thy Law, which led you out of the racist land of
America, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before
me." 360 For racial diversity's most fervent adherents, this is Alpha and Omega,
the first and the last commandment. The American academy has no room for
religious diversity, or any other sort of diversity besides the racial variant,
because affirmative action is already the official religion. Just as constitutional
law fancies itself as America's civic religion, 361 affirmative action has become
academe's state church, complete with Bakke as its "sacred text," an extensive
commentary by pious patriarchs and matriarchs, "an ecclesiastical hierarchy, a
chronically alienated laity, and occasional holy wars." 362 "If this be heresy,
make the most of it. ",363
IV. DIVERSITY BY THE NUMBERS
It's an old one about a little dirt farm girl
Who wanted to get out for good
357 Michaels, supra note 337, at 1571.
358 See generally Yang, supra note 82 (arguing for equal judicial treatment of claims to
racial and religious diversity).
359 See Volokh, supra note 26, at 2070-76; see also Hall, supra note 211 at 585-91.
360 Cf. Exodus 20:2-3 (King James) ("I am the LoRD thy God, which have brought thee
out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before
me.").
361 See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MoRAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CoNgSTrrIoNALISM: A TI-EOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 14 (1993) (describing "Christian
theology and American constitutionalism" as structurally similar "moral traditions" that have
become "rivals or competitors" for believers seeking a "rational exploration of the nature of
human community and of the good life").
362 Jim Chen, Book Review, 11 CONST. COMMETARY 599, 602 (1994-95) (reviewing
POWELL, supra note 361).
363 Chen, supra note 161, at 1308-09 (paraphrasing Patrick Henry).
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She'd do anything to keep that dream
She'd do anything she could....
She just couldn't believe...
There was a price to pay -Blues Traveler 364
Now that we have organized several types of diversity according to an
admittedly contrived framework, let us specify the number of distinct groups-
species, plant varieties, television stations, political parties, or races-in each
vision of diversity. To facilitate the analysis, I shall count backwards in orders
of magnitude. Call it "logarithm rolling": the inversely exponential point of
view should suggest the magnitude of diversity at stake. Although numbers
alone do not define diversity, this census will give us a rough basis for assessing
the magnitude of diversity at issue in different contexts.
A. Ten Degrees and Getting Colder365
At the time of TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court placed the best available
estimate of species at roughly two million: "approximately 1.4 million full
species of animals and 600,000 full species of plants."366 More recent estimates
range from five to thirty million species of living organisms.367 One study
estimates thirty million species of insects alone. 368 Truth be told, biologists "do
not know to the nearest order of magnitude how many species exist on
earth. 369 Entire swaths of biodiversity, such as the abyssal benthos of the deep
sea370 and soil bacteria, 37 1 elude reliable quantification. The sheer number is so
364 BLUBS TRAVEaER, Price to Pay, on FouR (A&M Records 1994).
365 NANci GIupmH, Ten Degrees and Getting Colder, on Orimx VoicEs, OTHER
RooMs (Electra 1993).
366 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159 n.8 (1978).
367 See Mark A. Urbanski, Chemical Prospecting, Biodiversity Conservation, and the
Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Biological Materials,
2 BuFF. J. INT'LL. 131, 133 (1995); Wilson, supra note 133, at3, 5.
368 See Terry L. Erwin, Tropical Forest Canopies: The Last Biotic Frontier, 29 BULL.
ENToMoLoGIcAL Soc'YAM. 14 (1983).
369 WILSON, supra note 131, at 273; see also E.O. Wilson, The Biological Diversity
Crisis: A Challenge to Science, 2 IssUmS ScI. TECHNOL. 20 (1985).
370 see J. Frederick Grassle, Deep-Sea Benthic Biodiversity, 41 BIOSCIENcE 464 (1991)
(estimating perhaps as many as ten million species of animals on the floor of the deep sea
without guessing even to an order of magnitude as to the diversity of bacteria and other
microorganisms).
371 See Vigdis Torsvik et al., Comparison of Phenotypic Diversity and DNA
Heterogeneity in a Population of Soil Bacteria, 56 APPLID & ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 776
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
overwhelming that the otherwise routine enterprise of arranging species within
Linnaean taxonomy "remains by force a part of modem science." 372
Given the uncertainty over the absolute number of species on earth,
"[t]here is no way to measure the absolute amount of biological diversity
vanishing year by year. ' 373 Edward Wilson nevertheless offers what he
considers "the most conservative estimate" of the current extinction rate from
rainforest destruction alone: twenty-seven thousand species per year-seventy-
four per day or three per hour.374 This rate is four orders of magnitude faster
than estimates of extinction rates over geological time-two species per year
since the beginning of the Cambrian period 590 million years ago. 375 In the
spirit of a scientific ethic that must choose between the true and the beautiful
when it cannot unite the tWO, 376 let us expand biodiversity's orders of
magnitude to a full poetic ten.377 Ten degrees, and definitely getting colder by
the minute.
B. Four
Of the vast number of animal species on earth, a minute proportion are
(1990); Vigdis Torsvik, High Diversity in DNA of Soil Bacteria, 56 APPLID & ENVTL.
MICROBIOLOGY 776, 782 (1990) (finding roughly ten thousand species of microbes in two
separate grams of sediment and offering no guess on the total degree of microbiological
diversity on earth).
372 WILSON, supra note 258, at 137; see also WILSON, supra note 131, at 318
(estimating the effort needed to document ten million species would consume twenty-five
thousand professional lifetimes); Wilson, supra note 133, at 14 (adding that the effort boasts
"one of the lowest cost-benefit ratios of all scientific disciplines").
373 WILSON, supra note 131, at 280.
374 See id.
375 See David M. Raup, Cohort Analysis of Generic Survivorship, 4 PALEoBIOLOGY 1
(1978) (deriving from the fossil record an estimated extinction rate of 9% per million years,
or roughly one species every five years in a biosphere containing two million species); David
M. Raup, Diversity Crises in the Geological Past, in BiODvERsrrY, supra note 133, at 51, 54
(increasing the slower extinction rate by "a factor of 10" in order to account for extinct "local
endemic species" not detectable by paleontologists).
376 See Obituaries (of Hermann Weyl), 177 NATuRE 457, 458 (1956) (quoting the
physicist Hermann Weyl: "My work tried to unite the true with the beautiful; but when I had
to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful."), quoted in WILSON, supra note
258, at 61.
377 If we cannot safely project all ten degrees across contemporary biodiversity, the
recognition that "almost all the species that ever lived are extinct," WILSON, supra note 131,
at 216, might let us project these ten degrees across geological time. Extinction rates over the
last three eras of geological time, as computed by David Raup, see sources cited supra note
375, would justify this addition of three or four orders of magnitude.
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birds and mammals. The roughly forty species of domestic livestock are drawn
from this sliver of terrestrial biodiversity. 378 The four thousand to five thousand
surviving domestic breeds of these species, enhanced by the genes from
roughly eighty species of wild relatives, "comprise the world's animal genetic
resources important for food and agriculture. ,379
The plant kingdom is fairing only somewhat better. The Seed Sowers
Exchange stockpiles nearly 20,000 varieties of heirloom crops, including seven
varieties of apples, two hundred varieties of grapes, and 18,000 varieties of
other food crops.380 Genetic engineering and other advanced techniques of
plant breeding have enhanced agriculture's biological arsenal. Between the
passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 and 1989, commercial plant
breeders have received certificates for more than two thousand new varieties of
sexually reproducing plants. 381 Between 1930 and 1989, the Patent and
Trademark Office issued more than six thousand plant patents for asexually
reproduced plants. 382
This survey of distinct plant varieties and distinct animal breeds fails to
account for plant hybrids protected solely under state laws or trade secrets and
includes ornamental plants as well as plants cultivated for food, fuel, or fiber.
We may nevertheless treat the resulting number of thirty or forty thousand
varieties and breeds as a rough measure of the orders of magnitude of
biological diversity in agriculture. That number is four. If the orders of
magnitude of biodiversity in the wild are estimated at eight, there would be only
half as many orders of magnitude on the farm.
The ten thousand-fold reduction in diversity bears a chilling resemblance to
other ratios common in contemporary discussions of extinction. The sixty-five
million years between the extinction of the dinosaurs and the present are ten
378 To be sure, other animals are candidates for domestication. Humanity has tamed the
honeybee and the silkworm, see DIAMoND, supra note 153, at 158, and some authorities
advocate the domestication of iguanas, see WILSON, supra note 131, at 294-96; WORLD
WATCH IST, supra note 268, at 734. This is not even to mention fish and crustaceans. But an
elite group of birds and ungulate mammals remains undisputed agrarian champions after
millennia of animal husbandry.
379 WORLD WATCH LiST, supra note 268, at 28.
380 Telephone Conservation with Ms. Arlyss Adelmann of Seed Sowers Exchange,
Decorah, Iowa, on Oct. 29, 1998.
381 See ROBERT JONDLE, Overview and Status of Plant Property Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs AssOcIATED wrrH PLANTS 5, 6-7 (1989); Neil D.
Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer (and the Crop)?: Contract
Production and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. Rnv. 48, 95
(1994).
382 See JONDLE, supra note 381, at 7.
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thousand times as long as the history of human civilization.383 Another
frightening ratio: through habitat destruction in the rainforest alone, "[h]uman
activity has increased extinction" by as much as "10,000 times over [the] level"
one would expect from natural selection.384 Even ten thousand as a cardinal
number has evolutionary significance: roughly ten thousand years ago, the
Paleo-Indian invasion precipitated the catastrophic extirpation of much of North
America's megafauna. 385
The lesson is clear: On the farm as in the wild, human intervention
dramatically reduces diversity. Modem agriculture gives a perverse twist to one
of the traditional lessons learned by farm children: "things die." 386 Four orders
of magnitude by four, diversity disappears.
C. Fifty-Seven Channels (And Nothin' On)387
As we cross the boundary between the natural world and the human world,
we witness another dramatic decline in diversity. During any given time slot,
mass media can be only as diverse as the number of channels. Until 1990 there
were three national television networks. That year, in a unheralded decision that
effectively reduced Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC388 to "nothing more
than... 1990's second most important legal development affecting minority
programming, '389 the FCC waived its finsyn and prime time access rules so
that the newborn Fox network could combat NBC, ABC, and CBS. 390 Two
smaller "emerging networks," 391 Warner and UPN, have brought the total
number to six. In a flat contradiction of the assumption that the narrowness of
the electromagnetic spectrum operates as the primary constraint on the number
of broadcasters, 392 the rise of new networks during the 1990s exposed how the
383 See WLSON, supra note 258, at 122.
384 WILSON, supra note 131, at 280; see also supra note 375 and accompanying text.
385 See DIAMOND, supra note 313, at 46-47; WLSON, supra note 131, at 246-49.
386 Susan Machler, People with Pipes: A Question of Euthanasia, 16 U. PuGEr SOUND
L. REv. 781, 782 (1993).
387 BRUcE SPRiNGsrEN, 57 Channels (and Nothin' On), on HUMAN ToucH (Columbia
1992).
388 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
389 Chen, supra note 195, at 1493 (noting that within three years of its emergence, the
Fox network captured half of the ten programs most popular among black viewers); see also
Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a New
Key, 25 U. MEMPHS L. REv. 1315, 1343-44 (1995) (same).
390 See Fox Broad. Co., 5 F.C.C.R. 3211 (1990).
391 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.662(f) (1998) (defining an "emerging network").
392 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) ("Where there are
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FCC's localism policy had kept the number of viable national networks at
three.393 That number, of course, could have been and was even lower; ABC
grew out of the Blue network that NBC was forced to divest during the early
1940s.394 The Commission giveth, and the Commission taketh away.
Modem video technology alleviates the tedium somewhat. As of 1994,
about 40% of the cable systems in the United States boasted a capacity of more
than fifty-three channels. 395 In other words, nearly half of America's cable
systems can carry the mind-numbing fifty-seven channels that became the
subject of Bruce Springsteen's protest against audiovisual boredom.396 Direct
broadcast satellite, "even in its nascent state," has been offering "between 45
and 75 video channels and up to 30 music channels," with a capacity for 360
using existing data compression technology.397
Depending on the precise method of delivery, the audiovisual diversity
found in the typical American living room ranges from slightly below ten to a
number approaching one hundred. The orders of magnitude of diversity in this
realm therefore range from slightly below one to slightly below two.
D. Nuts!
"And it's true we are immune / When fact is fiction and T.V. is
reality. ... "398 The amount of diversity in broadcast television roughly
approximates the diversity contemplated in American affirmative action
programs. American law plots racial diversity on a pentagram: white, black,
Asian American, Native American, and an all-embracing Hispanic category
whose members may be "of any race." By comparison, more than half of the
television markets in the United States "receive fewer than five commercial
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it
is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish."); see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (following RedLion).
393 See sources cited supra note 235.
394 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 208 (1943); National
Broad. Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 316
U.S. 447 (1942); LEoNARD H. GOLDENSON & MARvIN J. WoLF, BEATING THE ODDs: THE
UNTOLD STORY BEmND THE RiSE OF ABC 96-97 (1991); STERING QUINLAN, INSmE ABC:
Am1EcAN BROADCASTING COmPANY's RISE TO POWER 20 (1979).
395 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 628.
396 See SPRINGSIEEN, supra note 387.
397 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
398 U2, Sunday Bloody Sunday, on WAR (Island Records 1983).
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broadcast channels (including UHF channels), and only twenty percent receive
seven or more."'399 Race in America, like broadcast television, boasts
something less than a single order of magnitude of diversity. The snack bowl
supplies what may be the starkest measure of the boredom in both realms. The
typical jar of mixed nuts (peanuts, cashews, almonds, walnuts, filberts, and
Brazil nuts) offers as much excitement as Free TV (NBC, ABC, CBS, Fox,
Warner, UPN) and more variety than the EEOC.4°0 Adding macadamia nuts or
pistachios might make the thrill too big to bear.
Of course, it could be worse. Most cases designed to preserve political
diversity contemplate no more than two choices. Even the highly oligopolistic
long-distance telephone market immediately after the Bell breakup-AT&T,
MCI, and Sprint-offered a broader spectrum of options.40 1 Although the
Supreme Court has frowned upon state laws that "favor[ ] two particular
parties-the Republicans and the Democrats-and in effect.., give them a
complete monopoly,' 402 the better part of the Court's jurisprudence suggests
that there is such a thing as too much political diversity. In voting as in
broadcast regulation, the government enjoys substantial leeway in channeling
the "cacophony of competing voices, none of which [can] be clearly and
predictably heard" 4°3 into a very limited number of officially sanctioned
pathways. To the extent state laws give "legal force to the internal nominating
rules of' the Democratic and Republican Parties, they "raise the cost of
399 Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane).
400 So that's why "[they] want [their] MTV." DIRE STRArrs, Money for Nothing, on
BROTmRS IN ARMs (WEA/Wamer Bros. 1985).
40 1 See PAUL W. MAcAvoy, THE FAiLURE Op ANTrrRUST AND REGULAnON TO
ESTABLISH COMPEITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERvicEs 64 (1996). The modified
final judgment that broke up the Bell system was rendered in United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affid mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See generally Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political
Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 835, 850-59 (1997)
(describing the path of telecommunications law between the Bell breakup and the
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)).
402 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 805-06 (1983) (rejecting "political stability" as a basis for a law that imposed an
unreasonably early filing deadline on independent candidates).
403 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (footnote omitted); cf
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1945) (noting that awarding a
broadcast license necessarily precludes another applicant's proposal to broadcast on the
identical or nearby frequencies).
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defecting from the two major parties." 4°4 In cases permitting states to restrict
primaries to registered party members,4°5 to ban write-in votes 40 6 and fusion
tickets, 40 7 and to exclude minor party candidates from debates,40 8 the Justices
have generally adhered to the maxim, "third parties need not apply. " 409 Justice
Scalia, in particular, has defended the old-fashioned spoils system as a bulwark
of the two-party system.410 Although additional parties can supply a powerful
check on the two dominant parties, 411 the relevant cases give states ample room
to restrict the factional habitat of political parties in the name of preventing
voter confusion, "voter intimidation[,]... election fraud," and the like.412
Such "[s]tability-enhancing regulation" is merely a tool by which "state
legislatures (comprised exclusively of Democrats and Republicans) ... create
practically unchangeable two-party oligopolies." 413
That politics should reduce diversity so dramatically should come as no
404 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 182, at 668 (describing the ballot access provisions
at issue in Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 (1996)).
405 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 731-34 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973). But cf Tashijian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986)
(allowing a party to permit independents to vote in its primary notwithstanding state law to the
contrary).
406 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439-40 & n.9 (1992) (upholding a ban on
write-in voting as a measure for combating factionalism and fraud, preventing "party
raiding," "enforcing nominating requirements," and "'fostering informed and educated
expressions of the popular will'").
407 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1997).
408 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1644 (1998)
(upholding a decision to exclude an independent candidate for Congress from a televised
debate because the candidate "had generated no appreciable public interest").
409 See Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot Access Rights: Third
Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1991) (arguing that much of the state
ballot-access legislation is unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize
this unconstitutionality).
410 See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 92 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cf
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (assuming without deciding that the protection of
incumbents can be a legitimate interest in redistricting decisions); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 673 & n.10 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (same).
411 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 182, at 681-83; cf. MAURICE DuvERGER,
PoLrnCAL PARTiES: THEIm ORiGIN AND AcrnvrrY IN TiE MODERN STATE 216-18 (Barbara
North & Robert North trans., 1954) (describing the two-party system as the byproduct of
simple majority and single-member districting rules).
4 12 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (upholding a law prohibiting the
solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a
polling place).
413 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 182, at 686.
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surprise. Let us again treat the six thousand extant human languages as a rough
measure of human cultural diversity. Even if four-fifths of these languages
disappear during our lifetimes, the linguistic diversity that remained would still
span three orders of magnitude. By contrast, there are only 185 nation-states
belonging to the United Nations.414 The nation-state as a form of political
organization, thought in modem times to facilitate the self-determination of
peoples, 415 falls short of capturing human linguistic diversity by a full order of
magnitude.
When race and politics intersect, diversity diminishes even further. Even
though pleas to expand the traditional two-race paradigm have become a staple
of Asian-American 416 and Hispanic417 legal scholarship, the Supreme Court's
voting rights cases are stuck in a binary analytical mode. Thornburg v.
Gingles,418 the leading case interpreting section 2 of the reinvigorated Voting
Rights Act, speaks exclusively in terms of a single majority race and a single
minority race.4 19
The Court can barely envision, much less resolve, a voting rights case
involving more than two racial blocs. In United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,420 the Court could not and did not distinguish the
voting interests of Hasidic Jews-the epitome of a discrete and insular
minority-from those of other whites. More recently, a federal district court
practically choked on the famously incompatible claims of black and Hispanic
414 See United Nations, United Nations Member States (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
'<http://www.un.orgloverview/umember.html>.
415 See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points, Address of the President Before a
Joint Meeting of the Senate and House (Jan. 8, 1918) in 56 CONG. REc. 690-91 (1918). See
generally Mark Movsesian, The Persistent Nation-State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 18 CARaozo L. REv. 1083, 1084-94 (1996) ("sketch[ing]" a "broad outline" of the
history of the nation-state).
416 See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1290
(1998) (book review); Lance T. Izumi, Confounding the Paradigm: Asian Americans and
Race Preferences, 11 NoTRE DAME J.L. EmTIcs & PUB. POL'Y 121, 129-30 (1997); Frank
H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIaD
WoRLD L.J. 225 (1995).
417 See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995) (arguing that the increased racial and ethnic
diversity in America requires a new approach to race-conscious remedies).
418 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
419 See id. at 50-51 (recognizing a § 2 vote dilution claim where "the minority group" is
"sufficiently large," "geographically compact," and "politically cohesive" to amass a winning
"majority in a single-member district" but can be and often is defeated by bloc voting by the
"white majority").
420 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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voters in Florida.421 Faced with what it considered "two independent, viable
Section 2 claims," the court declined to add either an additional black district or
an additional Hispanic district.422 The Supreme Court ultimately dodged the
competing claims by holding that neither group's circumstances could "support
a finding of vote dilution." 423 One of the il-starred districts in Bush v. Vera424
"squiggle[d]" and "spurt[ed]" multiple "wings, or fingers" in order "to enclose
black voters, while excluding nearby Hispanic residents." 425
These cases shed a sobering light on the soul of diversity under
racialism.426 Especially when more than one racial bloc is involved, "racial
gerrymandering in [the] vote dilution cases" is merely "a slightly less precise
mechanism than the racial register for allocating representation on the basis of
race." 427 The redistricting game vividly illustrates the zero-sum game that any
affirmative action scheme ultimately becomes. In politics, after all, "[s]ome
candidate, along with his supporters, always loses." 428 There is an even larger
but simpler lesson. Race, being a purely political phenomenon, takes on no
more diversity than its immediate political context permits.
E. (Absolute) Zero
It can get worse. When diversity diminishes to zero orders of magnitude, it
disappears altogether. It becomes a single, lonely point.429 In educational
affirmative action, this is precisely what has happened. This logarithmic tour of
diversity by the numbers ends at zero.
421 See DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1577 (N.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd in
part, rev'd inpart sub nom. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
422 DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. at 1577.
423 Johnson v. Degrandy, 512 U.S. at 1024.
424 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
425 Id. at 973-74 (quoting Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts, "and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 MiCH. L. REv. 483, 556 (1993)).
426 Cf. OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALUISM (auth. ed. 1910).
427 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 908 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
428 United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977).
429 See EDwiN ABBOTr, FLATAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DnMENsIoNs 93 (6th ed.,
Dover Publications 1952) (1884) (describing "the realm of Pointland, the Abyss of No
Dimensions," as "the lowest depth of existence"). See generally Timothy P. Terrell, F/atlaw:
An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental
Normative Principles, 72 CAL. L. Rav. 288, 289 (1984) (using Flatland's depiction of a two-
dimensional world as an extended metaphor "for describing and assessing the related mental
exercise of legal reasoning").
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"Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be
asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal
standing of their ethnic groups." 430 In the two decades since Bakke, however,
the academy's "celebration of diversity" consists principally of an unyielding
"demand for conformity."'431 Although minority students and scholars "have
fewer degrees of freedom than their white counterparts," affirmative action's
enforcers systematically demand and often exact tribute in honor of race-
conscious admissions and hiring.432  Multiculturalism, the philosophy
underlying diversity-based affirmative action, has arguably become the
ascendant ideology in American education today. 433 The faction that was
"principally responsible for the Civil Rights Revolution" divided bitterly over
whether to adopt or to oppose race-based affirmative action. 434 Having
conquered the academy, affirmative action's proponents are proceeding to
hound the dissidents. Too often a commitment to diversity means rude behavior
toward critics of official race-consciousness, especially if those unfortunate
victims are nonwhite. 435 In large portions of the black community, it is no
longer possible to contemplate a "genuinely black" person who expresses
opposition to or even skepticism toward affirmative action, no more than we
can speak of a feminist against abortion rights.436 There is no other way to
explain the abuse directed at individuals as diverse as Clarence Thomas,
Randall Kennedy, Keith and Maria Hylton, and Ward Connerly. 437 At a more
subtle level, survey the ranks of law school deans, even of faculty appointments
committees. You will find few, if any, outspoken critics of affirmative action.
The persecution of those accused of crimes against diversity has inflicted
430 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
431 Arthur Schelsinger, Jr., Annual Doctoral Commencement, City University of New
York 8 (1994), quoted in NEL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND AcADEac FREEIbM: A LEGAL
AND HI oRICAL PERSPECnVE 64 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
432 Chen, supra note 10, at 1904.
433 See NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MumncuLTuRA= Now 4 (1995)
("[Multiculturalism in education... has, in a word, won.").
434 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1327-28 (1986).
435 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFnwAVE ACION BABY 103
(1993); DANIEL A. FARBER & SuZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMEuCAN LAw 78-84 (1997).
436 See Deborah Malamud, Values, Symbols and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate,
95 Mica. L. REv. 1668, 1713 (1997).
437 See Chen, supra note 10, at 1904-05.
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deep, abiding harm on higher education. 438 Such is the "mischief [that] lies in
using race... as a proxy for intellectual diversity." 439 So much for academic
freedom as "a special concern of the First Amendment. "'44 How especially sad
it is to recall the age when controversy was the very heart of free speech.44 1 By
the waters of Babylon we wept, when we remembered Zion.442
"Some say the world will end in fire / Some say in ice." 4 3 From the
"chilling effect"444 to the Supreme Court's "darkest, most despondent"
depictions of "fire and suffocation,"445 the predominant image of censorship in
free speech jurisprudence waivers between ice and fire. Ray Bradbury's science
fiction classic Fahrenheit 451 clearly favors fire.446 For my part, I prefer a
temperature besides the kindling point of paper. "[I]ce, I think," would
suffice.447 Absolute zero, zero degrees Kelvin, is surely the temperature of
hell. 448 It likewise represents the loss of diversity in our survey of endangered
438 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163, 189 (suggesting that treating "ethnic jokes" as "the
ultimate problem facing minority students within universities" gives short shrift to vastly more
pressing concerns such as "the extremely high attrition rates for some groups of minority
students" and "the right to engage in frank and controversial discussion of racial issues").
439 Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The
Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEx. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1993).
440 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); accord Regents of the
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). See generally J. Peter Byme, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989) (analyzing
the roles of the Constitution and the courts in protecting academic freedom).
441 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 547 (1980);
c.f, e.g., Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("A function of free
speech... is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.").
442 See Psalms 137:1.
443 ROBERT FROST, Fire and Ice, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 268, 268
(1949).
444 As penance for reciting this most hackneyed of legalisms, I shall cite Richard
Posner's concise catalogue of "cliches" of the judicial vocabulary. See Richard A. Posner,
The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 1 & n.2 (1984).
44 5 Jim Chen, Rock n'Roll Law School, 12 CONsT. COMMENTARY 315, 320 (1995).
4 46 RAY BRADBuRY, F ImENl 451 (1953).
447 FROST, supra note 443, at 268.
448 See DATE AUGmm, THE INFERNO OF DANTE, canto XXXIV, 11. 48-58, at 367
(Robert Pinsky trans., Farrer, Strauss & Giroux 1994), quoted in Chen, supra note 10, at
1845 n.42.
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species and university admissions. The death of diversity in the race-conscious
university is the true "inexorable zero" at issue in affirmative action.449
From the natural world to the university, the blinding speed at which
diversity has disappeared helps explain the mind-numbing nature of this debate.
Any university, or even education at large, is merely an "island of minute
dimensions[,] desperately isolated.., and simpler and less diverse by [degrees]
of magnitude than the environment in which" we naturally operate.450 "The
tedium in such a reduced world" is unavoidably "oppressive for highly trained
people aware of the grandeur of the original biosphere." 451 Deliver us.
V. THE ToOLBOx OF THE GODS
I will twine and will mingle my waving black hair
With the roses so red and the lilies so fair
The myrtle so green of an emerald hue
The pale emanita and violets of blue ....
Oh, he taught me to love him, he called me his flower
A blossom to cheer him through life's weary hour
But now he has gone and left me alone
The wildflowers to weep and the wild birds to man.....
I'll dance and I'll sing and my life shall be gay
I'll banish this weeping, drive troubles away
I'll live yet to see him regret this dark hour
When he won and neglected his frail wildwood flower.452
Aldo Leopold began his Sand County Almanac with a famous division of
humanity: "There are some who can live without wild things, and some who
cannot."'453 He was wrong. None of us can live without wild things. Insects,
the lone class of animals targeted by an exclusion from the Endangered Species
Act,454 are so essential to life on earth that if they "and other land-dwelling
449 See cases cited supra note 70.
450 WILSON, supra note 258, at 117.
451 Id.
452 JOAN BAEZ, Wildwood Flower, on JOAN BAEz (Vanguard 1960) (delivering a stirring
version of this traditional folk song).
453 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKErTCmS HERE AND THERE, at
vii (1949).
454 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994) (excluding from "[t]he term 'endangered
species' ... a species of the Class Insecta determined ... to constitute a pest whose
protection... would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man").
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anthropods... were to disappear, humanity probably could not last more than
a few months." 455 "Most of the amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals,"
along with "the bulk of the flowering plants and... the physical structure of
most forests and other terrestrial habitats" would disappear in turn. 456 The
world of higher organisms would, as it did at the end of the Permian period,
have "an extremely close brush with total destruction. '457 "The land would
return to" something resembling its Cambrian condition, "covered by mats of
recumbent wind-pollinated vegetation, sprinkled with clumps of small trees and
bushes here and there, largely devoid of animal life." 458
This fable of a world without insects illustrates the most extreme example
of ecological services provided by nonhuman species. 459 The honeybee, its
compatriots in the class Insecta, and every other species is a "magic well": the
more you draw, the deeper it gets.460 After surveying the many values
advanced by biological diversity and the conservation of endangered species,
this part explores the values putatively served by racial and ethnic diversity in
higher education. As this article's opening comparison of Bakke with TVA v.
Hill suggests, there are strong parallels between educational affirmative action
and the Endangered Species Act. A close examination of those connections-
and of the two legal schemes' significant differences-will bring us far closer to
a mature understanding of that decisive legal term, "diversity."
A. The Treasure of the Tierra Madre
The Endangered Species Act explicitly acknowledges the "esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of
endangered species and the biodiversity they represent. 461 Allied bodies of
international law confirm this view:462 global biological diversity is part of the
455 WILSON, supra note 131, at 133.
456 Id.
457 Raup, Diversity Crises in the Geological Past, supra note 375, at 52.
4 58 WILSON, supra note 131, at 133.
459 See Edward 0. Wilson, The Little Things That Run the World, 1 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 344 (1987).
460 Compare WSON, supra note 258, at 17 (recounting how the "great German
zoologist Karl von Frisch" described "his favorite organism ... the honeybee" as "a magic
well") with id. at 19 ("Every species is a magic well.").
461 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1994).
462 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into force July 1, 1975); Convention on
Biological Diversity, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, done June 5,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
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commonly owned heritage of all humanity and accordingly deserves full legal
protection.463 The values of biodiversity fall into three overlapping categories:
commodities, ecological services, and aesthetics.
1. Demeter's Dominion
First, many species are phenotypical or genotypical natural resources. In
the quaint language of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the species themselves
are "instrumentalities of interstate commerce." 464 American courts and
commentators have often noted the value of wild species as a supply of food.46 5
A world that is steadily losing its food security46 6 might expand the storehouse
of twenty plant species that supply nine-tenths of humanity's food supply. 467
"Waiting in the wings are tens of thousands of unused plant species, many
demonstrably superior to those in favor. '468 As genetic warehouses, many
plants are enhancing the productivity of crops already in use. In the United
States alone, the genes of wild plants have accounted for much of "the
explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s." 469 The contribution is
worth $1 billion each year.470
Moving from nature's farm to nature's pharmacy, we see even more
dramatic gains.471 Aspirin and penicillin-our star analgesic and antibiotic-had
humble origins in the meadowsweet plant and in cheese mold. 472 Leeches,
463 See Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public
Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 591-92 (1995).
464 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
465 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920); WILLIAM T. HORNADAY, OUR
VANISHING WILD LIF : Is EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION 236-43 (1913); WnLZAM T.
HORNADAY, WILD LIFE CONSERVATION IN THEORY Am PRACTICE 103-10 (1914).
466 See Luther Tweeten, Dodging a Malthusian Bullet in the 21st Century, 14
AGRIBUSINES 15 (1998).
467 See WILSON, supra note 131, at 287.
468 Id. at 289; see also id. at 287 (reporting that 30,000 plant species are known to have
edible parts and that seven thousand of these have been grown or collected for food at some
point in human history).
469 National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(opinion of Wald, J.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
4 70 See Endangered Species Act: Oversight Hearing Before the Task Force on
Endangered Species Act of the Comm. on Resources, House of Representatives, 104th Cong.
190(1995).
47 1 See generally Medicinal Uses of Plants; Protection for Plants Under the Endangered
Species Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993).
472 On aspirin, see WILSON, supra note 131, at 283. On penicillin, see Home Builders,
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vampire bats, and pit vipers save more hearts in the emergency room than they
stop in cinemas. These three species all contribute anticoagulant drugs that
reduce blood pressure, prevent heart attacks, and facilitate skin transplants. 473
The Costa Rican government is working together with Merck & Co., the
multinational pharmaceutical company, to assay that country's rich biota.474 A
single commercially viable product derived "from, say, any one species among
the twelve thousand plants and 300,000 insects estimated to live in... [Costa
Rica] could handsomely repay Merck's entire investment" of $1 million in
1991 dollars. 475 Gene splicing and other techniques for biological engineering
at the molecular level have opened the entire natural world's storehouse of
genetic wealth to human exploitation.
This evaluation of species as commodities and genetic warehouses is surely
understated. We have yet to account for option value, or the wealth that future
generations would transfer to the present in order to preserve an endangered
species for future exploitation. 476 Nor have we attempted to assess the even
more elusive value placed by individuals who expect never to use a species
directly but nevertheless would be willing to pay to ensure the species'
"existence."4477 Which species saved from unthinking development will be the
next perennial maize? 478 Absent aggressive legal intervention, what species will
lie silent in Grey's Country Graveyard?479 Who will recount the stories interred
130 F.3d at 1053 n.13; BIODIvERsrrY 1: UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECnNG OuR
BioLOICAL REsouRcEs 9 (Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla et al. eds., 1997).
473 See WSON, supra note 131, at 285-86; BIoDIvERsrTY II, supra note 472, at 9.
474 See generally Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Recent Development, Using the Merck-
INBio Agreement to Clarify the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 356-72 (1993) (suggesting the use of a private agreement between
Merck Pharmaceuticals and the government of Costa Rica as a practical approach to resolving
the contested issues of the Convention on Biological Diversity).
475 WISON, supra note 131, at 321.
476 See generally DAVID W. PEARcE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATuRAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 148-53 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A.
Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993).
477 See generally Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to
Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) (distinguishing this form of
"contingent valuation" from the standard measure of option value).
478 See Hugh H. fltis et al., Zea diploperennis (Gramineae): A New Teosinte from
Mexico, 203 SCEtcE 186 (1979) (reporting the discovery of a wild relative of domestic corn,
unique among maizes in growing perennially, on a few acres of land that were a week away
from being cleared for subsistence agriculture).
479 Cf. WILSON, supra note 131, at 244.
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with their tellers along the banks of the Spoon River?480 Silence, unbroken.
2. Gaia and Her Retinue
As the fable of a world without insects illustrates, animals, plants, and
microorganisms provide ecological services. 481 The Supreme Court has lauded
the pesticidal talents of migratory birds.482 Numerous organisms process the air
we breathe, the water we drink, the ground on which we walk. 4 8 3 Other species
serve as sentries. Just as canaries warned coal miners of lethal gases, the
decline or disappearance of indicator species provides an early warning system
against deeper environmental threats. 484 When frogs sprout extra limbs,
develop genital deformities, or disappear altogether, they sound a piercing
environmental alarm. 485
Still other organisms serve as keystone species. 486 These species play such
a central role in their ecosystem that their extirpation leads to a total imbalance
in other species, either extinction or unprecedented abundance. 487 Remove sea
otters from the Pacific coast, and sea urchins will strip the sea floor of its
biologically diverse kelp beds.488 By keeping rodent populations in check,
jaguars and pumas serve as the de facto managers of the rainforest, thereby
contending strongly for the title of "the big things that run the world. 489
480 See EDGAR LEE MASTERS, SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY (John E. Hallwas ed., Univ.
of ll. Press 1992) (1915).
481 See generally PAUL EHRUCH & ANNE EHRUCH, EXTINCTION 86-95 (1981).
482 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1919).
483 See CHARLES C. MANN & MAml L. PLUMME, NOAH'S CHOIcE: Tim FutURE OF
ENDANGERED SPEciES 123 (1995); John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV.
1171, 1210 (1998).
484 See Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That
Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?,
80 IOWA L. REv. 297, 301 & n.20 (1995).
485 See Kim A. McDonald, Sharp Decline of Amphibians Alarms Biologists Worldwide,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 24, 1998, at All.
486 See Oregon Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 339 (9th Cir.
1996); Ruhl, supra note 139, at 591.
487 See generally WILSON, supra note 131, at 164-72; Peter B. Landres et al.,
Ecological Uses of Vertebrate Indicator Species: A Critique, 2 CONSERVATON BIOLOGY 316
(1988).
4 88 See David 0. Duggins, Kelp Beds and Sea Otters: An Experimental Approach, 61
EcoLOGY 447 (1980).
489 John Terborgh, The Big Things That Run the World-A Sequel to E.O. Wilson, 2
CONSERVAiON BIOLOGY 402 (1988); cf Norman Owen-Smith, Megafaunal Extinctions: The
Conservation Message from 11,000 Years B.P., 3 CONSERVATiON BIOLOGY 405 (1989)
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The conservation of nonhuman organisms yields an amenity that is
arguably even more important: ecosystem protection. By protecting discrete
species, we indirectly protect the ecosystems-and all the species that live in
them.490 Some larger tropical animals may not carry great utilitarian value in
themselves, but the human urge to protect these charismatic "flagship species"
helps protect the rainforest at large.491 The bald eagle has served this function
in the country that has adopted it as the national symbol.492 Indeed, to save any
species, we must protect the ecosystems in which they live. 493
3. Persephone Is the Mother of the Muses
The true aesthete shuns the very thought of placing a value on beauty.494
"'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,'-that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need
to know."'495 Defenders of biodiversity nevertheless can and do measure the
"tangible economic value" of the pleasure derived from "visiting,
photographing, painting, and just looking at wildlife." 496 The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service placed the economic impact in 1991 of wildlife observation
and feeding at $18.1 billion in consumer spending, $3 billion in tax revenues,
and 766,000 jobs.497 Failure to protect threatened and endangered species
(offering as contestants the elephants, rhinoceroses, and other large herbivores that effectively
manage the African savanna).
490 See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Comple Adaptive System: How
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv.
933, 972 (1997).
491 See Paul R. Ehrlich & Edward 0. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy,
253 ScIENcE 758, 760 (1991); cf Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics and the
Preservation of Species, in THE PRESVATION OF SPECIMS: THE VALUE OF BIOLOGICAL
DivEmRTy 79, 87-88 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986) (noting and criticizing the human
preference for species with utilitarian value, legendary or patriotic significance, or some
intangible appeal to the human sense of beauty).
492 See Donell R. Grubbs, Of Spotted Owls and Bald Eagles: Raptor Conservation
Soars into the '90s, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 451,480-81 (1990).
493 See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual
and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1129 (1996).
494 See, e.g., OscAR WILDE, TiE PiCrURE OF DORiAN GRAY 4 (Donald L. Lawler ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) (1891) ("All art is quite useless.").
4 95 JoHn KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in THE COMPLEIT POEMS 344, 346 (John
Bamnard ed., 1973).
496 Nagle, supra note 483, at 1209.
497 See JAMEs D. CAUDiL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 1991 ECONOMIC IMPACrS OF
NONCONSUMTVw WLDLIFE-RELATED RECREATION 6-7 (1997); see also Nagle, supra note
483, at 1209-10 (distinguishing between amounts spent on wildlife observation in general and
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might even reduce traffic among "amateur students of nature or professional
scientists who ... [travel] to observe and study these species .... 498 On a
global scale, ecotourism gives tropical countries, home to most of the world's
species, a viable alternative to subsistence agriculture and other destructive
means of sustenance. Costa Rican rainforests preserved for ecotourism "have
become many times more profitable per hectare than land cleared for pastures
and fields," while the endangered gorilla has turned ecotourism into "the third
most important source of income in Rwanda." 499
But what of the species that lack any agricultural or pharmaceutical value,
that are so short of charisma that humans are unlikely to value them for
aesthetic reasons or to lobby for their protection? In light of the debate over
whether Endangered Species Act enforcement should more consciously account
for costs and benefits,500 the fate of seemingly useless and ugly creatures looms
large. To put it bluntly, most species languish on the margins of our historical,
recreational, and scientific balance sheets.501 "The vast majority of endangered
species probably will not cure cancer." 502 For these forgotten species, the
greatest hope lies in biophilia itself, the inborn human affinity for life and living
things.
"Human" culture means nothing without bestial "nature." Consider the
fundamental problem of Paradise Lost. How could John Milton possibly "hope
on the observation of endangered species in particular).
49 8 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D.
Haw. 1979), aft'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); accord United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d
1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). But cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566-67
(1992) (rejecting the "animal nexus" and "vocational nexus" theories of standing to enforce
the Endangered Species Act, which would grant standing to "anyone who observes or works
with an endangered species, anywhere in the world").
499 WILSON, supra note 131, at 305 ("As Rwanda protects the gorilla, the gorilla will
help to save Rwanda.").
500 Compare, e.g., MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 483 (arguing against protecting
every species) with, e.g., Nagle, supra note 483 (acknowledging the impossibility of rescuing
every species but positing a legal and moral obligation to try). See generally Martin L.
Weitzman, On Diversity, 107 QJ. EcoN. 363 (1992) (arguing that perfect species
conservation is not economically feasible). In a world of finite resources, ranking among
species is unavoidable. Even Edward 0. Wilson, perhaps the world's leading advocate of
biodiversity protection, has his favorite. See WI.soN, supra note 258, at 128 (arguing that
"[a]mong the perhaps thirty million species of organisms on Earth," the bonobo "deserves the
highest priority in research and preservation" on account of its extremely close kinship to
humans).
501 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 484, at 298; Plater, supra note 307, at 851.
502 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act-
A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the
Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 853 (1997).
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to express Creation's heart at the dawn of time"? 503 He accomplished this
literary stunt by summoning "the innate pleasure from living abundance and
diversity":504
Not that fairfield
Of Enna, where Prosperin gathering flowers,
Herself afairer flower, by gloomy Dis
Was gathered, which cost Ceres all that pain
To seek her through the world, nor that sweet grove
Of Daphne, by Orontes and the inspired
Castalian spring, might with this Paradise
Of Eden strive.505
In these "eight lines of astonishing symphonic power," Milton "shadows beauty
with a hint of tragedy, giving us the untrammeled and fertile world awaiting
corruption. 50 6 Belinda Carlisle expressed a similar sentiment in a succinct but
far less sublime fashion: "Heaven is a place on earth." 507 From the heights of
blank verse to the depths of bland pop, utilitarian questions "dissolve into a
study of aesthetics and morals. 508 Ethics and religion stem ultimately from the
relation of humans with their natural surroundings. 509
We as a species have no meaning except by reference to our natural
history. What T.S. Eliot said of tradition and the individual talent applies with
equal force to nature and the selfish gene:510 "No poet, no artist of any art, has
his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the
appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead." 511
Only by tracing "feeling and myth.... back through time past cultural history
to the evolutionary origins of human nature" 512 can we grasp a hint of the
503 WILSON, supra note 67, at 212.
504 Id.
505 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, book IV, 11.268-75 (1674).
506 WISON, supra note 67, at 212.
507 BELaDA CARLISLE, Heaven Is a Place on Earth, on HEAVEN ON EARmH (UNI/MCA
1987).
508 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960).
509 See generally WILSON, supra note 67, at 238-65.
510 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE Sa H GENE (1976) (describing the gene's
drive to reproduce and perpetuate itself as the prime mover in evolution).
5 11 T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in TIM SACRED WOOD 92, 49
(1928).
512 WILSON, supra note 258, at 55.
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"beauty and mystery that seized us at the beginning," of "[e]very contour of the
terrain, every plant and animal living in it, and the human intellect that masters
them all"11 513
B. Law Is a Many-Splendored Thing
Like biodiversity protected by the Endangered Species Act, the diversity
achieved through educational affirmative action reputedly confers rich benefits.
"Just as diversity in the gene pool, in the variability of life on earth, is
necessary for our survival, so is cultural diversity a great pool from which we
draw ideas and practices... to live by."'514 At the individual level, each
student belonging to an otherwise underrepresented group brings his or her
experience as an outsider in a white-dominated society. 515 At an extreme,
critical race theorists assert that every nonwhite student and scholar speaks and
writes in a distinctive "voice of color." 516 More modestly, other advocates
argue that a student's "background and life experience will... be vital
components" of that "student's potential to teach other students." 517 To the
extent that "experiences, outlooks, and ideas correlate in some measure
with... race," such a use of racial or ethnic identity as a "proxy
for ... intellectual diversity" may be considered the epistemological benefit of
diversity-based affirmative action. 518
A second benefit inheres in the interaction fostered by the infusion of
nonwhites into traditionally white-dominated universities.519 Mixing for its own
sake "ensur[es] that students and teachers encounter individuals with
experiences, backgrounds, and cultures different from their own. "520 At its
best, diversity promotes genuine self-governance: it "teach[es] students how to
be sovereign, responsible, and informed citizens in a heterogeneous
5 13 WILSON, supra note 67, at 237.
5 14 Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1401 (1991).
515 See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv.
855, 863-64 (1995).
516 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
517 Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1774.
518 Volokh, supra note 26, at 2059. But see Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive
Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FoRnsr L. REv. 759, 775 (1995) (doubting
the validity of race as a proxy for viewpoints and outlooks).
519 See Brest & Oshige, supra note 515, at 862-63.
520 Chen, supra note 10, at 1881; see also HOwARD R. BOWEN, INvEsrmENT IN
LEARNING: THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL VALUE OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 13
(1977).
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democracy. "521
This interactive strategy is extremely vulnerable to a deeply rooted, perhaps
intractable phenomenon: race-consciousness on campus is at war with itself. No
interaction will take place if the university's race-based strategy engenders
voluntary residential segregation and other forms of racial separatism. 522 Unless
the racially tinted view of the world is expunged altogether, increased racial
diversity of its own accord may not increase interracial understanding.
"[M]inority group members replicate the majority's view of all racial minorities
except their own. "523 Moreover, at least on the terms and conditions
established by academia's multiculturalist ruling class, affirmative action
scarcely permits, much less encourages, cultural fertilization across racial or
ethnic lines. Defenders of the diversity rationale question whether admitting the
son of "a fourth-generation Irish father.., and a Salvadoran immigrant
mother" who "relates [more] easily with the Anglo side of the family" would
"serve any of the goals of affirmative action." 524 To take another example, a
founder of Critical Race Theory has found it odd, even objectionable, for a
person of Asian descent who has assimilated into the American mainstream to
"claim[ ]... the historical heritage of African Americans as his own." 525 By
this reasoning, the Underground Railroad, Martin Luther King, Jr., and
Langston Hughes belong to some sort of exclusive enclave within the American
tradition, untouchable except by other blacks. 526
A third benefit ascribed to racial diversity further complicates the picture.
By swiftly increasing minority numbers, affirmative action putatively raises the
comfort level for many nonwhites.527 This crude application of network
521 Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1774; see also ALEKANDER W. ASrN, WHAT
MArrERs iN COLLEGE? FouR CRITCAL YEs REvsrrm 431 (1993) (reporting "self-
reported gains in cognitive and affective development (especially increased cultural
awareness)" and "increased commitment to promoting racial understanding").
522 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1778.
523 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MNcH. L. REv. 1611,
1698 (1985).
524 Brest & Oshige, supra note 515, at 875. Not to belabor the point, but I once again
"must note, if only in passing, the deep irony of equating 'Irish' with 'Anglo.'" Chen, supra
note 21, at 1138 n.101.
525 Gotanda, supra note 155, at 1594.
526 See id. at 1594-95.
527 See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 515, at 865 (noting that minority faculty
members "often provide important counsel, support, and comfort for minority students-
especially, but not only, when events occur that seem to threaten their sense of acceptance at
the institution"); Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. CoLO. L. REV. 939, 954 (1997) (speculating that "a school or employer might
decide that members of minority groups will only feel comfortable if they have safety in
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theory's first premise-that a consumer's utility increases as other consumers
buy the same good528-may raise more questions than it answers. To treat the
notion of comforting minority students as a benefit of diversity conflates
diversity with the distinct and doctrinally unsound role model rationale.529
On the other hand, if "comfort" is simply shorthand for the claim that
affirmative action should increase minority representation above token
numbers, it might be defended on the grounds that a "critical mass of students
of a particular group" will enhance this group's visibility on campus and,
critically, enhance "diversity within the group." 530 In sufficient numbers,
members of a favored group might develop enough diversity among themselves
that they and other students learn "one of the most important lessons" in
American education: "That the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national
backgrounds.., in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land." 531 On the other
hand, this assimilationist vision contradicts the epistemological justification for
enhancing racial diversity.532
Suffice it to say that the benefits delivered by educational affirmative action
fall far short of the clarity and magnitude of the benefits delivered by
biodiversity conservation. A fuller understanding of the differences between
these two types of diversity, however, depends on a systematic comparison of
the legal mechanisms at issue. I now turn to that task.
C. Diversity and Its Doppelgdinger
In many respects, affirmative action strongly resembles the Endangered
Species Act. Both legal schemes rest on a notion of "diversity." Striking
similarities in remedies and rationales link the two bodies of law. Even more
remarkably, concepts developed in the context of species conservation and
affirmative action also appear in the law governing competition in markets for
goods and markets for ideas. But there are also differences. Though subtle,
these differences are significant enough to undermine the claim that affirmative
numbers, and that, therefore, minorities must be overrepresented if they are to feel
comfortable enough to fully deliver the benefits of diversification .... ").
528 See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods,
20 J. PuB. ECON. 231, 231-32 (1983); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Extenalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 424 (1985); Lemley
& McGowan, supra note 351, at 483.
529 See Chen, supra note 10, at 1881-82.
530 Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1777.
531 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
532 See Chen, supra note 10, at 1882.
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action after Bakke is genuinely motivated by an interest in diversity.
1. For Every Right There Is a Remedy
At the broadest level of generality, both species conservation and
affirmative action address predation, parasitism, competition, and habitat
destruction. All of these natural activities and their human analogues threaten
diversity. Overt discrimination is the equivalent of senseless hunting; hate
speech is comparable to firing a harpoon in anger at protected marine
mammals.533 And just as protecting discrete animals or species leads to the
protection of the ecosystem, preferential admission of individual students
shelters the entire educational system from race-based subordination. Indeed,
the entire rhetoric of antitrust and economic regulation rests on similar
metaphors of predatory pricing and rate discrimination.5 34 Moreover, although
federal judges routinely protest that the law protects "competition, not
competitors,"5 35 American antitrust policy often adopts this very strategy of
indirectly protecting competition as a process by directly protecting discrete,
identifiable competitors on the verge of economic extinction. 536
The similarities become even stronger when one considers primary legal
duties and remedies. Both species conservation and affirmative action draw
sharp distinctions between public-sector and private-sector conduct. Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act targets the federal government; its requirement of
interagency consultation, 537 as illustrated in TVA v. Hill,538 can crush the most
lavishly funded federal project. By contrast, section 9's prohibition on unlawful
"takings" of endangered species applies to any "person," especially private
property owners. As I have already outlined, 539 section 9 is weaker than section
7 in two significant respects. 540
533 Cf United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a defendant
who utilized gun-fire to scare porpoises away from the daily catch did not violate the Marine
Mammal Protection Act).
534 See Chen & Gifford, supra note 389, at 1327-33.
535 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); accord, e.g., Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337-39 (1990); Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
536 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfer as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsIGs L.J. 67, 104 (1982).
537 See supra notes 300-304 and accompanying text.
538 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
539 See supra notes 309-319 and accompanying text.
540 First, whereas § 7 protects both threatened and endangered species, § 9 applies only
to endangered species. Second, § 9 confers less protection on endangered plants than on
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The law of affirmative action likewise boasts a cascading hierarchy of legal
obligations based on the governmental, publicly funded, or purely private
nature of the actor in question. The sequence from the Equal Protection Clause
to Title VI to Title VII-or, if you prefer, from Bakke, Croson, and Adarand to
Guardians to Weber-can be summarized simply: The more "private" the
actor, the greater its freedom to pursue affirmative action on its own. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, the federal government and the states may pursue only
those race-conscious strategies that are narrowly tailored to achieving a
compelling interest.541 Title VI, which bans discrimination, exclusion from
participation, or denial of benefits "on the ground of race, color, or national
origin" in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 542
has been interpreted as applying constraints equivalent to those under the Equal
Protection Clause to federally subsidized private schools. 543 On the other hand,
Department of Education regulations implementing Title VI purport to permit
some forms of voluntary affirmative action. 544 To the extent that Congress
passed Title VI under its spending power,545 federally funded entities may not
have received the extraordinary level of notice needed before they can incur
endangered animals. Section 7 lacks that taxonomic distinction.
541 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-93, 505 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
542 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
543 See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 639-42 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 n.77 (1980) (plurality opinion of
Burger, C.J.); id. at 517 n.15 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Tide VI must
be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Fifth Amendment."); id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Tide VI prohibits only those uses
of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its
agencies.... ").
544 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii) (1997); Washington Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984
F.2d 483, 484-85, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1518 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
545 See Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1268-69 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(characterizing Title VI as an exercise of the spending power and as an exercise of Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 1 F.
Supp. 2d 426, 434-35 (D.N.J. 1998) (same); cf. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 893
F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1990) (describing Title VI as a statute enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment without addressing whether Congress also relied on its spending power).
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liability under this statute.546 Finally, the received wisdom is that private
employers may freely adopt race-based affirmative action programs.
547
The Endangered Species Act and federal discrimination law alike support
theories of liability for "environmental" misconduct that harms a protected
group's interests without injuring any single identifiable victim. The Supreme
Court has sustained the Interior Department's application of section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act to habitat destruction.548 The obvious analogue in
discrimination law is Vinson v. Meritor Savings Bank,549 which recognized a
Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment when an employer creates a
"hostile work environment. 550 In two recent cases, public universities in Texas
and Maryland have tried unsuccessfully to defend race-conscious admissions
and financial aid as responses to racially hostile campus environments.
551
Both bodies of law contemplate-and disfavor-the extreme remedy of a
set-aside. Section 5 of the Endangered Species Act authorizes the United States
to acquire habitat for endangered and threatened species. 552 To avoid such an
expensive conservation strategy, the Secretary of the Interior may instead
invoke section 9's restrictions on private land use.553 Similarly, although Bakke
frowned upon the use of quotas rather than reliance on putatively flexible "plus
factors," the Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold set-asides and other
quantitative measures that respond to clear instances of institutional
discrimination.554  The presence of comparable harsh remedies in
communications law-the new rule on educational programming for children555
546 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399-1401, 1406 (1lth
Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843); Samuel
Issacharoff, Can Affi native Action Be Defended?, 59 Onto ST. L.J., 669, 673 n.11 (1998).
But see Doe v. University of llinois, 138 F.3d 653, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Davis).
547 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
548 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
549 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
550 See id. at 73.
551 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 152-57 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1128 (1995).
552 See 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994).
553 See Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 702-03 (acknowledging that purchases of
habitat under § 5 "may well cost the government less in many circumstances than pursuing
civil or criminal penalties" under § 9).
554 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987).
555 See Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981 (Aug. 27, 1996).
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and cable television's "must-carry" rule 56-completes the picture. Given
sufficient room to stretch the level of generality, we can extend the analogy to
laws requiring regulated utilities to offer interconnection and unbundled access
to their competitors. 557 If the sort of diversity at stake is fragile and compelling
enough, a commensurate remedy within the bounds of the law's imagination
will clear out the necessary living space.
From this perspective, what affirmative action advocates want is academic
Lebensraum for historically disadvantaged groups. The question is not one of
ability but one of resources and will. Both species protection and affirmative
action inspire harsh rhetoric about the costs of diversity and the distribution of
those costs. The debate invariably becomes hotter as the perceived costs rise.
Consider first the reactions to more aggressive applications of the
Endangered Species Act. In objecting to the extension of section 9's prohibition
against "tak[ing]" species, Justice Scalia complained that habitat preservation
"on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not just
upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to
national zoological use. "558
The alternative to an expansive application of section 9, of course, is
publicly financed land acquisition under section 5 of the Act. Justice Scalia's
rhetoric and logic unmistakably reflect those of the Takings Clause, which is
unquestionably "'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." 559
What Justice Scalia merely intimated, Justice White explicitly stated in a
notorious dissent from denial of certiorari in another Endangered Species Act
case. A $2,500 fine under the Act for shooting an endangered grizzly bear that
threatened domesticated sheep, Justice White reasoned, might serve as "the
constitutional equivalent of an edict taking [the sheep] in the first place." 560 In
light of such judicial sentiments, we can readily understand (albeit
556 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
557 See, e.g., American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461
U.S. 402 (1983); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 879 (1998). See generally Jim Chen, TELRTC in Turmoil, Telecommunications in
Transition: A Note on the Iowa Utilities Board Litigation, 33 WAKE FORESr L. REV. 51
(1998) (describing and assessing regulatory schemes of this sort).
558 Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
559 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
560 Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114, 1116 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
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unsympathetically) why Congress would intervene in endangered species
listings and critical habitat determinations. 561 Everyone loves diversity, but no
one wants to pay for it.
It is hard to imagine a simpler sunmmary of the affirmative action debate.
Every argument, pro or con, can be restated as a cry that affirmative action, or
failure to engage in it, inflicts unacceptable costs. Stressing unfairness to
innocent victims is tantamount to complaining about costs borne by displaced
whites or, in certain circumstances, Asian Americans. To argue that affirmative
action stigmatizes its beneficiaries is to object to the costs borne by the
marginally less capable members of these groups.
2. Adaptive Radiation
Though they proceed on similar premises, species conservation and
affirmative action differ quite dramatically. The fundamental unit in
biodiversity, of course, is the species. The vexing problem of geographically
separated subspecies aside, nature dictates the definition of a species: a species
is a population or series of populations of organisms that freely interbreed with
one another in natural conditions.562 Over time each species becomes "a closed
gene pool, an assemblage of organisms that does not exchange genes with other
species[,] .... evolves diagnostic hereditary trains[,] and comes to occupy a
unique geographic range." 563 So bound are individuals by the need to
reproduce sexually within this genetic community that the species as a whole
should be regarded as an individual in its own right.564 Endangered Species Act
controversies over the definition of a species565 reflect the political economy of
decisions under section 4 to list a species as threatened or endangered, which in
turn triggers burdensome legal obligations under sections 7 and 9.
561 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a rider prohibiting the expenditure of money to make final species listings or
critical habitat determinations entitled the Secretary of the Interior to postpone the listing of
the California red-legged frog "until a reasonable time after appropriated funds are made
available").
562 WILSON, supra note 131, at 405; see id. at 38 (defining the "'biological-species
concept'": "a species is a population whose members are able to interbreed freely wider
natural conditions"). See generally MAYR, supra note 134, at 477-525.
563 WILSON, supra note 131, at 42.
564 See Ghiselin, supra note 134, at 269-72.
565 See, e.g., Endangered Species Comm. v. Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1994)
(ordering the delisting of the California gnatcatcher because the author of the scientific report
used by the Fish and Wildlife Service refused to release the data to construction industry
consultants, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act). See generally Michael Taylor,
Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 6 (1993).
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By contrast, race as the basic unit of affirmative action has no biological
basis. Its definition has shifted over American history. 566 Its very fluidity-the
fact that members of different races can and do freely interbreed-holds the key
to affirmative action's destiny. The Asian and Hispanic categories have been
cobbled out of politically convenient alliances of culturally diverse ethnic
groups, and the Census Bureau has narrowly repelled a corrosive effort to
introduce an all-embracing "multiracial" category. Because I have more to say
about this subject, I shall defer an extended, detailed discussion. For the
moment, it suffices to notice that no natural barriers forestall a comprehensive
redefinition or even the complete disposal of the legal construct called race.567
Legal protection of diversity begins only when someone sounds the alarm
of scarcity. It should come as no surprise that the entire body of federal mass
communications law rests on what is now recognized as a spurious assumption
that the electromagnetic spectrum is incurably "scarce." But types of scarcity
differ dramatically. In conventional broadcasting, scarcity is a purely temporal
constraint. No number of abusively boring signals can cut the atmosphere's
capacity for radio waves. The scarcity of black and Hispanic students in
Texas's and California's public universities is blamed on an unfortunate
confluence of factors and events-the much maligned use of standardized tests,
coupled with ill-timed judicial, administrative, or political decisions. No one
genuinely believes that this shortfall will be permanent; the real debate concerns
the nature, extent, and timing of the universities' legally permissible responses.
And the spectacular example of Hebrew in the twentieth century shows that
even dead languages can be revived. 568
Not so with natural extinction. Extirpated species never return. The
diversity of species living and lost is matched only by the number of ways in
which humans speed their destruction. Hunting is perhaps the least of these.
The introduction of exotic competitors and predators, chemical pollution, or the
extirpation of a keystone species all play significant roles. Most prominent of all
is habitat destruction, 569 which often has the perverse effect of removing
566 See generally LOPEz, supra note 142, at 3-9 (pointing out that early assignments of
race "implied that races exist as physical fact" while current reliance on common knowledge
"demonstrates that racial taxonomies devolve upon social demarcations").
567 Cf Chen, supra note 21, at 1163 ("As a strictly sociopolitical phenomenon lacking
any basis in biology, race lives and dies by law. It deserves to die.") (footnotes omitted).
568 See Pa'xaa, supra note 330, at 260.
569 See, e.g., Paul R. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, in
BIoDivERsrrY, supra note 133, at 21; cf. Larry E. Morse et al., Native Vascular Plants, in
OuR LiviNG REsoURcEs: REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE D5IrmnoN, ABUNDAN CE, AND
HEALTH OF U.S. PLANTS, ANIMALS, AND EcosYsrEMs 205, 208 (1995) (describing "[h]abitat
alteration and incompatible land use" as larger threats to endangered plants in the United
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dominant species. 570 The extreme form of habitat destruction is a Centinelan
holocaust, so named for the conversion of a diverse forest ridge in Ecuador into
a cacao plantation.571 There is far greater urgency and far less room for error
in species conservation than in any other scheme for preserving diversity.
The permanent nature of lost biodiversity profoundly affects the baseline
from which the Endangered Species Act begins and the normative goal that it
can hope to accomplish. Except perhaps the most hopeless of critical race
theorists, all of us dare to imagine a world after racism.572 By contrast, there is
no way to remove the massive human footprint on terrestrial biology. We have
inflicted deep damage that cannot be fixed within any temporal frame of
reference shy of geological time. At most we can try to reintroduce some
species to their former ranges and hope that the transplantation will take.
Finally, the most intriguing way in which biological diversity differs from
its human analogues may be the role of numbers. Ecology and evolutionary
biology abound with mathematically significant thresholds and concepts. The
sheer number of species may contribute to an ecosystem's long-run vitality.573
The 50-500 rule of genetic health posits that a species needs an effective
population of at least fifty to survive short-term threats, but at least five hundred
to ensure that genetic drift can offset the long-term genetic deterioration caused
by inbreeding. 574 Equitability, or rough proportionality in abundance among
species, is another important quantitative concept.575 Even if an ecosystem has
a large number of species-say, a thousand-it is less diverse than another
ecosystem containing the same number of species, but with roughly the same
number of individuals in each species. The latter ecosystem, by virtue of its
States than over-collecting, global climate change, and sea-level rise).
570 See David Tilman et al., Habitat Destruction and the Extinction Debt, 371 NATURE
65 (1994).
571 See Calaway Dodson & Alwyn H. Gentry, Biological Extinction in Western
Ecuador, 78 ANNALS Mo. BOTANICAL GARDENs 273 (1991); see also WILSON, supra note
131, at 243 (arguing that the name of the ridge, Centinela, "deserves to be synonymous with
the silent hemorrhaging of biological diversity").
572 But see DEmcK BELL, FACES AT Tnm BorroM OF TiE WELL (1992); MICHAEL OMI
& HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN fma UNrrED STATES: FROM Tm 1960s TO miE
1990S, at 5 (2d ed. 1994); cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1062 (1991) (arguing that positive race-conscious attitudes should not
wither away).
573 See Yvonne Baskin, Ecologists Dare to Ask: How Much Does Diversity Matter?,
264 SCiENCE 202 (1994).
574 See sources cited supra note 132.
575 See ANNE E. MAGuRRAN, ECOLOGICAL DIVA srrY ND ITs MEAu m (1988);
WILSON, supra note 131, at 151-52.
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greater equitability, is more diverse.
These notions of critical mass and proportionality find their analogues in
affirmative action. Few if any major universities are completely devoid of
students from each of America's five recognized racial groups. The real
complaint is that certain groups, usually blacks and Hispanics, are
underrepresented. Thus, a university might argue that it needs a "critical mass
of students of a particular group so that other students become aware of the
group" and-perhaps just as importantly-so that "diversity within the group"
will have a chance to blossom.576
On the other hand, there is reason to dread an excessively enthusiastic
application of the equitability concept in higher education. As the last
generation of Asian Americans has discovered, proportional representation in
admissions justifies caps as readily as it does floors.577 The Supreme Court has
already rejected enhancement theory, which is the First Amendment version of
the equitability concept. "Mhe concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 578 It is a short step thence,
especially in field so intimately connected to free speech, to rejecting or at least
curbing the notions of equitability and proportionality in educational affirmative
576 Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1777.
577 See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-73 (1977) (Brennan, I.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing how "a purportedly
preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous
treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries"); Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147
F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing a school district's 40% cap on students belonging to
"any [single] racial/ethnic group" at any one school); Wessmann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996
F. Supp. 120, 132 n.9 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that a diversity-driven, race-based public
school admissions program "resulted in the non-admission of two Hispanic student applicants
who had higher composite scores than a white student applicant who was admitted"); Jerry
Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's
Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HIAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 43 (1996) (noting how
contemporary academic practice "asks Asian Americans to bear a greater burden than
Americans of European descent to further the interest of decreasing racial prejudice"); Frank
H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIMD
WoRmn L.J. 225, 278 (1995) (noting how subtle caps on Asian-American university
enrollment are defended as benign, diversity-enhancing transfers "from Asian
Americans... to African Americans"); c. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (arguing that a nominal price cap, putatively beneficial to consumers,
might in fact operate as a welfare-destroying scheme to fix minimum prices).
578 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam); see also L.A. Powe, Jr.,
Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. Cr. Ray. 243, 269 (characterizing
enhancement theory as "wildly at odds with the normal First Amendment belief that more
speech is better").
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action.
Especially in California, the hue and cry over the loss of "diversity" after
the end of affirmative action overlooks a crucial racial dynamic. The abolition
of racial preferences has increased rather than decreased Asian-American
access to that state's public universities. Seen in this light, the whole project
reeks of a wildlife management plan for controlling "exotics." Have students of
Asian ancestry become the equivalent of Eurasian milfoil in the Great Lakes, an
unwanted exotic with no natural enemies (i.e., whites) whose success in the
new environment crowds out more desirable native species (i.e., the blacks and
Hispanics who preceded Asians in immigration and political participation)? Or
is Asian success on the so-called quantitative measures of academic
preparedness the equivalent of unchecked predation by the Nile perch?579
VI. THE DESCENT OF LAW
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time. -T.S. Eliot580
Having surveyed other legal schemes for protecting diversity, I shall now
proceed to level six distinct but interrelated objections to diversity as an
affirmative action rationale. First, far from enhancing expressive diversity,
affirmative action has transmogrifled itself into a corrupt form of educational
patronage and graft. Second, the palpable gap in credentials between specially
and ordinarily admitted students has converted affirmative action into an engine
of group libel. Third, affirmative action acts as a catalyst for resentment and
incivility. Fourth, the obsession with racial balance at all levels of education has
blinded administrators to stronger, more reliable indicia of intellectual diversity.
Fifth, the affirmative action debate has drained precious attention and energy
from far more pressing issues. Sixth and finally, in what may be the most
profound lesson that biological diversity can teach its educational imposter, the
inherent unity of the human genome spells doom for affirmative action. The
static classification of humans into distinct racial categories will not long endure
579 See Christopher G. Barlow & Allan Lisle, Biology of the Nile Perch Lates niloticus
(Pisces: Centropomidae) with Reference to Its Proposed Role as a Sport Fish in Australia, 39
BIoLOGIcAL CONSERVATION 269 (1987); Daniel J. Miller, Introductions and Extinction of
Fish in the Aflican Great Lakes, 4 TRENDs iN ECOLoGY & EvOLtION 56 (1989). See
generally Tus GOLDscHmiDT, DARWIN's DREAMPOND: DRAMA iN LAKE VICroRiA (Sherry
Marx-MacDonald trans., 1998).
580 T.S. ETOT, Little Gidding, 11. 239-42, in FouR QuARTERS 49, 59 (1943).
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in the melting pot that the freely interbreeding world has become.
None of these arguments against affimnative action rests on any theory of
justice or an appeal to sympathy for putatively innocent white victims.
"'Deserve,"' I repeat, "don't have nothing to do with it."5 8 1 If affirmative
action is to be justified on the terms outlined in Bakke, then it is diversity rather
than justice that must supply the defense. And the failure of that defense, "when
viewed by the light of our knowledge of the [various] world[s]" in which
diversity matters, "is unmistakable." 582 "It is incredible that all these facts
should speak falsely." 583 All of our justice-seeking urges notwithstanding, we
must confess that affirmative action has been judged on its own terms-and has
been found wanting. Diversity as an affirmative action rationale, simply put,
has failed.
A. Stealth Kakocracy
Let us begin by paying proper homage to Lyndon Johnson who, with a
later boost from Richard Nixon,584 introduced affirmative action into American
law. 585 President Johnson's footrace metaphor is one of the most widely quoted
presidential defenses of affirmative action. Johnson stressed the remedial
imperative of affirmative action: "You do not take a person who for years has
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a
race, and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly
believe that you have been completely fair."'586
It strains credulity, however, to take as masterful a politician as Lyndon
Johnson at face value. As a beneficiary of one of the deepest "good ol' boy"
networks of all time, Johnson surely expected that affirmative action would
create a new class of bureaucrats and other insiders, who would proceed to
duplicate themselves through race-conscious hiring. This is an intensely
Darwinian vision of affirmative action as a political surrogate for natural
581 UNFORGIvEN (Warner Bros. 1993), quoted in Chen, supra note 10, at 1850.
5 82 CHARLs DARWiN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELEMrcON IN RELATION TO SEX 630
(2d ed. 1874).
583 Id.
584 See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971);
Farber, supra note 25, at 896-97.
585 See generally HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CviL RIGHTS ERA: ORINs AND
DEmLOPMENT oF NATIONAL PoLicY 1960-1972, at 284-97 (1990); Robert P. Schuwerk,
Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Cm.
L. REv. 723 (1972).
586 Lyndon Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: To Fulfill These
Rights (June 4, 1965), reprinted in 2 PuB. PAPERs 636 (1965).
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reproduction. If the urge to commit genocide follows racial or ethnic lines,587
we should expect other forms of politically motivated behavior, including
patronage, to proceed no differently.
But the picture of Johnson that is probably most appropriate to affirmative
action is that of the President predicting that "the Negroes" empowered by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 would "have every politician, north and south, east
and west, kissing their ass, begging for their support." 588 As Nixon did after
him, Johnson rightly recognized the awesome political power of race-conscious
laws. Johnson's cynical manipulation of race brings us back to the familiar
tension between the dreamer and the schemer.589 Affirmative action as a cure
for societal discrimination appeals to the dreamer, but the schemers have
transformed affirmative action in practice into a corrupt jobs program. Bakke
killed the dream but supplied diversity as a smokescreen for the scheme. 590
In practice, the educational diversity that Justice Powell envisioned in
Bakke has never emerged. Colleges do not keep running tallies of musicians
who apply, secure admission, matriculate, and graduate. Graduate schools do
not engage in elaborate schemes for "norming" the standardized test scores and
undergraduate grade point averages of polyglots or committed community
activists. 591 These practices are reserved for special admissions categories on
which disproportionate amounts of political influence and alumni largess
depend: profit-generating athletes, in-state applicants to public institutions, and
"legacy" admits everywhere. Call race-based affirmative action a moral
imperative if you wish, but mediocre double legacies and semiliterate gladiators
make sorry company. Far from serving as an indicator of "beneficial
educational pluralism," 592 race has become the vector for yet another form of
graft.
Genuine diversity in higher education should be nothing of this sort. It
transcends the mere counting of bodies and beans. Each student offers more
than his or her race to the university community, and the university's notion of
diversity must embrace more than race. 593 Unlike its ecological counterpart,
587 See generally DIAMOND, supra note 326, at 276-309.
588 MMprM u, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 371 (1980).
589 See Chen, supra note 21, at 1266.
590 See generally Kingley R. Browne, Affirmative Action: Policy-Making by Deception,
22 Omno N.U. L. REv. 1291 (1996).
591 cQ. Lino A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
97, 100 (1992) (arguing that "all or nearly all accredited law schools today[ ] use[ ] a system
of race norming" in admissions).
592 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
593 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1772; Chen, supra note 10, at 1878.
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diversity as a justification for race-conscious official action must serve some
utilitarian function. On this point, both sides in Metro Broadcasting agreed.
Said the District of Columbia Circuit in its futile rebuff of race-conscious
licensing, "[t]he goal of racial diversity might be compelling.., only when
that greater diversity serves one of society's fundamental goals." 594 Even while
reversing, the Supreme Court agreed: diversity must have some discernible
impact on the content of speech, arguably even on the viewpoint.595 Diversity
divorced from a measurable impact on speech converts affirmative action into a
program for allocating jobs by race, perhaps the oldest and justifiably most
despised of American employment practices. "Affirmative action assumes
nothing about culture-neither that it has been neglected nor that it should be
recognized and celebrated. It is about jobs and admissions. '5 96 It is "nothing
more than a form of patronage. 597
Educational race-consciousness thus pursues the connection between race
and politics to its logical conclusion, eliminating intellectual diversity in the
process. Each discrete and insular group represented in an affirmative action
plan constitutes its own party. Expressing views shared by a salient majority of
such a group is analogous to identifying with a political party. At an extreme,
diversity-based affirmative action might require a professor to "obtain requisite
support" from the appropriate group or to "affiliate with" that group in order to
be hired, to be promoted, or to avoid being fired.598 This is too steep a price;
"the knowledge that one must have a sponsor" in the relevant [group] in order
to gain or "retain one's job" represents a significant "coercion of belief."599
Partisan or educational, patronage violates the First Amendment. To invoke the
exception for political appointees with policymaking responsibilities 600 will not
do, for that maneuver would subject the otherwise apolitical world of academia
59 4 Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
595 See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 569-71.
596 GLAZER, supra note 433, at 12.
597 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 n.9 (1989). See generally
Chen, supra note 10, at 1896-98 (describing and condemning educational affirmative action
as a form of patronage).
598 Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 351, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion); accord O'Hare
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 171-19 (1996); Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990); see also Chen, Unloving, supra note 35, at 147-49 (providing
anecdotal evidence of one such incident).
599 Brani v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
600 See id. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (plurality opinion); id. at 375 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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to an unacceptable ideological litmus test.60 1
To be sure, some snippets from United States Reports do support a defense
of affirmative action as a patronage-like system for building minority solidarity.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party6 2 offers the most stirring
boost. Like all other forms of patronage, affirmative action enables historically
"excluded groups" to attain substantial "social and political integration" by
"supporting and ultimately dominating a particular party 'machine."' 603
According to Justice Scalia, patronage does not decimate expressive freedom; it
merely channels the "diversity of political expression ... to a different stage-
to the contests for [initial] endorsement rather than the [decisive] elections."604
In First Amendment terms, however, patronage is patronage. "[R]acial
patronage, like a racial gerrymander, is no more defensible than political
patronage or a political gerrymander." 605 "To the victor," after all, "belong
only those spoils that are constitutionally obtained. ' 606 Affirmative action in
practice creates corrupt jobs programs and celebrity admissions programs
without advancing any identifiable, much less substantial, interest in diversity.
Indeed, to the extent "rewarding race consciousness ... encourage[s] more
race consciousness" distributing "valuable preferences" by race may actually
lessen diversity by redirecting minority students' and teachers' viewpoints
toward a homogenous culture of victinhood.6°7 When an affirmative action
program restricts itself to "six racial classifications, and no others," 608 and
when the University of Texas tellingly confines preferential treatment to
politically potent black and Chicano constituencies, 609 the program is
embarrassingly less interested in true expressive diversity than in the "allocation
of goods to persons of particular racial backgrounds. "610
How indeed does one pick which groups to favor? Diversity cannot be
60 1 See AMUCAN ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
167 (1967) ("An inviolable refuge from such [political] tyranny should be found in the
university."), reprinted in HAMILTON, supra note 431, at 365.
602 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
603 Id. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
604 Id. at 109.
605 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 n.9 (1989).
606 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64.
607 Bloom, supra note 84, at 52.
608 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 552 n.30 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
609 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 966 n.24 (5th Cir.) (Wiener, J., specially
concurring), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
6 10 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 623 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
accord Chen, supra note 10, at 1892-93.
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limited to one race or another. It is no answer to assert that "a university should
exclude from its affirmative action program ... those applicants whose race is
adequately represented without affirmative action." 611 Just as every species is
intrinsically valuable, no race is "less" diverse than any other. No employer,
government, or greater force can explain, for instance, "[w]hy a black coach
[can be] deemed capable of providing the benefits associated with racial
diversity that a hispanic coach could not." 612 Therein lies a trap that has
ensnared much of the educational establishment. Affirmative action "is fraught
with... dangers, for one must immediately determine which groups are to
receive such favored treatment and which are to be excluded, the proportions of
the class that are to be allocated to each, and even the criteria by which to
determine whether an individual is a member of a favored group." 613 This is
why there cannot be a pick-and-choose approach to diversity. 614
Who indeed remembers the Armenians? Seriously, why do people of
Middle Eastern origin benefit so rarely from affirmative action? Arabs and Jews
are protected under Title VII. 615 Both groups have endured immense amounts
of ethnic hatred in the United States. The world of Islam represents one of three
major civilizations now combatting each other for world domination. 616 How
could any system of affirmative action ignore immigrants from the Middle
East? It can if it is a jobs program rather than a serious effort to protect cultural
diversity, for academic administrators and other politicians can afford to ignore
groups too small or too disorganized to affect elections.
B. Charity Toward Some, Malice Toward All
It is no exaggeration to describe competition as the American cultural
characteristic. 617 If so, educational affirmative action is un-American. Any
practice that delivers so constantly corrosive an attack on merit-based
competition deserves to be condemned as a seditious institution. Americans as a
rule give no respect to boondoggles won through political blackmail rather than
611 Note, supra note 75, at 1363.
612 Covington v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F. Supp. 1402, 1412-13 (E.D. Tex.
1989).
613 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
614 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 966 (5th Cir.) (Wiener, J., specially
concurring), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
615 See Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 606 (1987) (Arabs); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 618 (1987) (Jews).
616 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 250, at 209-18.
617 C., e.g., JoHN UPDKE, IN THE BEAUTY OF THE LI ns 139 (1996) ("He didn't want
to compete, and yet this seemed the only way to be an American. Be stretched or strike.").
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some form of arguably merit-based competition. The longer affirmative action
remains entrenched, the more blatantly political it becomes.
618
In many circumstances, the gap between regularly and "specially" admitted
students is "so highly irregular" that these admissions decisions "cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to [admit students] on the basis of
race."'619 In university administration, as in redistricting, "appearances do
matter." 620 Standing alone, the "dramatically irregular ... may have sufficient
probative force to call for an explanation." 621 Even sympathetic observers of
affimnative action display "obvious discomfort ... in confronting the
credentials gap" between specially and regularly admitted students. 622 Visibly
underprepared "special admits" bear a stigma inflicted not only by a putatively
hostile majority-white society, but also by the well-intentioned university
administration. 623 Nothing undermines the "democratic benefits of diversity"
more thoroughly than "reinforcing stereotypes of minority students as poor
students." 624 In affirmative action, race isn't the most important thing. It's the
only thing. 625
6 18 See David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. Or.
REv. 1, 24-25; cf. THoMAs SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL PouLcms 88-89 (1990) (observing how
race-conscious policies have tended to become permanently entrenched despite nominal
commitments to making such policies temporary).
619 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993) (discussing reapportionment plans and
racial gerrymandering).
620 Id. at 647.
621 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983).
622 Issacharoff, supra note 546, at 536. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS:
BLAcK AND WHnTE, SEPARATE, HoSTLE, UNEQUAL 134-46 (1992) (describing the
implementation of affirmative action through changes in university admissions).
623 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
448 U.S. 469, 516-17 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545, 552-54 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
624 Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1777; see also Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v.
Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC.
79, 82-83, 92-93 (1995).
625 See Richard P. Boley, Lawyer Mentoring Committee, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv.
818, 820 (1998) (quoting Vince Lombardi: "Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing");
see also Stephan Themstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical
Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education," 15 CONST.
COMMENTARY 11, 20 (1998) (reporting evidence that suggested that "[r]ace was not just one
of many possible 'plus' factors" in law school admission decisions but rather "the only factor
that could explain the admission of most black students"); cf. Amar & Katyal, supra note 3,
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No less than school desegregation before Brown v. Board of Education626
defamed black schoolchildren by labeling them "unfit to attend school with
white children," 627 affirmative action after Bakke defames all students who fall
into the "preferred" categories. Both practices are engines of group defamation
and group libel. 628 Justice Powell himself acknowledged that "preferential
programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups
are unable to achieve success without special protection." 629 Over time, the
stigma deepens. "[P]ervasive affirmative action for blacks"-coupled with
continued but patently implausible insistence that specially admitted students are
as qualified as all others630-has "ensure[d] that blacks are systematically"
admitted to schools at "the level just above their competence and cause[d]
affirmative action to become an engine of group defamation." 631 This is the
sense in which even putatively benign race consciousness measures violate the
"anti-subordination" principle that supposedly motivates affirmative action. 632
Affirmative action as practiced perpetuates stereotypes of nonwhite
inferiority and gives the most bigoted, least deserving whites superficially
plausible but utterly illegitimate basis for attributing their success to "merit."633
Even as smug whites regard their admission "as a matter of right," many a
minority student wonders whether she was admitted "as an ornament, a
curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant to the lives of white
professors and students. '634 Affirmative action's putative beneficiaries may
at 1777 (arguing that such dispositive reliance on race is unfaithful to Bakke's vision of
diversity); Bloom, supra note 84, at 47.
626 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
627 Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431,463.
628 See generally Beauhanais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
629 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
630 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 82, at 1172 (arguing that students admitted and
"workers hired under affirmative action... perform as well as anyone else, or better");
Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1997).
631 Edmund Kitch, The Return of Color Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber,
Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 12.
632 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-88 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
633 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83
GEo. L.J. 1711, 1746 (1995).
634 Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
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internalize the message of inherent inferiority and thereby inflict lasting damage
to their self-esteem. 635
The heaviest burden falls upon exceptional nonwhite students. Even if their
credentials and achievements match or exceed those of top white students, these
students cannot completely escape the label of inferiority that affirmative action
slaps on entire groups. Their superior performances are known only to those
who are willing to read r6sum6s, study transcripts, and check references. Racial
identity serves as a cheaper-albeit misleading-signal of academic
performance. And if one of these students should have the misfortune to hold
quirky political opinions, the logic of race as a proxy all but invites his or her
classmates to visit ostracization and abuse upon the misguided soul. 636 How sad
that we should so casually sacrifice the constitutional aspiration, most recently
expressed in United States v. Virginia,637 that equal protection be measured by
the needs and dreams of the most exceptional members of any group.638
Perversely enough, the twisted way in which affirmative action has become
a mockery of itself may speed its demise. Abraham Lincoln assured us that
"you can't fool all of the people all of the time." 639 When precisely does
Honest Abe's maxim take effect? When, I submit, people begin to laugh at you.
We are now treated to the spectacle of law students choosing electives with
"many blacks and Hispanics" who would be more "likely to get the lower
grades" under the school's "forced curve." 640 Lie if you must, for the implicit
logic of affirmative action compels it,641 but expect by and by to become the
nation's laughingstock. When "the racial sorting" becomes so "egregious" that
it no longer "takes work to get the true picture," the race-conscious stratagem
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 570 n.46 (1984).
635 See Adarand Constnctors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (rhomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OuR
CHARACrE 90 (1990) ("Since there are laws to protect us against discrimination, preferences
only impute a certain helplessness to blacks that diminishes our self-esteem.").
6 36 See generally Chen, supra note 10, at 1900-10.
637 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
638 See id. at 516.
639 BAR'Tp's Fm..LAR QUOTAuONS 524 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting a speech by
Lincoln in Clinton, linois, on September 2, 1858).
640 Volokh, supra note 26, at 2067 n.16.
641 See Greve, supra note 246, at 19-20; Christopher T. Wonnell, Circumventing
Racism: Confronting the Problem of the Affirmative Action Ideology, 1989 BYU L. REv. 95,
119-41 (suggesting that many beneficiaries and advocates of affirmative action eventually
reconcile the tension between their self-esteem and the stigma of racial preferences by
attacking the notion of academic merit).
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turns into "a joke." 64 2 History may repeat itself, but imperfectly. The first time
it is tragedy; the second, farce.643 "The first coming of the diversity rationale"
in Bakke "depicted the tragedy of lingering racial discrimination; its second
shall expose the farce that racial classifications under law have become.'644
C. The Coarser Angels of Our Nature
Regardless of its effectiveness, affirmative action deserves condemnation as
an institution that has systematically eroded civic virtue and republican ideals. It
has bred resentment and incivility everywhere. So much for the Confucian
values of "[c]ourtesy, tolerance, good faith, diligence and kindness" practiced
"everywhere under Heaven." 645
Now, to be sure, it almost goes without saying that anyone who "seriously
believes in the value of education" is "an unhappy person."646 But economic
globalization has raised the stakes. Higher education may rank highest among
"the few remaining magic gates to bourgeois comfort in an increasingly
competitive global economy." 647 This helps make the educational affirmative
action debate even more bitter than it has to be. For education to confer
prestige, it must be scarce. And scarcity means winners and losers. Alas,
"[n]othing bums one up faster than the affects of resentiment. "648
Resentment breeds selaratism. Many of affirmative action's strongest
supporters display not the slightest interest in integration or interaction across
racial lines. 649 As it was with Satan in Paradise Lost, so it is with the bitterest
children of affirmative action: "fardest from him is best, / Whom reason hath
equall'd, force hath made supreme / Above his equals."650 Well, maybe not
quite. Satan was never so inarticulate that he would have stooped to chanting,
642 Abigail Thermstrom, Voting Rights: Another Affinnative Action Mess, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 2031, 2041 (1996).
643 See KARL MARX, TIm EiGHTEENTH BRuMAIRE OF Louis NAPOLEON 9 (Daniel de
Leon trans., 1919) ("Hegel says somewhere that all great historic facts and personages recur
twice. He forgot to add: 'Once as tragedy, and again as farce.'").
644 Chen, supra note 21, at 1130.
645 CoNFucIus, Tim ANALEmcS 17.5, at 69-70 (Raymond Dawson trans., 1993).
646 BILL WATrERSON, THE CALvIN AND HOBBES TENTH ANNIVERSARY BOOK 25 (1995).
647 Chen, supra note 21, at 1134.
648 FIEDRIcH NJEZSCHE, ECCE HOMO, in ON THE GENEOLOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE
HoMo 215, 230 (Walter Kaufina ed. & trans., 1967) (1888).
649 C. Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1778 (suggesting "that schools that permit de
facto residential segregation may be estopped from pleading Bakke as a defense to affirmative
action in admissions").
650 MILTON, supra note 505, at book I, ll. 247-49.
[Vol. 59:811
DIVERSIT IN A DIFFERENTDIMENSION
"Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western culture's gotta go. " 651
How bedeviling the whole circus has become! The rancor that affirmative
action fosters has inspired rude, dishonest behavior. Players on both sides of the
issue evidently know no ethical bounds in their zealous desire to extend or to
end affirmative action. For every Timothy Maguire who purloins data from the
Georgetown Law Center admissions office, 652 there is a dishonest law clerk
who leaks drafts of a controversial judicial opinion on affirmative action. 653
Tragically, the academy seems unable to end the cycle of mendacity and
resentment on its own. "Timeless in [its] ability to affect the future," the
diversity rationale has become affirmative action's dead hand.654 Grounding
affirmative action in diversity frees universities from having "to answer the
hardest question" of all: "the question of when it is time to stop." 655 The
academic committees charged with enforcing and preserving affirmative action
are "utterly unrepresentative of anything" or anyone. 656 In the "secret and
specialized contexts" of university hiring and admissions, "in an atmosphere
uninhibited by the usual challenges of representative government," affirmative
action as patronage enjoys perpetual life. 657 "The harvest is past, the summer is
ended, and we are not saved." 658
651 Western Culture: The Decade's Great Debate Continues.... STAN. OBSERvER,
Feb. 1998, at 1, quoted in Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Reviews, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 1319, 1334; cf James D. Gordon III, Oh No!A New Bluebook!, 90 MNcH. L.
REv. 1698, 1704 (1992) ("Hey hey, ho ho Bluebook culture's got to go.").
652 See Anthony T. Pierre et al., Degrees of Success, WAsH. PosT, May 9, 1991, at
A31.
653 See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Buckley, J.,
concurring).
654 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.).
655 Malamud, supra note 527, at 953.
656 Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 431-32
(1979); see also Chin, supra note 112, at 934-35.
657 Board of County Cormm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 683 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College
Adnissions, in THE BLAcK-WHrrE TEST ScoRE GAP 431, 432 (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998), reprinted in 59 OIO ST. L.J. 971, 971 (1998) ("Because
colleges shroud their admissions procedures in mystery, the public knows little about the
extent to which racial preference is practiced. Even less is known about the impact of such
preferences on the later careers of [affected students]."); cf Diane Ravitch, Adventures in
Wonderland: A Scholar in Washington, 64 AM. ScHoLR 497, 498 (1995) ("There is one
sure way to achieve eternal life: Become a federal program.").
658 Jeremiah 8:20; cf DEtRcK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSiVE QUEST
FOR RAcriAL JusncE (1987).
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D. Color-Blindness of a Different Sort
America's obsession with race has blinded its universities to other measures
of diversity. Other factors, rarely if ever considered in university admissions or
faculty hiring, outweigh race in their impact on intellectual, aesthetic, and
political viewpoints. Consider birth order, for example. "As a source of militant
tendencies in racial reform, birth order is twice as predictive as gender or
race." 659 Indeed, whereas birth order is a "significant predictor of militancy,"
neither race nor gender is.660 Despite its impact on personality and viewpoint,
birth order shows up nowhere in hiring or university admissions timetables.
Foreign language ability is another forgotten factor. Although failure to
accommodate linguistic difference has been recognized as a civil rights violation
for nearly a quarter-century, 661 the literature on educational affirmative action
scarcely mentions this form of diversity. The oversight is all the more
surprising in light of the growing evidence that human genetics more closely
tracks language groups than any of the traditional measures of race. 662 To my
knowledge, no program for affirmative action in university admissions
explicitly gives preferential treatment to applicants who speak some language
besides English, either as a first or second language. Universities seem to be
deliberately ignoring the obvious overlap with membership in the Hispanic and
Asian-American categories. Membership in a favored racial group provides
conclusive evidence of cultural diversity. If anything, any effort to define Asian
identity through language may meet resistance from those who recognize just
how incoherent and fragile the Asian-American coalition really is.663
659 FRANK J. SuLLOWAY, BoRN TO REBEL: BiRTH ORDER, FAMILY DYNAMICs, AND
CREATIvE LnvEs 300 (1996).
660 Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted).
661 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (holding that the failure to provide
adequate instruction to Chinese-speaking schoolchildren violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); cf Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 354 (1991) ("[F]or certain ethnic
groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color,
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.").
662 See, e.g., Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Genes, Peoples and Languages, Sci. AM.,
Nov. 1991, at 104; Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza et al., Reconstruction of Human Evolution:
Bringing Together Genetic, Archaeological, and Linguistic Data, 85 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. 6002 (1988). "One interesting" implication of this research "is that what most people
think of as the Mongoloid or Oriental race on the basis of superficial facial features and skin
coloring may have no biological reality." PNKER, supra note 330, at 257. In humanity's
linguistically informed "genetic family tree, northeast Asians such as Siberians, Japanese, and
Koreans are more similar to Europeans than to southeast Asians such as Chinese and Thai."
Id.
663 Compare Chen, Unloving, supra note 35, at 157 (recounting how I responded to an
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Perhaps all this simply goes to show that affirmative action is nothing more
than the last of many legal reactions to the great black migration, by far the
most important demographic change in America before 1965.664 In other
words, affirmative action is a reaction to the great demographic upheaval of the
last generation. The real demographic change of the last third of the century has
been immigration and the dramatic explosion in foreign-born members of the
U.S. population. Immigration and different rates of reproduction suggest that
Hispanics of all races will outnumber non-Hispanic blacks in this country by
2005.665 The 2000 Census, in other words, will be the last one in which the
black population will be the largest minority bloc in America. We are rapidly
moving beyond affirmative action's original black/white paradigm, a paradigm
too rigid to respond to sweeping demographic revolution.
E. A Dirge That Is Murmured Around the Lowly Grave 666
Of its own accord, mere insignificance would be forgivable. Affirmative
action might waste law professors' time, but society is arguably better off for
that. But in light of far more pressing social priorities and, yes, the power of
legal academics to alleviate these tragedies, the obsession with affirmative
action and its false vision of diversity deserves harsh censure. In a word,
diversity hurts because it diverts.
1. The Wages of Crying Wolf
Extinction is forever. Affirmative action should not be. Short of forcible
judicial intervention, however, no such end looms. "Affirmative action today,
affirmative action tomorrow, affirmative action forever." Such is the battle cry
in today's schoolhouse door.
Overblown rhetoric aside, the stakes in the affirmative action debate are
uncomfortable inquiry into Asian-American political identity by converting the "English-
language interrogation into a Taiwanese-language dialogue") with Gotanda, supra note 155, at
1601 (criticizing my retreat into "Taiwanese ethnicity" at the expense of a larger Asian-
American racial identity and my effort "to shut out non-Taiwanese through the exclusivity of
a 'foreign' language").
664 See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PRoMrsED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).
665 See Steven A. Holmes, Black Populace Nearly Equaled by Hispanic, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1998, at A13.
666 NANCI GRIF=rH, Hard iues Come Again No More, on OTHER VOICES, Too (A
TRIP BACK TO BOUNTFuL) (Electra 1998) (performing a version of this Stephen Foster
classic).
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relatively trivial. 667 The loss of racial diversity in higher education is blamed on
excessive reliance on standardized tests and other supposedly "quantitative"
measures of preparedness. But if test scores and grade point averages are
admissions office tools of convenience used to weed out weaker applicants of
all races, colors, and creeds, "either the [standardized test] says something
meaningful about all aspiring ... students..., or [a] school's admissions
officers had better explain why they use the test at all. "668 Questions of
consistency aside, marginal shortcomings by well-intentioned educators in
defining or gauging the notion of academic merit barely warrant the sort of
opprobrium that should be reserved for conscious acts of overhunting and
habitat destruction-or for overtly racist acts.
In other words, the entire debate over educational affirmative action turns
not on access as such to higher education, but rather on marginal differences.
Nearly three decades ago, before Bakke, even before DeFunis, prescient
scholars argued that race-conscious admissions would merely steer some black
students toward stronger schools without substantially affecting the total number
of blacks in higher education. 669 As the sun threatens to set on affirmative
action, we will witness little more than the reverse. This "redistribution of
minority students down the educational pecking order" poses a "cognizable but
hardly unbearable disturbance." 670 Only a quarter of American universities are
selective enough to contemplate affirmative action; the remainder admit all or
nearly all applicants and will remain bastions of access to higher education no
matter what fate befalls Bakke.671
What a colossal waste this fixation has been. Our focus has been misguided
all along. Rodriguez,672 handed down in the same year as Congress passed the
Endangered Species Act, was a far more significant setback for educational
equity than any outcome in Bakke ever could have been. As our eyes were
diverted to the 1977 Term's second-and less significant-diversity case, our
eyes have likewise focused on one of the less significant educational decisions
in the Supreme Court's case law.
667 See generally Farber, supra note 25, at 912 (claiming the "decreasing significance of
affinnative action").
668 Chen, supra note 21, at 1149.
669 See THoMAs SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYr=s AND TRAGEDIES (1972); Clyde
W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U. TOL.
L. REv. 377.
670 Bloom, supra note 84, at 62.
671 See DEREK BOK & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RivER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLUEGE AND UNivERsrrY ADMISSON (1998).
672 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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A dirge, then, for the forgotten victims, for the worthy causes obscured by
the affirmative action debate and weakened by the resulting diversion of
political energy and material resources: 673
While we seek mirth and beauty and music light and gay
There are frail forns fainting at the door
Though their voices are silent, their pleading looks will say;
Oh, hard times come again no more.674
What we are seeing in undergraduate and law school admissions is a
disappointment of the constitutional goal of avoiding a generation of
illiterates. 675 Public schools play a supremely important role "in the preparation
of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values
on which our society rests." 676 With Dowell,677 Freeman,678 and the Missouri
v. Jenkins679 litigation, the Brown era has come to an end, and clinging to some
variant of Bakke is a sorry substitute. "[I]lliteracy is a crime against humanity,
for we are the only creatures who have the Word, and therefore implicit in our
human condition is the right to read and write, and to create and enjoy the texts
of the imagination." 680 Without the Word there can be no Culture, no Law-
nothing of human value and no civilized means by which to protect it. These
luxuries emerge only after human communities "become adept ... at creating
and categorizing mental representations" of wealth-building and esthetically
pleasing activities. 681
I have a modest proposal. Perhaps we can agree to end affirmative action
673 See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 375
(1992) (arguing that the overstating of the problems of racial minorities has compounded
neglect of gender discrimination).
674 GRwFFH, supra note 666.
675 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 241 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[I]t hardly
can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a
subclass of illiterate persons.").
676 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). See generally Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 131 (1995)
(outlining the contours of an education that will produce "republican citizenship").
677 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
678 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
679 515 U.S. 70 (1995); 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
680 Nadine Gordimer, Dare to Dream of Eradicating Poverty, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1,
1998, at A13.
681 Antonio R. Damasio & Hanna Damasio, Brain and Language, Sci. AM., Sept.
1992, at 88, 89.
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now and forever in exchange for a binding national commitment to educational
equity at primary and secondary levels. No price is too great. Marvel "at what
every kid can do when he learns A to Z," how young appetites whetted early
and often will grow to "devour every one of those books in the Tower of
Knowledge. '682 Let the wailing and gnashing of teeth begin. Taxes will be
raised and resources shifted from the rich and the bourgeois to the poor.
2. Exit the Dragon
I regret having called affirmative action a "bourgeois boondoggle." 683 Not
that the practice itself is effective, for it is not.684 Rather, I regret failing to
deliver a harsher blow to the attention devoted to affirmative action. The
volume of scholarship devoted to this subject is a disgrace, and I am ashamed to
admit my complicity in the overkill. The energy lavished in defense of race-
conscious university admissions rather than deeper questions of distributive
justice is insulting and offensive. Within the admittedly limited world of legal
scholarship, it is hard to imagine a more ridiculous misallocation of scarce
resources than the amount of ink currently dedicated to this subject, especially
when the only issue at stake is the marginal difference between a seat at an elite
school and a seat at a somewhat less elite school. Achieving precise
demographic balance in elite law schools is an extravagance in a society torn by
abiding structural inequality attributable to factors including, but transcending,
race. In a word, it is scandalous to treat disappointed professors and students as
"the wretched of the earth" while ignoring the concerns of those "who live in
the streets and beg for scraps of garbage to eat."685
After this diatribe, I have no choice but to renounce affirmative action
scholarship. And so I do. Henceforth I shall write no article respecting the
establishment of affirmative action, or addressing individuals' freedom
therefrom. Having learned first-hand the perils of dissenting on matters of race,
however, I must reserve the right to defend myself.686 I can unflinchingly
682 10,000 MANACS, Cheny Tree, on IN MY TRME (Electra/Aslyum 1987).
683 Chen, supra note 10, at 1893.
684 See CAR ER, supra note 435, at 71-72 (criticizing affirmative action as "racial
justice on the cheap"); WA.w JuLIus WI-soN, TEE DECLINING SIGNImCANCE OF RACE 110
(1978) (criticizing the attention directed to affirmative action as a relatively elite concern);
WniJAm JuLIus WILSON, T)H TauLY DISADvANTAGED 115-16 (1987) (finding that
affirmative action has primarily benefited members of the middle class rather than the
underclass).
685 Graber, supra note 161, at 818.
686 See Chen, Unloving, supra note 35, at 145; Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant,
supra note 35, at 1612.
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promise that anything I write on affirmative action will be narrowly tailored
toward accomplishing a compelling scholarly objective. We scholars should
withstand the same sort of strict scrutiny that affirmative action itself must
endure after Adarand.687 Short of meeting this lofty standard, we should
confine ourselves to writing articles on things that really matter, like the price
of milk.688
F. The Destiny of Species
I quit this field with no regrets. Eventually the affirmative action problem
will go away on its own. Indeed, we may actually live long enough to witness
the withering away of the racialist state. In the long run we are all multiracial.
No respectable scientist today defines race in biological terms or defends
anyone who does. Genetic variability within any putative race-that is,
differences between members of that race-overwhelms any differences
between the races as such.689 Thanks to the interbreeding that unites Homo
sapiens as a species, "the phenotypical characteristics we traditionally associate
with particular 'races' are not quanta of racial identity but infinitely modulated
characteristics which further shade into each other with each successive
[reproductive] union. '' 690 Yet the multiculturalist movement effectively assumes
that "something in [students'] blood or their race memory or in their cultural
687 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
688 Compare Chen, supra note 273, at 860-62 (describing lower food prices as a policy
imperative consistent with widely shared notions of distributive justice) with West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 n.18 (1994) (observing that 2Q per quart in
income support for dairy farmers was unlikely to stir consumer opposition) and Scott Kilman,
Why the Price of Milk Depends on the Distance from Eau Claire, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1991, at Al ("Milk is sort of like the international gold system .... Only a handful of people
claim to understand it, and most of them are lying."). See generally Jim Chen, The Potable
Constitution, 15 CoNsr. COMMENTARY 1 (1998) (uncovering the unsung constitutional
significance of cases involving liquor, beer, wine, and milk). In other words, governmental
abuse is most likely whenever "the average consumer" or the average voter "has no incentive
to become informed about [a contested] program, let alone to lobby against it." Daniel A.
Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1565, 1571 (1995). This
sort of red flag should be inviting massive amounts of legal scholarship. By and large, it does
not. And that is disgraceful.
689 See, e.g., Walter F. Bodmer & Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Intelligence and Race,
Sci. AM., Oct. 1970, at 19-29; John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, On the Universality of
Human Nature and the Uniqueness of the Individual: The Role of Genetics and Adqptation, 58
J. PERsoNA=TY 17, 35 (1990).
690 Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1239 (1994).
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DNA defines who they are and what they may achieve. '691
To be sure, the obsession with race will not readily fade. "Of all ties, the
ties of blood are strongest." 692 Adoptive parents do and perhaps always will
yearn for some visible genetic link to the children they adopt.693 But the tide is
turning against race, and irretrievably so. Exogamy is booming. 694 It is the rare
and pessimistic naysayer who stresses how many white Americans are married
to other whites. 695 Yet in 1990, almost ten million persons indicated "other"
when the Census Bureau asked for their race696-and this despite strident
official efforts to confine respondents to the five standard categories. 697 The
Bureau's resistance to giving individuals "the option of refusal" or "the choice
of more than one [racial] category" leaves "no doubt about the [government's]
intent and effort to enforce racial classification and quotas." 698 The government
has partially relented; beginning in 2000, individuals of mixed-race
backgrounds will be allowed to check more than one box even though they will
be barred from describing themselves as "multiracial." 699 We have not
witnessed the end of racism or even of racial classifications, but we may be
witnessing the beginning of the end. Race-conscious programs can last only as
long as their underlying racial categories endure. The coming wave of racial
confusion spells welcome doom for race in American public life.700
691 Diane Ravitch, Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 59 AM. SCHOLAR 337, 341
(1990).
692 BERTOLT BRECHT, ThE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRcLE, in SEvEN PLAYs 495, 578 (Eric
Bentley ed., 1961).
693 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cmi. L. REv. 209 (1995).
694 See Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Affirmative Action and
Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHno ST. L.J. 697, 728 n.159 (1998).
695 See Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the
Dream That is America, 23 HASnNGs CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1124 (1996).
696 See Kenneth Payson, Comment, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15
and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1261 (1996).
697 See Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics &
Administrative Reporting, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260 (1978).
698 Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998).
699 See Office of Management and Budget, Revisions to the Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,786 (Oct. 30,
1997); see also Christine B. I-Eckman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MicH. L. REv. 1161, 1187-1202 (1997)
(reviewing proposals to add a multiracial category to the Census).
700 C Payson, supra note 696, at 1288 (rejecting the notion of official colorblindness
but admitting that the intractable nature of tracking multiracial individuals may lead in that
direction).
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VII. THE TWIGHT OF THE IDOLS
I spun, I wove, I kept the house, I nursed the sick,
I made the garden, andfor holiday
Rambled over the fields where sang the larks,
And by Spoon River gathering many a shell,
And many aflower and medicinal weed-
Shouting to the wooded hills, singing to the green valleys ....
What is this I hear of sorrow and weariness,
Anger, discontent and drooping hopes?
Degenerate sons and daughters,
Life is too strongforyou-
It takes life to love Life. -Edgar Lee Masters701
What should a legal scholar say upon exiting any field, especially one as
intractable as this? Be honest. Get real. Be bold.
Be honest. Honesty really does remain the best policy. As matters stand,
honesty in discussions of affirmative action is in short supply. Affirmative
action has "always depended on secrecy and deceit"702-on the ignorance of
strangers, so to speak.70 3 To keep swallowing Bakke without examining its
central rationale condemns us all to suffer "the profound moral perversity of a
world" where "everything is pardoned in advance and therefore everything
cynically permitted."7 °4 Bakke simply does not emerge unscathed from a
critical comparison with cognate forms of diversity. The same defects that
doomed the role model theory of affirmative action-"lack of substantiation and
a well-nigh unlimited reach"-should doom the diversity-based variant as
well.705 The role model rationale is "a very big lie: a whopper."706 So is the
diversity rationale. Oh, the mendacity!707
If affirmative action is to survive, its defenders must be more honest.
"[Sleparat[ing] the concept of diversity from affirmative action" would make a
701 EIxAR LEE MASm, Lucinda Matlock, in SPOON RrvaR A'rlOLOGY 295, 295
(John E. Hallwas ed., Univ. of Il. Press 1992) (1915).
702 Greve, supra note 246, at 16.
703  TNNESSEE WnIUAMS, A SRErrcAR NAMED DEssRE 102-03 (1947) ("I have
always depended on the kindness of strangers.").
7O4 KuNDEPA, supra note 1, at 4.
705 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 949
(1997).
706 Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Realty
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MlcH. L. REv. 1222, 1228 (1991).
707 See TENNESSEE WnLLAMS, CAT ON A HOT TIN ROOF 108-15 (1955).
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good start.708 "Affirmative action is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for diversity, and the diversity" that Bakke envisioned "goes beyond affirmative
action categories." 709 Any institution relying on Bakke's diversity rationale
must assure "the public that the institution [is] living within the law rather than
surreptitiously evading it.'' 710 This means publishing extensive, brutally honest
"average grade point and standardized test scores for [all] groups." 711 If the
price of honesty is too dear, then racial preferences deserve to die.712
Get real. If affirmative action ended tomorrow, the world would not. There
is no blunter way to say this.
Be bold. Polemics lose their power once their authors speak from positions
of absolute security. Such is the rhetorically enervating effect of tenure.713 Still,
I beg you: "For believe me: The secret for harvesting from existence the
greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is- to live dangerously! "714
One of the hidden virtues of the California Regents' vote to terminate
affirmative action, Proposition 209, and the Hopwood decision is that we will
now experience political diversity in a sense that would have pleased Louis
Brandeis. California and Texas will serve as "laboratories of democracy"; 715
we shall be able to compare their experiences after affirmative action with those
of states who have yet to abandon race-based admissions. We thus return to the
original meaning of Epluribus unm,7 16 to the original meaning of "diversity"
in American law.717 Unlike their counterparts in biology, specialists in
educational diversity have fifty-one publicly supported proving grounds, plus an
even greater variety of privately owned laboratories. This is a far cry from that
lament of environmentalists everywhere, "One planet, one experiment." 718
708 Welch & Grubl, supra note 694, at 730.
709 Id.
710 Bloom, supra note 84, at 68.
711 Id. at 69.
712 See id. at 71.
713 See Chen, supra note 688, at 1.
714 FRIEDRICH NIEIZsCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 228 (Walter Kauflnann trans., 1974)
(1882).
715 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See generally Farber, supra note 438.
716 C. ARTHUR M. SCEINGER, JR., THE DISUNING OF AMERICA: REFIECTONS ON
A MuLTIcu=UAL SocIETy 2 (1991) (decrying the "cult of ethnicity" that "belittles wuun
and glorifies pluribus").
717 C. U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 1 (permitting federal jurisdiction to controversies between
citizens of different states); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (exercising such diversity jurisdiction).
718 WILSON, supra note 131, at 182; cf Norman Myers, Tropical Forests and Their
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Affirmative action is nothing but an experiment, "as all life is an
experiment. '719 It is time to try something else. Ah, "[i]f we would guide by
the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."720
Species: Going, Going... ?, in BIoDivERsrrY, supra note 133, at 32 ("[W]e are conducting
an irreversible experiment on a global scale with Earth's stock of species.").
719 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
720 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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